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This monograph is about welfare (well-being) and its relation to social
policy. Thus we shall be interested in the concept of welfare, the way in
which concepts of welfare have been incorporated into social policies, how
social welfare could be measured, and so on.
The subtitle ))A study in policy science>) has been given, because the
problem of welfare and its relationship to social policy is one of the central
questions of the »new>) science of policy (or policy sciences, as Yehezkel
Dror prefers to call it). It has also been given this subtitle to emphasize
that we shall be occupied with problems normally belonging to many dif-
ferent disciplines.
In Welfare Theory and Social Policy, we shall thus cover problems ranging
from needs to decision strategies, with the primary interest, or the leading
thought of the monograph being in an attempt to see in which ways the
concept of welfare could be utilized in policy.
In this context, I shall refrain from more practical suggestions, these
being relegated to later and shorter papers, and instead, concentrate on
an attempt to form a general framework for such ensuing endeavors.
This character of the monograph will mean, primarily, that I shall
explore many different fields, theories, and so on, and secondly, that
many problems must be left to very scant attention. Thus the monograph
will abound with statements of the type: this is a problem we shall not
go into... I hope this shall be understood as necessitated by the limi-
tations of time and space. It is however necessary to attempt to make
a total analysis even with scant resources, as this is exactly what is missing.1
However, the choice of the problems to be analyzed is decidedly #sub-
jective# and certainly does not give a complete picture of the field. On the
1 C. Wright Mills (1959: 142) has very aptly described the conception of this monograph in
a statement about the unity of social sciences: »To state and solve any one of the significant
problems of our period requires a selection of materials, conceptions and methods from
more than any one of these several disciplines. A social scientist need not »master the field»
in order to be familiar enough with its materials and perspectives to use them in clarifying
the problems that concern him. It is in terms of such topical »problems» rather than in ac-
cordance with academic boundaries that specialization ought to occur. This, it seems to me
is now happening.» See also Science, Growth and Society: 57 for the same emphasis.
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other hand, it should be emphasized that there is no pre-existing con-
ception of the whole ))field)); in fact, there is no agreement about the field
at all.
The outline of the monograph will be as follows: First I will analyze
the concept of policy science and policy, and its relation to the problems
of welfare, followed by an analysis of the problem of rationality and goals.
After this I will go into the concept of welfare itself. Thereafter, I will
investigate some of the best known and most explored fields of welfare
theory)), namely those of welfare economics and the Arrow theorem. But
to welfare theory belong also the concepts of level of living and social
indicators, which are dealt with together. This brings to a close the ques-
tion of welfare analysis proper.
I shall conclude the monograph with a lengthy analysis of the general
problem of social control and guidance. In this we shall seek insights into
what is missing, or wrong, in the approaches analysed previously. This
chapter will also include a statement of how to link welfare, in general
terms, to the system of social decision-making, to conscious social control.
Thus I shall end with what I hope is a rather broad view of the subject
and thus related to the policy science point of view of the first chapter.
2. Policy Science and Social Policy
Lately there have been rudiments of a )mew)) ))science)) growing out of the
elaborate tangle of politics, science, application, social decision-making,
and so on. This ))science)) has been called policy science, a name coined in
a book by Lerner and Lasswell (1951), and after a quiet period suddenly
adopted by many researchers working with similar problems.'
Of course the idea of a policy science is as old as social science itself.
If we wished, we could go back to the classical economists, (see 1Vryrdal
1971: chapter 1) to Bentham, More, and certainly Plato for the origin
and development of these ideas. Mannheim (1936: 109), for instance,
when speaking about a science of politics, was very obviously alluding
to what now is meant by policy science. In this context, then, we can
definitely speak of ideas already existent, but adopted into more general
1 Dror (1968, 1970: 103, 1971a, b,), Bauer-Gergen (1968), Etzioni (1971: 11), Ranney (1968).
I shall not take up the history of policy science. But it should be mentioned that, for instance,
Comte and Saint-Simon were quite near the policy science tradition, as was Destutt de Tracy.
A more recent approach that borders on policy science is so-called praxeology (or praxiology),
and especially its Polish version. Its subject matter is more general, but the approach is
comparable. Some of the historical origins of praxeology seem also highly relevant for policy
science, especially those of Bogdanov, who is primarily considered an administrative science
man, and Slutski (see Kotarbinski (1965) and Zielenewski (1971)).
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use only after they have become socially usable through the development
of the society.
But long before the concept of ))policy science)) was developed in the
United States there had already existed a rather similar type of science
in certain European countries, especially in Germany and the Scandinavian
countries. This was the science of Sozialpolitik (social policy, sosiaali-
politiikka) first developed by the famous ))Verein fur Sozialpolitik)) (foun-
ded in 1872).
The 'Sozialpolitik' of the Verein fur Sozialpolitik was originally con-
gruent with current usage of policy science.' Later it degenerated into
a 'science' of the administration of the old, sick, unemployed, and in the
most promising case, of the poor in general. 2 This meant doing research
about the problems of the 'risk' groups of society, but little else. Only
very lately has there been some interest in returning to the old problem
of guiding the society — of making policy. The development of policy
science in the United States is in most respects in the same situation as
in Europe. Historically, the origins of American policy science grew out
of an attempt to integrate different areas of science and to put them at
the service of the decision-maker for public policy-making and in many
respects constitutes a continuance of the tradition of social engineering.
Although, on the other hand, the European variant of policy science
developed under the pressure of some burning social problems (die Arbeiter-
frage) (see e.g., Shils 1969: 36), both traditions have essentially the same
content. The only difference is in that they respond to the same problems
in different conditions. While the problems of Sozialpolitik were connected
with the adaptation and reformation of the developing capitalism of the
nineteenth century, the problem of the 'policy science' of the 50's and
60's is to adapt and reform the ripened version of this same capitalism.
(See here especially Waris 1966: 15 and 31-35, Nieminen 1955: 19-20,
Kuusi 1964).
1 See Nieminen (1955: 46-47), Ringer (1969: 146-149). My colleague Risto Erasaari has
pointed out to me that in a certain sense policy science and Sozialpolitik are not connected
at all. It is obvious that there are differences: but having in mind the general functions of
social policy in the 1880's it seems to me that it quite well compares with the general intended
function of policy sciences now, presenting itself as solutions to the most pressing problems
of society, and seeing the problem from the point of view of public decision makers.
2 It is of interest to note that Max Weber, a member of the Verein, had much to do with
with this degeneration. The famous Werturteilstreit was concerned with precisely this ques-
tion of the existence of a policy science. From the point of view of Weber and some other
younger members of the Society, such a science could not, and should not, exist. Later this
view prevailed, and sozialpolitik, as policy science, faded out of existence (see for instance
Myrdal (1971: x, 12-13), about Weber's standpoint see Gustafsson (1971: Chapter 1, esp.
pp. 31-36) and Ringer (1969: 152-158, 161-162).
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While the theorists of sozialpolitik and social policy previously spoke
openly about the necessity of saving capitalism, of representing the interests
of capitalism against the interests of the worker (and of trying to integrate
the workers into the society), their later colleagues have used more euphem-
istic expressions, describing social policy as a science for the good of
all people, on the basis that 'class distinctions have disappeared', and
so on.1
In this respect, the American policy scientists have probably surpassed
their European colleagues. Especially if one defines public policy-making
in terms of its ends, it is easy to succumb to euphemisms along the lines
of well-being for all citizens, etc. But in a concrete analysis one must
determine as well whether the means available are such that the ends
given are practically attainable. This is something that theorists of social
policy very rarely do.
But what especially European social policy has been lacking is a theor-
etical background, an attempt to develop a science instead of merely carry
out lines of practical research. 2
 And it is here that the concept of policy
science is so important; social policy needs precisely the more general
type of theoretical approach at which too few attempts have thus far been
made.
It is necessary to point out — contrary to the opinions of most prac-
titioners of policy science — what policy science, the general theory of
public policy-making, is not. It is not, and cannot be, an attempt to define
generally what a policy-maker should do in any circumstances. 3 It is not
a universal solution — a panacea for all the problems of society — as some
of the more optimistic policy scientists seem to think, and finally it should
not be unaware of the limitations of public policy-making.
These are precisely the points that have been completely neglected in
the American version of policy science, where the social prerequisites of
1 See Dror (1971: a), Nieminen (1955: 53 — 55, 71— 74), Waris (1966: 31— 32). Waris (1966: 15)
describes the social policy point of view as follows: »Before the Second World War, after
internal strife, the Finnish worker movement had in practice rejected the direct Marxist-
revolutionary program and the Utopian-idealistic programlessness for social reformatory
evolution and development. The social policy point of view had won also in the second round.»
According to Lasswell. *The continuing crisis of national security in which we live calls
for the most efficient use of manpower, facilities and resources of the American people.»
Lasswell 1951: 3).
Also Dror (1971a: 53) represents a rather conservative view on the nature of policy science.
See also Kalenski — Mocek — 'Awe (1971: 175 — 177).
2 Although it should be emphasized that the German developers of sozialpolitik were often
extremely theoretical and abstract in their analyses.
3 As Dror (1968: 241 et seq.) seems to conceive it: a science about which the socialists and the
bourgeois scientists can agree.
COMMENTATIONES SCIENTIARUM SOCIALIUM 4
	 11
a policy have mainly been thought to consist of prevailing attitudes and
norms, if any restrictions at all have been mentioned.1
A construction of the nature of policy science must be divided into two
main stages: the problem of public policy-making or social policy, and the
problems of what constitutes a comprehensive, theoretical analysis of that
subject-matter (see also Dror 1970: 105; 1968: 160).
For the present we shall be interested only in public policy-making
(or social policy) and not in policy-making in general. This will lead to
the elimination of some central problems of the nature of public policy-
making and the factors affecting it.
2.1. Definitions of Policy
The intuitive conception of policy would be something like ))a, set of prin-
ciples about action)). This comes out in proverbs like amnesty is the best
policy)). 2 The famous definition by Lasswell and Kaplan (1950: 71): Policy
is a projected program of goal values and practices)), is clearly closely
related to this intuitive conception (see also Bauer 1968: 2). But for our
purpose this is a rather restrictive definition. It disregards wholly the
policy-making aspect of policy which we want to include into the term.
Lasswell and Kaplan, for example, distinguish the policy process from
policy proper and define it in a way which makes it synonymic for policy-
making (1950: 71). For obvious reasons this is avoided here: what would
a policy science be where policy is only a set of principles? We would rather
see policy as the main concept, comprising both principles and policy-
making in the widest sense.3
Freeman and Sherwood (1970: 2-3) list four different ways to define
social policy:
Dror (1968: 287 et seq.) Later, Dror has arrived at a slightly more sophisticated stand-
.
point, (1971a: 37-39).
2 Gil (1971: 4) speaks fittingly of the »mystery of social policies», by which he means that
nobody actually knows what social policies are even if the term is used quite widely. See also
Popper (1966: 139) about the principle aspect of social policy.
3 As a matter of curiosity it could be mentioned here that Dror (1971b: 100-101) presents
a method for the definition and analysis of policy first developed by Louis Guttman in several
articles, beginning from 1954. This method is exactly the same as that used by this author
in his previous work, »Hyvinvointi yhteiskuntapolitiikan tavoitteena» (Welfare as an objec-
tive of social policy).
This method, the use of Cartesian products of the subfield of a concept, and the analysis
of possible alternatives thus achieved (see Dror 1971b: 109, 116, Roos 1968: appendix 1),
is certainly quite simple, but yet a step forward from the coarse analysis of policies by their
subsectors. It might also be mentioned that Suppes (1966: 294) employs the same method
to study decision situations, i.e., a more general framework.
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The first is social policy as a philosophical concept. This I would trans-
late as policy science or social policy as a scientific concept.
The second definition refers to social policy as a product. Social policy
thus means the decisions that are made by policy makers. Therefore,
social policy would essentially be identical with a theory of public
decision-making.
The third definition describes social policy as a process. Freeman and
Sherwood mean specifically a fundamental process of stabilization and
self-regulation.
The fourth way of seeing social policy is as a framework for action.
In this sense social policy is both a process and a productl.
The most important distinction here is that between product and pro-
cess. If we define policy as the decisions of policy-makers, we are giving
up all the qualities of policies which are important (see next page). Policy
is not something that decision-makers stipulate; rather, it has certain
inherent requirements. This is best brought out by seeing policy as a pro-
cess, as a set of actions which fulfill certain basic requirements.
We would like to speak about policy as a course of action in which the
decision maker (whoever and whatever it is) attempts consciously to secure
a set of given goals or principles. In short: a conscious, co-ordinated course
of action. The question of consciousness is here the central one, as it as-
sumes the whole problem complex under which conditions the policy
makers are acting.
There is a temptation to define policy — as in decision theory — as
a sequence of actions where first goals are defined, then means are selected,
actions valued, and so on. 2 This is done by many policy theorists (see e.g.,
Dror 1968: 163-164). As Lindblom points out, dhis way of looking at
policy-making is useful for some purposes, but it tends to view policy-
making as though it were a product of one governing mind, which is clearly
not the case. It fails to evoke or suggest the distinctively political aspects
of policy making, its apparent disorder, and the consequent strikingly
different ways in which policies emerge» (Lindblom 1968: 4).
The decision-type models can be defended from the point of view of,
for example, a planner, because he needs a systematic sequence of steps
1 See also Salisbury (1968: 152-153), who distinguishes three meanings of policy:
Policy means authoritative or sanctioned decisions by public authorities;
policy means general questions and general decisions about these;
3. policy is a course of action within which one tries to realise a specific goal.
2 It should be noted that public policy can also be functionally divided into subsector8.
This is not done here because we think it is a rather fruitless procedure. And being the classic
mode of procedure in Scandinavia and Germany, it is a pretty well-exhausted alternative.
(See e.g., Nieminen 1955: 44; Waris 1969: 113).
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in which he can analyze a situation (see Drewnowski, et al. 1970: 4-5).
But as a point of departure for a theory about policy-making it is not
very useful because it overly abstracts the essential qualities of policy.
The most extensive Western definition of policy is probably that of
Yehezkel Dror (1968: 12), which is by no means original. Although in some
ways Dror's proposal is inferior to the majority of other definitions, it in
any case contains all the elements of policy that have been mentioned by
policy theorists (see e.g., Friedrich 1963: 79, Ranney 1968: 6-7, Van
Dyke 1968: 27, Bauer 1968: 2).
The Dror definition:
)>Public policy-making is a very complex, dynamic process whose various
components make different contributions to it. It decides major guide-
lines for action directed at the future, mainly by governmental organs.
These guidelines (policies) formally aim at achieving what is in the public
interest by the best possible means.#
On the basis of this definition, Dror then distinguishes twelve principal
characteristics of public policy-making. It should be noted that Dror has
chosen to use the term public policy-making which here is shortened to
policy. These components are as follows (Dror 1968: 12-16):
1. complexity, 2. dynamic process, 3. various components, 4. different
contributions of these components, 5. decision making, 6. which gives
main guidelines, 7. that concern action, 8. which is directed at the future,
9. mainly by governmental organs, 10. guidelines formally aim at achieving,
11. what is in the public interest, 12. by the best possible means.
Some of these components demand scrutiny. Dror emphasizes that
public policy-making is a species of decision-making along side other forms
of decision making like planning, and so forth. This is a valid point, to
which we will return.
That policy-making is a strategy for action has already been mentioned.
The interesting point in which Dror differs from other policy theorists is
in that he plays down the importance of objectives. He says that the
formal objective is general welfare (public interest) which should be reached
by the best possible means. But this is only a formal objective and may
have nothing to do with the actual objective. This a much more realistic
view than those of Ranney (1968) or Van Dyke (1968) who see objectives
as a very important part of the public policy-making process, or those
like Nieminen (1955: 43), who actually define policy in terms of its objec-
tives.
Gil (1970: 413, 1971) had also presented a very comprehensive definition
of social policy which is also of the #optimistic# type, in which it is believed
that practically everything can be achieved by way of social policy.
Here we reach an important point. Is there actually a policy in any
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other than a retrospective sense? This is not the place to analyze the laws
of motion of a capitalist state, but it should be rather clear that when
public policy is analyzed, a very important part of what constitutes policy
in a capitalist society is ignored. It is possible for public policy-makers to
make plans and plan policy, but it would be misleading to believe that
this is the actual policy observed. This is especially true when we discuss
objectives (see Nieminen 1955: 51-52).
There is an interesting dictum of Max Weber's about defining the state
which applies especially well for policy: the state must not be defined in
terms of what it does.' Essentially, what Dror's definition does is merely
to define policy in terms of what the policy makers should do. If one defined
policy with respect to what policy makers can do, it would be very meagre
indeed. Social policy is everything and nothing: there is a vast amount
of laws and measures that are called policy, but are these really an expres-
sion of any policy from any other standpoint than in a retrospective view,
in other words, what in our terminology is not policy at all? From a policy
science point of view, the interesting thing is to separate non-policy from
policy and try to analyze how policies could be pursued instead of non-
policies. But we should be aware that the existence of »real» policy in our
sense is very rare indeed.
In our terminology, a policy then is a set of actions attempting at
comprehensive, consistent and conscious control and guidance of the
society. 2
 We might here try to specify some of the additional requirements
for a policy in this sense.
From a social policy »proper» we could in the first place require that
it is »democratic», in the sense that it is related to the wishes of the people
and that the people can effectively control its realization.
1 See Runciman (1969: 35) where he also points out a mistake in the translation of Weber.
2 The question of whether policy can be uncontrolled and self — regulating is quite interesting.
In a private communication Hannu Uusitalo has argued for the view that, for instance,
the operation of a perfect market should be considered as policy. He is certainly correct in
pointing out that control cannot and should not be comprehensive. But in accordance with
my outlook, this means that policy cannot be comprehensive because policy hinges on control.
It is certainly a policy decision to #choose free markets» if it can be done under a choice situ-
ation. But this policy decision simultaneously implies the ceasing of making policies, as far
as the decision maker adheres to a perfect market.
The second problem mentioned by Uusitalo is that such a definition of policy would make
it impossible for policy science to analyze and compare situations in which the element of
market is involved. This I think is not true. Of course policy science is interested in the
consequences of policy, especially in uncontrolled, unexpected consequences. Thus it is
highly important to observe the consequences of a policy decision to utilize markets and
abandon control, and to then compare these with a situation in which control has been active.
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Secondly, we could require that objectives and functions of a policy
should be co-ordinated in the sense that they combine to produce the
desired result.
Third, we could require that it is #scientific*, in the sense that co-ordi-
nation and control are based on a scientific analysis, that is on a policy
science. Here we should not forget however, our first requirement: a true
scientific policy is never undemocratic.
Fourth, it should be obvious that social policies can never and should
never be comprehensive, in the sense that they cover all activities of the
people. Certainly in the society in which we live, social policies are only
a minor, if growing part of all social activity, and their influence in this
society is by no means central nor comprehensive. Even in such fields
where the public policy-makers are considered to have a monopoly, as for
instance in foreign policy, it is undoubtably questionable that they con-
stitute the only factors affecting resultant foreign policy.
The requirement for a democratic basis is a central problem of any
policy-making in a democratic society. In the following, it will be seen
that most attempts to utilize the concept of welfare in social policy actually
sidestep the issue of a truly democratic policy. Once the welfare of the
people can be assessed, policy can be pursued independent of whether
the people participate in it or not. This is certainly not the most desirable
case.
2.2. The Concept of Policy Science
What I have said above about the mon-existence)) of true social policy is
in one sense obvious: there would be no need for a policy science if one
would already know how to pursue proper policies. Thus the existence
of social policy and policy science are clearly interrelated. However, we
can have many different conceptions about policy science,' depending
upon our views about policies, concerning how science and policy should
be related, and so forth. The necessity and importance of policy science
is recognized; it is seen that we need a comprehensive theoretical approach,
a >mew» paradigm for the problems of policy making (see Dror 1971a: 28,
Etzioni 1971, Afanasyev 1971: 283, Boguslaw 1965: 51, and many others).
Some very general features of the policy-science approach are also agreed
upon, such as the interdisciplinary nature of policy science, and some of
the problems it should be concerned with. The agreement for the mean
1 Dror has here preferred the use of policy sciences although as a singular term, to emphasize
the multi-disciplinary, but concurrently unified nature of the policy sciences. I shall be
satisfied to indicate these qualities in the text, but to speak of policy science.
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time does not extend much further. Thus, we cannot speak about the
existence of a policy science, rather only about attempts to develop such
a discipline.
The most obvious approach to policy science is to conceive of it as
a science which simply studies the various aspects of policy-making prob-
lems. Such views have been presented by Lasswell (1951: 3 —4), Freeman-
Sherwood (1970: 1), and Gil (1970: 412) to mention a few. This, of cource,
does not say much about the actual content of policy science, which we
want to explore.
Dror (1968: 8) has described policy science as »the discipline that
searches for policy knowledge, that seeks general policy-issue knowledge
and policy-making knowledge and integrates them into distinct study».
Later he has termed these forms of knowledge as knowledge regarding
meta-direction and metacontrol, i.e., knowledge regarding direction of
the environment and society, as well as individual-controlling and -directing
activities (see Dror 1971a: 4). This distinction between knowledge about
direction and metadirection is not particularly clear, but supposedly
Dror has wished to emphasize the nature of policy science as being very
abstractly concerned with the principles of good policy-making (ibid,:
51). Etzioni (1971: 8) in turn likens policy science to something in be-
tween basic and applied research, furnishing the strategy while basic
research furniches the theory, and applied research the tactics. In his
view policy science would be nearer practice than are the regular social
sciences, being more easily understandable to decision makers, and oper-
ating with concepts and knowledge not far removed from the observed
world and that experienced by the policy maker». (Etzioni 1971: 11.)
There would thus seem to be a difference between the views of Dror and
Etzioni; while the former seeks rather abstract knowledge and does not
specify how policy-makers should manage to profit from this knowledge,
Etzioni imagines policy science as a mediator between the sciences and
the policy-makers, as a process which distils practical conclusions from
the results of social sciences.
Dror's view is, on the other hand, much more traditional. He sees policy
science very simply as an attempt to transform the whole of the policy-
making process, and make it purely a matter of science. This is supported
by the fact that he envisions the interest of policy science centering mainly
around the stages of the decision-making process (see Dror 1970: 105).
It should be mentioned that also in the socialist countries there has
been a development of something akin to policy science, under the name
of »scientific control (or management) of society>> (see Afanasyev 1971,
Spirkin (undated): 239-240, Miller 1971, Urban 1970, Soviet Economic
Reform: 14-15). Particularly Afanasyev speaks very clearly of the need
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for a general theory of social management (1971: 283). According to this
view, policy science would be based on historical materialism, but as an
independent science would solve the problems of guiding the economic,
social and cultural processes (see also Urban 1970).
It seems to me that the existing Western policy science approaches,
although they have been presented with much fanfare and promises about
))revolutionary# development, are actually rather void of any new or useful
content.'- For instance, although Dror emphasizes very much the »revol-
utionary)) qualities of the policy science, he however does support some
very traditional notions about the nature of policy science. He has empha-
sized for instance that policy science is only interested in instrumental
knowledge, in the improvement of the quality, but not the substance of
policy-making (Dror 1968: 241, 1971a: 51). This is obviously nothing else
but simple separation of means and ends, the impossibility of which should
be one of the basic axioms of a viable policy science (see next chapter).
In addition some of his #revolutionary# notions, such as the combination
of tacit knowledge and scientific knowledge seem rather impractical and
unrealistic. Furthermore I do agree with the pessimistic notions of Bertram
Gross (1971: 292) and I. L. Horowitz (1967: 356-357) about the existing
approaches to policy science. But I would also like to emphasize that,
as the need for policy science grows in capitalistic societies, there certainly
will appear more fruitful and practical approaches. Thus it seems certain
that the policy sciences do have a future, and it is in this spirit that we
will explore the future areas of policy science.
In my view, the following aspects of policy science are critical to its
development: 1. its interdisciplinary nature, 2. its relationship to the
policy-making process and, 3. its relationship to the development of society,
i.e., the objective processes of society.
The interdisciplinary nature of the policy science has been emphasized
by all the students of policy science and related approaches (see, for instance,
Mannheim 1936: 111-112, Lasswell 1951: 3, Dror 1968: 241, 1970: 103,
Etzioni 1971). But there are, of course, differing views as to how policy
science should actually be constructed out of the existing disciplines.
It should be emphasized that there are many policy-science problems
not yet explored by any existing disciplines. I shall not at this time go
into the matter of the relationship between, say, political science, sociology,
or economics among one another and with policy science (see, for instance,
Mitchell 1969, Riker 1961, Runciman 1969, MacKenzie 1969, Barry 1970).
One interesting fact is that depending on the nature of the interdiscipli-
nary mix there are different alternative approaches which are all related
1 As for promises, see Dror (1970: 105; 1971a: preface, 51-52).
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to policy science. Such are, for instance, the new political economy»
approach by Mitchell (1969, see also Springer 1970: 9), the »sociological
school of political economy» developed by A. and J. Marchal (see Afanasyev
1971: 67), the »Systemic Planning» of Catanese and Steiss (1970), and many
others.
Depending on the various fields of interest inside policy science we shall
have a different >>interdisciplinary mix». For instance, in the field in which
we are interested, that of welfare theory, there are relevant developments
occuring in the areas of philosophy, economics, sociology, political science
and so on.
Dror has emphasized that although this interdisciplinary nature is
a necessity, it does not mean that policy sciences would be merely a >>super-
imposed term covering a broad set of studies, disciplines and professionals»
(1971a: 49), but that what it needs is a methodology of its own. 1 There are
many things which support this view. As our survey into the confines
of welfare economics will clearly show, the results are rather meagre if
we start from the normal assumptions of the economist and attempt to
develop a »positivistic» theory of welfare. And there are indeed many
a novel problem confronting the scientists who want to become policy
scientists.
One of these problems is the relationship of policy science to the policy-
making process. There are many different problems connected with this.
Should policy science be simply an attempt to reconstruct and analyze
scientifically what the policy-makers do, and then attempt, from the
policy-maker's standpoint, to make recommendations as how to improve
this process? Or should policy science assume a critical, more far-reaching
stance, and make an attempt to study the overall nature of the policy
and to be of active aid also to the objects of the policy-making, the people?
This question has been analyzed rather scantly in the context of policy
science.2
There is also the additional problem of who shall exercise control over
the policy-makers, and what is the role of policy science in this. I see one
of the main functions of policy science as the enlargening of possibilities
for self-control by the people themselves, through the understanding of
societal processes and their social consequences.
I shall return to these problems in the last chapter of this monograph,
1 By methodology I mean here simply the mrsenals of policy science, i.e., the different sets
of practical approaches that are useful. Therefore, what we need is not necessarily new meth-
ods, but rather the new combinations of old methods: compound methods.
2 Etzioni (1971) mentions that policy science should be ))criticak. Later, however, he empha-
sizes that policy science should see the world through the eyes of the policy-maker, which
makes its critical nature rather frail.
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where the conclusions of welfare theory relevant to policy science are
drawn.
The third critical aspect of policy science is its relationship to the devel-
opment of society. We cannot examine this aspect at all at the present
time. It is obviously related to the previous point, but it has a very great
significance of its own. In my opinion the developers of policy science
have been too little aware of this aspect, although they have continuously
emphasized that the burning problems of mankind necessitate the devel-
opment of policy science. It is possible to specify much more clearly the
exact nature of these burning problems which necessitate the development
of policy science, in the capitalist countries as well as in the socialist.
In socialist states, conscious social control is seen as a ))naturab necessity
(see for instance Afanasyev 1971, Glezerman 1969) but also in the capitalist
countries economic and social development has necessitated attempts at
conscious social control, one part of which is the development of policy
science.
3. Rationality and Goals
3.1. Forms of Rational Action
Problems of rationality and goals in policy-making are closely interrelated.
For policy to be rational (or, for that matter, policy at all) it must have
goals. Goals are thus an integral part of rationality. 1 Here we are especially
interested in social welfare as a goal. Ultimately this means that social
welfare shall of necessity be a criterion of social choice, and shall form the
central part of the social choice mechanism.
There are many alternative ways of making a social choice. Arrow
(1963: 1-2) distinguishes only four, (namely voting, the market mechanism,
1 But this is not true for all activities. In a study of the thought of the Greek philosophers
on goals, chance and necessity, Hintikka (1964: 66, 70) remarks that for the Greeks it seemed
an impossibility to imagine that rational activity could exist without goals. Aristotle, however,
already saw that not all rational activity need have a goal. There are many perfectly rational
activities which can be considered to be undertaken merely for the sake of activity, with
no external goal in mind. But a policy is never an activity for activity's sake; it needs to
have a definite goal. Barry (1970: 10) has claimed that the idea of rationality in the sense
of pursuing goals rationally originates with Bentham, and that the older, competing tradition
which he calls conservative, was not interested in goal pursuit.
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dictatorship, and convention) claiming that in a capitalist democracy
only the first two are available. Herder-Dorneich (1965: 44) accept group
bargaining (collective bargaining, gruppenverhandlungen) in addition to
these. It is obvious that these are not by far the only methods. Barry
(1965: 85 — 90) mentions altogether seven, namely combat, bargaining,
discussion on merits, (the difference between these two being that in the
former, the result is a compromise not representing anyone's opinion, while
in the latter, the parties change opinions to reach a final solution) voting,
change, competition and authoritative determination, where the decision
is delegated to another party. Barry criticizes the inclusion of the market
mechanism as a procedure for social choice. Depending on the market
structure, we have a completely automatic decision reached through the
intercourse of sellers and buyers concerning both the quality and quantity
of a product. But if the markets are concentrated, allowing either the seller
or the buyer an oligopolistic or monopolistic position, we can speak of
other types of market choice: types of choice which can be likened to
»dictatorship or to choice by one or a few, which, however, is not authori-
tative determination. The fourth type of choice suggested by Arrow,
that of convention, is usually only a form of choice included in other types
of social choice. Convention can be reached by bargaining, result from
dictatorship, and so on. The methods of social choice are important when
we analyze the use of welfare in social policy. It should be obvious that
in all the methods mentioned here, we can use welfare as a criterion of
choice. Depending on the method of choice, one may be interested in the
welfare of a certain group, in the welfare of the people or, if we have a
completely atomistic decision method, every decision-maker is only inter-
ested in his own welfare. The only exception to this is that decision-making
by chance is not relevant in welfare considerations. One could also include
decision-making by tradition, which is merely a variant of the status quo,
i.e., no social choice at all. Following tradition is typical of situations in
which no change is wished. We can conceive of decisions where tradition
determines a revolutionary decision but these are certainly rare.
Therefore, for the purposes of welfare theory it is interesting also to
inquire who are making the actual decisions? Can we claim that it is
the people and the people alone? Or is it the decision-makers who do it
for the people (or for some segments of the population), or must we recog-
nize simply one group which makes decisions for itself, with all others
simply ignored? The existing decision-making mechanisms in capitalist
states are obviously modifications of the latter system. The Klecision-makers>>
in the society are partially people who make decisions simply in the interests
of themselves or for a very restricted group, and partially people who
are supposed to make the decisions for the entire nation. But the first
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possibility, that of the people making decisions for themselves, is very
rare and extends to few cases, and is therefore the starting point of our
analysis. We are interested in public policy-makers, most of whom are
supposed to make decisions in the interests of the whole people. The central
question then is how are they supposed to determine what are the interests
of the people, i.e., what kinds of decision-making strategies may they
resort to? This problem has received very widespread attention.
In a very general sense, the decision-makers are rational if they, in
making decisions, do this on the basis of fulfilling certain goals. The con-
cept of rationality in policy-making is a very problematic one. There are
those who see rationality in a restricted sense and thus present alternative
strategies of decision-making. Here I shall follow the Habermas (1971: 55)
dictum that rationalization is a fundamental requirement of scientific
control, and of a scientific approach to decision-making. But this does
not free us from the problem of analyzing rationality itself.'
Rationality may be defined in many different ways. The classical dis-
tinction is that between formal, functional or instrumental and substan-
tive rationality (see Weber 1966: 185, Mannheim 1940: 52-53, Etzioni
1968a: 254). There are slight differences in the definitions of formal, func-
tional, or instrumental rationality, but roughly they mean that actions
are taken in order to secure given ends. Mannheim emphasizes that we may
have a process of actions, a chain which must lead to a certain goal, while
Weber emphasizes the calculability of formal rationality. The main idea
is that whatever the goals, a formally rational decision-maker will try to
achieve them to a maximum degree with minimal effort. Substantive ration-
ality — or comprehensive rationality (Etzioni) — or action rationality
(Gross 1971: 293) on the other hand, means a broader concept of rational-
ity, where not only the means but also the ends are considered. In other
words, we wish to assess rationality also in terms of the goals of some
endeavor. Now, the former concept is the one which figures in most
of the analyses of decision-making processes and strategies. In this we
are mainly interested in developing the best possible means to reach
some given ends (even Dror's idea of policy science seems to be based on
this idea).
However, from the point of view of welfare, it is the idea of substantive
»Whether it is a matter of rationalizing the production of goods, management and admin-
istration, construction of machine tools, roads or airplanes, or the manipulation of electoral,
consumer of leisure-time behaviour, the professional practice in question will always have
to assume the form of technical control over objectified processes>> (Habermas 1971: 55).
Thus, in order to use social welfare in societal guidance in a rational way we must be able
to analyze it as an 'objectified process' as a measurable phenomenon. It is evident that this
is not completely possible and should not be so. This will be analyzed in the following.
22	 J. P. Roos, Welfare Theory and Social Policy
rationality which is most relevant. We are interested in the nature of the
goals, not in the means to achieve the goals. And the interesting thing,
of course, is that while welfare analysis is supposed to be interested in
substantive rationality, the models (implicit or explicit) which it has
employed have traditionally been based on formal rationality!'
Of course there are differences even within the concept of substantive
rationality. For Etzioni, the concept of comprehensive rationality which
he employs, is definitely less broad than some of the concepts of substantive
rationality which cover essentially the idea of studying goals in many
other senses other than just their simultaneous consideration (see Etzioni
1968a: 260).
Now, we may ask whether rationality can be achieved spontaneously —
through individual actions in the market, or direct democratic processes —
or only through the actions of decision-makers, representing the society
as a whole. This is the question put by Dahrendorf (1968: 217-218),
although he is only interested in the market and the >>planh, or in social
action. Dahrendorf defines market rationality, as rationality which is
realized by the rational action of the individuals in the markets, and plan
rationality, as rationality realized through the actions of the collectivity,
society.
Actually we can distinguish many sorts of plan rationality, which
would make it much more attractive than market rationality, but as
Dahrendorf is primarily interested in showing that plan rationality is bad
and that market rationality is good, he presents only the worst alternative
within the scope of plan rationality. The essential quality of market ration-
ality is that intrinsic to it we find no conscious social choice and control
at all. Thus, it does not interest us in this context. It is obvious that social
choice through the market alone is not possible, even were all markets
perfect markets, which they are not.
What we are then interested in, is some form of plan rationality. Here
we can distinguish many possibilities from perfect direct democracy to
perfect one-man control (either delegated or not); but we can also discuss
the various alternative strategies within plan rationality.
There are various decision-making strategies suggested in the literature
of this field. The most general one, which figures especially in the presen-
tations of decision theory, is what Dror calls ))pure rationality policy-
1 See Braybrooke —Lindblom (1963: 12-13); Biderman (1966a: 70-71) has pointed out,
with reference to the Mannheimian distinction, that social indicators signify an attempt
to move from functional rationality to substantive rationality in the analysis of policies.
For emphasis on substantive rationality instead of mere formal rationality, see Gould
(1971: 16), Kaplan (1964: 57), Habermas (1971: 81), and Gross (1971: 293).
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making>>. This model is commonly presented in studies of planning, policy-
making, decision-making, and so on.'
The following components of the pure rationality model can be dis-
tinguished:
establishment of goals and of the utility function relating these goals
establishment of other values and resources
preparing a complete set of available alternative policies
preparing a complete set of valid predictions of the costs and benefits
of each alternative
calculation of the net benefit of each alternative
identification of the best alternative
If we assume that the decision-maker is not alone, i.e., he has competi-
tors or there are other decision-makers affecting his available alternatives,
we may specify additional prerequisites, such as the calculation power of
the decision-makers, and so on (see Churchman 1970: 112, Dror 1968: 132).
The essential characteristic of this pure rationality model is its com-
prehensiveness: it presumedly covers the whole decision-making situation.
Presented in the above form, it is also a formal rationality model: its goals
are essentially given (of course, it is possible to assume within the frame-
work of this model that the goal-searching stage fulfills the criteria of
substantive rationality), but it is probably fair to say that this model has
implicitly been connected with designated goals, the primary concern
being the search for alternative policies and their effects. Were this model
possible to construct in reality, we would not need anything else. It would
fulfill all our needs.
Now, much criticism has been directed against the pure rationality
model. It can easily be seen that it is an ))ideal>> model in the sense that
it can seldom, if never, be completely fulfilled. It has also been pointed
out that it is probably ineffective and often consumes an abundancy of
time and energy (see Boguslaw 1965, who presents a chess example about
the use of this pure rationality model in constructing chessplaying ma-
chines). In effect, pure rationality models are not possible as practical
policy-making strategies (see Etzioni 1968a: 260, Dror 1968: 133, Ozbekhan
1969: 119, Braybrooke —Lindblom 1963: 45). There have been an unbeliev-
able amount of alternatives suggested. We have strategic planning, dynamic
planning, optimal policy, and ameliorative policy, to name a few (Kassouf
1970: 85-86).
1 See Dror (1968: 132), Churchman (1970: 112), Rothenberg (1961: 5-6), TOrnqvist-Nord-
berg (1968: 11), Chernoff—Moses (1959: 10 --11), Tinbergen (1956), Ozbekhan (1969: 118),
Braybrooke —Lindblom (1963: 9). It should also be noted that sometimes it is not presented
as a strategy, but as a framework, but it is undoubtedly true that other strategies presented
here are not applicable to this framework, which is explicitly comprehensive.
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Most of the other alternatives have the characteristic that they are
»open» in some sense: i.e., they do not attempt to be complete and com-
prehensive. This means that systematics is also sacrificed in many of them.
This is driven to the extreme in the incrementalism model, which has been
developed by many outstanding students of the field. Etzioni (1968a:
268) mentions Myrdal, Dewey and Hume as its developers. The name has
probably been coined by Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963). 1 Briefly the
idea of the incremental strategy is that the decision-makers only resort
to 'small decisions' and we have a sequence of independent minor decisions
with no grand objectives nor major changes (see Braybrooke—Lindblom
1968: 78, Dror 1968: 143-147). It is based on the idea of »muddling through
elevated to the station of an ideal. 2 As Etzioni notes, the incrementalist
model is not interesting per se, but mainly because it has received wide
support as a solution to the problem of social decision-making (Etzioni
1968a: 273).
Here we encounter a phenomenon which seems rather common in
social science: that of necessity hailed as a virtue. In what follows we shall
see how welfare economists gave up the interpersonal comparability of
utility; primarily due to its impossibility, after which they noted that it
was actually theoretically more elegant and efficient to ignore inter-
personal comparison. Here we have in the incrementalist point of view,
an empty model for decision-making, hailed as the latest advance of science
in the study of social policy.
What is important here, however, is the fact that the incrementalist
strategy is not related to welfare at all. On the contrary, its developers
emphasize that within the scope of incrementalism such abstract prin-
ciples as social welfare are beyond consideration.
Incremental decisions are considered not to serve abstract welfare but
rather some concrete interests of the moment. It is also interesting to note
in this context, that the previously mentioned 'second best' argument
applies also to the incrementalist strategy. By incrementalist methods it
is not possible to arrive at optimal solutions, because each decision may
have a different impact if realized by itself, and not as a part of a complete
policy (see Baumol 1965: 30).
A combination of the incremental and comprehensive rationality models
has been devised by Etzioni (1968a: 282 et seq.) which he calls mixed scan-
ning strategy. In this strategy two types of decisions are distinguished:
contextuating or fundamental decisions, and bit decisions. Contextual
1 See also their earlier works; also the name of Popper (see Popper 1965) figures very notably
here.
2 See Lindblom (1959) who speaks of the sciences of muddling through.
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decisions are decisions which should be made on rationalist bases, while
bit decisions should be according to incrementalist principles. The pro-
cedure would be such that while the decision-maker makes chiefly bit de-
cisions, he is now and then required to check his actions by making con-
textuating decisions. That is, he simultaneously covers the field thoroughly-
and generally. (Etzioni draws an analogy to weather satellites as represen-
tative of mixed scanning.) According to Etzioni (1968a: 289) bit decisions
always reflect contextual choice, in which he is obviously wrong. This
would mean that decision-making is always conscious in the sense that it
has a deeper purpose. This certainly is not true for the greater part of
decision-making. In itself, the Etzioni model is certainly a more realistic
decision-making strategy as a simple disjointed in crementalistic model.
The *goodness)) of decision-making depends on how well we are able to apply
our kit) decisions to the fundamental policy we are following. There are
various alternatives for mixed scanning: we can have a #social-democratic))
model in which the decision-makers proclaim a set of lofty principles, which
he however ignores in his actual >>bit)) decision-making. Again we may
have radical strategies where the fundamental principle is so closely
adhered to that bit decisions are practically non-existent. Also pure
incrementalism, >>the professional politician policy-strategy)), where funda-
mental principles are unknown, is a special case of mixed scanning.
All of these strategies are, in our terminology, ))open)). They are not
complete nor comprehensive. They attempt to be realistic descriptions of
the working of the decision-maker.
On the other hand, we may have models which are comprehensive, but
much more complex than the simple pure rationality models. Such models
are the >>Human Action Model» by Ozbekhan, and the Drorian optimal
policy-making model. The Ozbekhan model (see Ozbekhan 1969: 118)
consists of the following characteristics: in it the decision-maker selects
values, invents objectives, defines goals, seeks norms, defines purpose; the
decision-making organization is defined by the purpose; and the system
is self-regulating and self-adaptive. It exhibits ))regulation of steady-state
dynamics through change and governance of meta-system's self-adaptive
and self-regulatory tendencies, through policy formation)); it also exhibits
goal-derived feedback.
The Drorian optimal policy-making model (see Dror 1968: 163-164)
is even more perfect. Its main qualities are its qualitativity and quanti-
tativity. It exhibits both rational and extra-rational elements, a built-in
feedback system and deals with metapolicy-making (by which Dror means
principles of policy-making). In short, it is an impossible model. It is also
suspiciously resembles a pure-rationality, stages of decision-making model,
with the amount of stages doubled. The difference between these two is
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that while pure rationality models could be claimed to implicitly represent
functional rationality, these models very obviously represent the idea of
substantial rationality, notwithstanding the Drorian claim that extra-
rational elements are also included.'
The reason why I have dealt in such detail with the different strategies
of decision-making, is due to their intimate connection with the idea of
welfare in social policy. But in reality, we should be aware that it is not
possible to speak abstractly of decision-making strategies. Etzioni makes
the noteworthy comment that there is no one effective strategy of decision-
making in the abstract, apart from the societal context in which it is
introduced and from the control capacities of the actors introducing it#
(Etzioni 1968: 293). All decision-making strategies are actually concerned
with social choice being made by authoritative decision. The principal
problem is how to best serve the interests of those in whose name the
decision is being made. This reveals the fundamental shortcoming of such
strategies. The essential question should be: >Mow can the people best
make social choices in a way that is in their interests, and improves their
welfare This can be divided into two questions: the question of the decision-
making systems, system of social choice; and the question of how are the
people aware of their best interests. The less Klecision-making# in the sense
of autonomous, delegated strategy, be it comprehensive, incremental,
mixed scanning or whatnot, the better. Thus we must start from the
concept of self-control, and not from that of control that is externally
exerted. This does not of course eliminate the problems of rational decision,
on the contrary, but considered from this angle the problem takes on quite
another quality.
But the discussion of rationality is not complete without a discussion
of the problem of goals. Although goals will occupy a relatively minor
position in this monograph, their role is certainly important in social policy.
It is to this problem that we shall now turn.
3.2. The Nature of Goals in Social Policy
The problem of goals has received a relatively central position in the Western
analysis of social policies. 2 Many of the modern policy approaches depend
centrally on the definition and determination of goals for policy. On the
theoretical level as well goals have been considered most interesting (see
Nieininen 1955: 170, Ahmavaara 1970: 190). Ahmavaara has argued that
1 This can be said to be a quality of substantial rationality, as well.
2 For an approach in which this is especially emphasized, see Ozbekhan (1969).
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the analysis of goals is of utmost importance in the analysis of society,
and especially in the cybernetic methodology of the social sciences.
Ahmavaara asserts that in principle it is completely possible to clarify
the goals of an individual if we are aware of his preconditions. As yet,
our knowledge of these preconditions is too sparse to be able to wompute»
the goals of an individual (see Ahmavaara 1970: 124). This seems to rep-
resent an extremely mechanistic notion of the nature of goals. Were we
able to compute the goals of individuals (which, by the way, is the starting
point of all classical and neoclassical welfare analysis), the remainder
would be simple by comparison as we would probably then also know the
power of the individual and all other relevant information.
Yet there does still exist the critical area all too often left unexplored:
in what sense can we actually speak of goals in social policy? By definition
it is obvious that there can be no policy without goals. We cannot speak
of conscious policies if we cannot find goals for these policies. So in this
sense the existence of goals is crucial to the whole concept of social policy.
If the #goals)) of society are to a large extent only illusory, then its policies
must also be: there is only a set of largely unco-ordinated and unrelated
actions, the analysis of which could be based on the real causes of these
actions, and not on some assumed goals. For instance Israel (1970: 33)
remarks that for Marx consciousness meant conscious activity, activity to
achieve certain goals.
To define goal is in principle rather easy. A goal is any state of affairs
which is wanted by some individual or collectivity. If the individual A
for instance wants to become president, (i.e., wants to effect a state of
affairs where he is president), it is his goal. It is eminently obvious that
individuals can and do have goals, ranging from minor to rather extensive
ones. But do collectivities have goals in the same sense and, in particular,
do societies? Can we speak of a collectivity collectively interested in causing
some state of affairs to happen?' .
According to Runciman (1969: 117) one may speak of the goals of an
organization such as a bureaucracy or a firm, but it is much more problem-
atic when related to societies, because a firm or a bureaucracy is contrived
for some purpose, and independent of the wishes of its employees it acts
to realize this purpose.
However, in many cases organizations are judged by their ends, a
method which, unless we also consider how the ends are actually realized,
will lead to very biased results. This is also the basic reason why ends
1 Of course we do speak of such things: for instance Finland 'wants' a security conference;
it is interesting to hear how even very minor officials often speak that Finland #wants» this
or that, completely naturally, without once pausing to think what this actually means.
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are so popular: they can be readily used as a smoke screen to disguise the
true nature of an organization. Especially in relation to welfare this prob-
lem is acute.
We must thus not forget the problem of false, or imagined goals. An
organization or an individual may signify goals for themselves which
are not at all related to the actual functioning of the unit. To resolve this,
Etzioni has suggested that in a given situation we define as the real goals
of a society only such states of affairs toward which the resources of the
organization are directed and which prevail over other goals in conflict
situations (Etzioni 1968b: 15). This is especially relevant with regard to
societies. It can be said that most goals of a society are false in the sense
that we can show instances where they certainly are not pursued. But this
is a more basic problem than simply a one of falseness: it is due to the
conflicting interests of the members of society.
There is in one sense, however, no qualitative difference between the
goals of an organization and those of a society. Just as we can denote the
goals of a firm according to the designs of its owners, can we equally well
express the goals of a society in term of the interests of those in power in
that society.' This would imply that the most important problem regarding
the actual existence of goals, is the study of the power and interest struc-
ture of a society, i.e., class analysis.
There are many who completely deny the existence of groups which
can bring about their own interests at the expense of other groups in a
Western capitalist society. On the contrary, they claim that the system
of representative de'mocracy accurately conveys the interests of the ma-
jority, while concurrently protecting the rights of minorities. Thus we can
speak of collective goals of the society, goals which are accepted by every-
body.
With regard to Western society, I contend that this view cannot be
accepted. There are clearly groups with very diverging interests and goals
whose realization would lead to a decline in welfare among a majority of
the people. Indeed the central problem then if we are interested in goals,
is the problem of class interests and power.
Olson (1968) presents an interesting rebuttal to the goal-seeking con-
cept of society in which he argues the view that there cannot be collective,
goals in the sense of goals of all, but that there must always be an organi-
zation which forces its members to work towards their collective goal.
In other words, the existence of collective goals has no relevance, as they
cannot have any significance. Only in relatively small groups can we expect
1 This is emphasized by Lenski (1966: 41— 42) who says that it is by no means necessary
that a goal of society be such that it does not harm some or most of its members.
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that the group will act freely for a common goal. In all other situations,
men will be expected to further only special goals (which are not in the
interests of the whole collectivity). The Olson analysis is based on the
concept of collective good, to which I will return later. Here it should
suffice to note that the collective-good approach is extremely fruitful,
and in a sense can be considered an alternative to the approach of goals.
According to Olson's analysis, then, men will not act for collective
interests, and thus we cannot speak of collective goals, except as the goals
of a collectivity as such. This analysis then provides a justification for all
the technocratic models where decisions are made for somebody, in fact
to the reality around us. This is an important problem which I shall return
to at length.
Although man sets goals for himself and acts to realize them, we
cannot say that goals are the primary, decisive factors of man's activities.
There are decidedly more basic questions relating to the conditions of men,
to the laws determining the development of societies. There are many
questions which we may approach from the more general view of goals,
as social processes, determined by the basic factors of man's activities.
The central question here is that of welfare. We can see it simply as a goal,
and try to formulate it in the best possible way, or we can regard it as a
social process, determined by the basic needs and requirements of men.
Although these are alternatives, they are by no means exclusive, as we
shall see.
4. The Nature and Dimensions of Welfare
4.1. What Is Welfare Theory?1
There exists no generally accepted and coherent theory of welfare, only
fragments and 'overdeveloped' areas (e.g., welfare economics).
It is therefore not possible here to present a complete theory of welfare,
but only a survey of the possibilities and requisites for such a theory.
In subsequent chapters, the existing fragments of welfare theory will be
presented and analyzed. Thus, in a way, this chapter will somewhat antici-
1 The conceptual difficulties here are well known. In the Anglo-American usage, the concept
of welfare has two different meanings: that of well-being and that of social measures for
social security and assistance (i.e., a very euphemistic usage). I am here concerned with
the more general sense with welfare referring to the well-being of man and »social welfare»
referring to the welfare of the members of society. In an ideal society these two conditions
of course coincide, but certainly not in the societies of today.
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pate the ensuing discussion; but this is necessary if only because it is cus-
tomary to restrict oneself to such small fragments of the whole area.
A definition of welfare theory should be, intuitively, rather easy to
devise. Its subject is naturally welfare (in this discussion especially social
welfare) and the factors that influence welfare. It tries to answer questions
such as: What are social and individual welfare? How can social and indi-
vidual welfare be related? How can social welfare be measured? and so
on (Arrow 1951: 923). Although, as I have mentioned, welfare theory is
rather fragmentary, there are some areas that can be said to be well-
developed or at least subject to some analysis. Examples of such sectors
are welfare economics, which is best known and which is usually referred
to when theory of welfare is mentioned, (see e.g. Rothenberg 1961, Arrow
1951, Reder 1947: 14); the research of the level of living and social indi-
cators, which is actually an attempt to develop methods for the empirical
measurement of welfare; and cost-benefit analysis, which is related to wel-
fare economics (see Mishan 1971, who claims that cost-benefit analysis is
included in welfare economics); among others. In addition, problems that
properly belong to welfare theory have been and are being analyzed under
various different names in different disciplines. The Arrow paradox, for
example, has been analyzed by economists, logicians and political scientists
to mention a few. It is also understandable that welfare theory should use
knowledge from various and diverse disciplines, which makes its incor-
poration a very difficult task (see introduction). But the most basic question
is not that of what components can comprise welfare theory. What we must
first inquire is: can a welfare theory in actuality be constructed? A science
of welfare implies rather questionable attempts at scientifying such pro-
cesses and things that apparently defy scientization, and which are some-
times considered antithetical to scientific investigation. These problems
center around the concept of welfare. It is probably fair to say that welfare
is an extremely elusive concept. Some might even suggest that it is not
open to analysis at all. But it is apparent that the concept of social welfare,
or the aggregate welfare of all members of a society, must be analyzed
even though it proves difficult, if a society is to be called a society that
directs itself (or a *rational* society, see Gould 1971: 16).
This analytical difficulty is emphasized by von Wright (1963a: 86):
))The notion of the good of man , . . . , is the central notion of our whole
inquiry. The problems connected with it are of utmost difficulty.* We are
also aware that there are very subtle complications of a philosophical
nature in the analysis of the concept of welfare. But these are not the only
difficulties. When welfare is analyzed from the policy point of view, that is,
with a view to concrete social problems and circumstances, clear solutions
become all the more evasive.
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Concrete social analyses especially have been completely ignored.
In criticizing Otto Neurath for his overly optimistic attempts at defining
welfare, Richard von Mises contends that the concept of welfare should
not be mentioned until one can analyze its causes (von Mises 1951: 257).
If Mises means a theory of society, his dictum is perfectly acceptable, but
should he mean, as could be easily inferred, a >natural science -type)) of
analysis, his attitude is much too restrictive.
But it is not due only to such difficulties that abstinence from analysis
has been recommended in the social sciences. We are dealing here namely
with the problem of the scientization of politics (see chapter 2), of which
the scientization of welfare plays a critical role. This problem has been
analyzed cursorily in the previous chapter, but here we must concentrate
on some subaspects that are connected expressly with welfare.
4.2. The Origins of the Concept of Welfare
The concept of welfare as an object of study is comparatively recent in
the literature of the social sciences. For example, in the recent Inter-
national Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, there is not a reference word
for the concept of welfare. This could be due to accidental shortsightedness,
but it is deep in the tradition: there has been no such concept in many
earlier encyclopedias. Yet it is necessary to point out that there was an
idea of a general welfare behind much of the economic thought of the
previous centuries, a concept of common good as the maxim of the whole
analysis (see Myrdal 1971: 4-5). That is, welfare has been considered
implicitly by economists (and sociologists) in their analyses, often using
terms that under close inspection prove to be synonyms of welfare in the
sense used here. We can, in fact, trace a line of development from the con-
cept of wealth, through the concepts of satisfaction, happiness and utility
to the concept of welfare (Myrdal 1971: 16, 142). Myint (1948: 229) traces
two stages, the analysis of welfare at the physical level by classical econ-
omists, and analysis of welfare at the subjective level by the neoclassical
(welfare) economists.
The classical economists were concerned only with material welfare,
or wealth, in their analyses (Herz 1961: 134 ff., consistently translates the
word 'wealth' as dilstand (welfare), in the texts of Smith, Mill and others).
According to IVIyint (1948: 11, 71) in Mill's usage, however, the word wealth
was not considered identical to welfare. It was Lauderdale (Inquiry into
the nature and origin of public wealth, pp. 151-152; cited in Myint), who
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considered wealth and welfare as equal, which was consequently accepted
by Say.1
On the other hand, Say had already emphasized subjective utility,
or satisfaction or happiness, as the central concept of economics (Herz
1961: 127) (for an analysis of the concept of utility, see chapter 6).2
It has been customary to separate the form and the substance of welfare
and to be content with the analysis of the former (see especially Archibald
1959: 319). This had led to very unsatisfactory results, as what is essential
in welfare certainly relates to its substance and not its form, whatever
that entails. In the conceptions of welfare economists, the 4orm# of welfare
has usually meant such things as the conditions for maximum welfare —
which is impossible to define without a proper conception of welfare —
problems of comparability, diminishing utility, and so on.
A welfare theory must consider both the substance and the form of
welfare. Regrettably, although the separation between form and substance
is not satisfactory, this separation does exist and has had an unavoidable
influence upon the definition of welfare.
Attempts to define welfare meaningfully have been extremely rare.
The problem of infinite regress has been one reason: in the following I shall
discuss others. Welfare is such a fundamental concept that its definition
necessarily entails an entire system of concepts and relations.3
Especially the representatives of the mew welfare economics* have been
known for their almost complete nihilism with regard to welfare. For
them, only the form of welfare has mattered: the rules that determine the
1 Lauderdale: *If, on the other hand, wealth is regarded in its true light, as consisting of the
abundance of objects of men's desire, it would be impossible to discern why that should
not be considered wealth which tends to the satisfaction of men's immediate desire, as that
which is stocked and stored up for the satisfaction of future desire.»
2 This development is comparable to the change noted by Myrdal (1968, appendix 1), in the
concept of underdevelopment. The evolution from backward to underdeveloped to devel-
oping signified moving from reality to euphemisms, and an imaginary change of reality.
In economics, the change from wealth to utility to welfare implies a similar replacement of
reality with euphemisms (see Little 1951: 79). As shall be shown below, the concept of wel-
fare in economics is completely devoid of content, actually only a synonym for choice, and
it is immediately clear that the analysis of wealth is a task much more suitable for economists.
3 Kuhn (1970) notes that most important are not definitions in themselves but the theories,
to which these definitions are connected. In the case of welfare, it seems of little bearing
whether one begins from a theory or from a definition, as both should actually be identical.
One minor reason behind the paucity of welfare definitions is also the understandable
reluctance to specify such a central concept. As there always exists the danger for a reduc-
tion to trivialities: while trying to define welfare you may actually have defined the ideal
of the English shopkeeper as Marx (1967a: 603) commented about Bentham: With the
driest naivete he takes the modern shopkeeper, especially the English shopkeeper, as the
normal man. Whatever is useful to normal man, and to his world, is absolutely useful*.
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behavior of welfare, but not welfare in itself. Here, in fact, we can dis-
tinguish between external and internal definitions of welfare, the external
concerning the rules, and the internal the content of welfare. This dis-
tinction proves quite useful in the analysis of the Arrowian concept of
welfare, but it cannot be extended very far. In the following, I shall be
referring to both external and internal analyses of welfare.
There are, however, two related principle reasons for this nihilism:
first, is the positivist distinction of normative and positive science and
the attempt of economics to be a positive science; and secondly, the prob-
lem of who is to judge social and individual welfare. Both problems have
been given extremely straight-forward and simple solutions in welfare
economics, despite their extremely complicated natures.
The traditional excuse for avoiding a definition of welfare, has been
that this would naturally involve value judgements, and therefore could
not be considered proper scientific activity.'
Most of welfare economics has accepted this traditional view and has
consequently not promoted nor attempted a definition of welfare. (In
chapter 6, the few existing endeavours will be analyzed.) Indeed, Archi-
bald's famous assertion (1950: 319), that welfare needs no definition, has
obviously been approved by the majority of welfare economists. (For
a typical example, see van der Praag 1968: 1 —3).2
In the field of philosophy, ethics has dealt surprisingly little with the
problems of welfare (see for example, general introductions to ethics:
Brandt 1959, Frankena 1963), although there have been some more relevant
analyses (Tenkku 1963, von Wright 1963a). But the main weakness of
philosophical analysis, for our purposes, is its conceptuality. For the more
central a concept is, the less of its relevant properties are brought to light
1 e.g., Majumdar (1958: 16) claims: *. . What is welfare? Any answer to such a question
would no doubt involve value judgement of one kind or another and would therefore be
relevant to economics only as a datum imported into the system. However, much the ends
of human welfare be presented in terms of economic aggregates such as output etc., the
decision to follow such an end is essentially a kind of ethical judgement which must be beyond
the scope of economicsd> This view has been effectively countered by Rescher (1969), Frankena
(1962) and Wright (1963a); it is obvious that much of ethical research would be impossible
if Majumdar's view would be accepted.
2 Welfare economists are not alone in their avoidance of the question of the content of welfare.
Decision theorists, for example, have almost completely ignored these problems, the most
closely related to our discussion being their analyses of the behaviour of the loss or utility
functions. (See the standard work of Chernoff—Moses (1959)). In the work of TOrnqvist and
Nordberg (1968), there is somewhat more on this problem, but not significantly so.
See, however, Gintis (1969), where the problem of individual welfare is very thoroughly
analyzed.
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through 'normal' conceptual study.' Von Wright, for example (1963a:
121), avoids many of the most pertinent aspects completely (such as the
problem of social welfare), undoubtably due to the fact that the analysis
of such concepts presupposes and demands a strong background in the
analysis of society. However, a wide spectrum of important principles and
conceptual difficulties ha-6 been analyzed in philosophical literature which
makes it a source of valuable reference material.
The analysis of welfare is a part of the analysis of goodness. The com-
plicated nature of the latter concept will not be dwelt upon here: for a list
of the various aspects of goodness see von Wright (1963a: 9-10) and
Frankena (1963: 66). There are many other aspects of goodness in addition
to that of welfare alone. However, many such aspects would actually be
combined with welfare if understood in a wider sense: for example, the
technical goodness of man, and especially health (see von Wright 1963a).
The second factor contributing to the >>new welfare economists'>> nihilistic
attitudes towards definitions of welfare — namely, the problem of who or
what is in a position to determine the meaning of welfare — seems more
interesting. The undisputed dictum of welfare economics has been that
the individual is the best judge of his own welfare (Majumdar 1958: 17)2
and although it is naturally conceded that instances occur when the indi-
vidual might be mistaken, as a general principle this axiom is still rigidly
adhered to. This principle has led especially to the assertion that represen-
tatives of society lack the ability to make deductions about its members'
welfare except by observing how they act or by asking them (see Lenski
1966: 36). Should we proceed to generalize on the basis of this point of
view, it would appear fruitless to attempt to analyze people's welfare
objectively, that is, from the outside. In its strictest sense this principle
implies that welfare is an entirely subjective affair, with no objective
elements. Ultimately, however, this extreme derivative would be unlikely
to gain much support.
Probably most would agree with von Wright that welfare is composed
1 In the terminology of modern semantics: a concept has four »dimensions»: semantic, syn-
tactic, pragmatic and sigmatic. Normally philosophical analysis (for instance, by von Wright
1963a) has concentrated on the semantic and syntactic aspects and has ignored the prag-
matic and sigmatic. Although it is still highly disputable whether these concepts truly endure
scientific inquiry, for our purposes they appear very appropriate: it is exactly the prag-
matic (i.e. problems of reality and its relationship to the concept) and sigmatic (i.e. the
»significance» of the concepts), which seem to be missing from most analyses.
2 von Wright (1963a: 99f) shows very convincingly that a man must be the judge of his own
happiness. And this is certainly true, because, as von Wright says: »Whether a person is
happy or not depends upon his own attitude to his circumstances of life. The supreme judge
of the case must be the subject himself>>. This is all true with regard to happiness, but the
same cannot be said of welfare (as von Wright notes, see p. 109).
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of causal and axiological components but concurrence about what is actu-
ally objectively measurable and what is not, is extremely difficult to
arrive at. Even this solution may appear too mechanical: welfare cannot
be divided into 'measurable' and 'unmeasurable' components (for the
opposite view, see e.g., Noponen 1971: 15).
Many sociologists and philosophers, however, have been much more
ready to investigate the substance and content of welfare (see Parsons —
Smelser 1965: 32 for an example) which seems quite natural as sociologists
should, in principle, have better means to analyze such a concept as wel-
fare.
Marxist economists, however, have proposed the Marxist approach
to welfare as a direct counterpart to the neoclassical positivist views (see
Baran 1968: 28, Bettelheim 1959: 58-65, Mandel 1968: 663). In their
view, social welfare is an objective historically determined process which
is unquestionably accessible by scientifically analysis. I consider this
an overly simplicistic point of view. It seems that the correct Marxist
interpretation is considerably more complex and regrettably not so #scien-
tifically)) and ))easily)) measurable as has been claimed. Of course there
does not exist any Marxist welfare theory)), but as the well-being of man
occupied such a central position in Marx' thought, we have many (con-
flicting) clues as how to reconstruct a validly Marxist view of welfare.
With regard to the problem at hand, however, there is one interesting
Marxist concept which may be fruitful to examine here. This is the con-
cept of false consciousness.
This problem, most vehemently ignored or lamented by welfare econ-
omists and many sociologists alike, has a central place in historical materi-
alism, the Marxist theory of society. Recently it has become the object
of some scrutiny among western sociologists (Winch 1971, Willner 1971).
What Marx and Engels meant with false consciousness is not at all
clear (see Marx 1965: 132, Baran 1968: 24-28, Markovic 1971).1
Briefly the Marxist position could be described as follows. There exists
an objective and necessary historical process, the development of which,
however, depends on the activity of the masses. Its correct subjective
consciousness (i.e., the consciousness of a ))class for itself))) is represented
by the Communist party, the vanguard of the proletariat itself. Due to its
heterogeneous composition, the effects of the bourgeois superstructure,
etc., there exists a false consciousness which prevents the proletariat
1 One writer who demonstrates a clearly ambivalent attitude toward the problem of
false consciousness is Barry (1965: 38-41, 297). While he strongly resists using what he
calls ideal-regarding principles in the determination of people's wants, he nevertheless
approves of the use of the concept public interest understood in a way that links it directly
with false consciousness.
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from realizing the necessity of the social developments that are in its own
interests.
Fundamentally speaking, therefore, we can say that people endowed
with false consciousness are those unaware not only of their own best
interests, but also of the causal process that leads to the realization of these
interests. Applied to the problem of welfare, the crucial dilemma of welfare
theory has been whether or not the individual can be the judge of his own
welfare.
There is general agreement that a knowledge of the causal structure,
mentioned in the preceding is often lacking: people simply are not aware
of how a certain action affects them. But this has been compensated for
through the assertion that this aspect is not of any pertinence; the only
factor of interest is whether or not an individual can judge the results of
these actions as conducive to his welfare. It seems apparent that such a
separation is impossible. There cannot exist a discriminant welfare 'con-
tent' of every action, rather the totality of the effects of this action is
what must be considered.
Few would, on the other hand, claim that the actual perception of
welfare could be misled by false consciousness. If a person says: I am feeling
well, my state is one of welfare; assuming that he is honest, that is that.
But in even so simplistic a situation there are still difficulties. Would the
individual experience welfare if he were aware of all the possibilities, of
all the alternatives to the specific state of the world in which he is experi-
encing welfare? This is a central problem. A part of the proletariat may
be subjectively 'faring well' under the conditions of capitalism, but there
is no certainty as to whether or not he might not fare even better under
conditions of socialism.
How then, can we apply the concept of false consciousness? In fact,
most of the standard of living and social indicators research relies im-
plicitly on the assumption of false consciousness. But the real application
of this conception lies in the theoretical structure of the problem. It leads
to a wholly different approach to problems of welfare.
Contrary to the traditional approach, one must begin from the objec-
tive processes that determine welfare; but we cannot disregard the subjec-
tive aspect entirely. Social welfare is the result of a dialectical process of
subjective activity and objective processes. Men create their welfare from
these objective processes, but their perception of it is not solely passive.
Therefore, we cannot have a simple and mechanical division: this is
objective welfare and that is subjective welfare; rather the two are com-
pletely interwined and tangled with one another and cannot be separated.
We have a set of objective factors — historical, social and other — and
we have man's subjective activity and consciousness which acts upon
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these objective factors. It makes no sense to speak of Kobjectivo welfare:
neither is it reasonable to contend that only the individual can be the
judge of his welfare. His welfare is essentially #givem to him (by the society)
but this conferral is not a conscious social act. In the analysis of welfare,
we must therefore, give attention to both the social process of welfare
creation (decision-making, social choice, etc.) and to the objective factors
of welfare, of which the concept of welfare is traditionally understood to
be formulated.
But in this we are already approaching the next problem, that of the
definition of welfare.
4.3. Problems in Defining Welfare
As I have noted above, there has been a great reluctance to define welfare.
I shall also refrain from attempting a comprehensive definition of welfare,
as this is not possible until one has examined all of the building blocks
necessary to grasp such a concept.' In this context my intention is to
indicate some of the most important problems in approaching a concept
of welfare.
The first such problem is the multidimensionality of welfare. There
exists no single, unitary concept of welfare, rather it consists of a widely
varying collection of aspects, components or dimensions. We can speak
to a certain degree of >Tarts)), and more specifically of the components of
welfare, such as health, being well-fed, well-housed, etc.
The second problem is that of the unit-level of welfare. Shall we speak
only of individual welfare, and if not, what does social welfare actually
imply? Is it merely the somehow aggregated collection of the measures
of individual welfare (the multidimensionality of which must not be for-
gotten), or might it be something beyond this, something more than a
simple composite? (This is already tangent to the problem of the dynam-
ics of welfare.)
The third problem relates to the dynamic nature of welfare. Welfare
is not merely an outward and #objective» entity to be measured and re-
corded. It is inherently related to the activities of men, with the concep-
tions of the good life (i.e. not simply a good state of affairs). Welfare is
1 Actually, in speaking of welfare, it is possible to utilize many different names to fulfill the
same purpose. We can speak of the enjoyment of value, we can speak of the good life, health,
well-being, the ends of man and society, of interest, and so on. Some of these emphasize dif-
ferent aspects of the concept of welfare and therefore merit attention. Some are again simply
synonyms (well-being, enjoyment of value, and health, in the broadest sense) and need not
confuse us.
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constantly *created)) by man, not exclusively something passively per-
c3ived. This is a problem of infinite complication, to which very scant
attention has hitherto been directed.
In addition to this, and mainly related with the aspect of multidimen-
sionality, I shall discuss the problem of the relationships between welfare
and some related concepts, such as justice, freedom, equality, alienation,
etc. This, I hope, will throw additional light on the actual complexity
and comprehensiveness of the concept of welfare.
But first some general remarks. I shall here consider welfare extremely
broadly, as a sort of super-concept which provides a ceiling for
practically everything which is or should be considered good for man and
by man. In normal usage, this is not the case: welfare is usually conceived
of as a rather minor part of the whole of societal activities (see Allardt
1971a: 308).
Sometimes welfare is even identified with health, or factors conducive
to health. (Barry 1965: 224: ))Welfare, it will be recalled, refers to the
physical conditions conducive to health)). See also Lee 1967: 194). It is
obvious that when health is understood in the widest possible sense, there
is not much that separates it from welfare. But there are reasons to ask
whether such a definition is the most practical one. Would it not be better
to emphasize that health is one of the most central conditions relevant
to welfare but that it is not the only one (see v. Wright (1963a, 54) where
he presents such a view). Then welfare is the ultimate end of health policies,
but health policies are not the only means to this end.
It seems untenable to assert that, for instance, education, power,
freedom, justice, etc., would not, in actual fact, be aspects of welfare,
but something external to it. This is especially so, if we begin with the
assumption of multidimensionality. It is then natural to conceive of free-
dom as one dimension of welfare, justice as another, and so on. This ap-
proach can nevertheless be criticized. If welfare is considered very broadly,
there is not much that can not be included as a part of it: and the concept
itself loses its relevance. (See for instance Hicks 1969: 95 for such a criti-
cism.)
It is my contention however that what is still external to this expansive
view of welfare is quite a lot; a broad concept in any case enables us to
discuss the relationship of welfare to many other things, as should also
be the case (welfare is affected by almost anything, one could say).
One minor distinction, made by von Wright, is of use here (von Wright
1963a: 87-88). This is the distinction between welfare and happiness.
It should be obvious that, while we may speak of welfare as a relatively
stable phenomenon the changes in which are not very rapid, the subjective,
monetary feelings of pleasure, complete enjoyment, etc., which may gen-
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erally be called happiness, are much more transitional. It is, of course,
evident that matters which obstruct the feeling of happiness may be
rather minor, and of limited duration, if conditions are otherwise conducive
to welfare. In the words of von Wright, >>of happiness I could also say that
it is the consummation or crown or flower of welfare> (ibid.: 88). For von
Wright then, the most important factor in the distinction between welfare
and happiness is their relationship to causality. According to him, con-
siderations of welfare are essentially the consideration of how the action
and incidence of various phenomena will causally affect a being. But with
happiness, we need not be interested in such problems. Although this is
a rather strained approach (evidently also happiness must be caused by
something), with happiness, the causal connections are indeed much less
relevant, as the factors affecting happiness are themselves less important.
It is mainly upon another interesting problem that this distinction
throws light. This is the relationship between needs and preferences, or de-
sires. While we can maintain that welfare is intimately connected with needs
(see next chapter) i.e., some rather stable, centrally guiding factors upon
human action, happiness is related to preferences or desires, i.e., some
rather arbitrary and transcedental factors in man's activities (see Bray-
brooke 1968, Rescher 1969: 109-110, Benn —Peters 1965: 58, Nieminen
1955: 91— 92; see also Barry 1965: 39-41 for a slightly different view).
This also enables us to propose that preferences and desires need not
be considered except in a very superficial manner in the examination of
welfare. (This is a very important point with regard to the approach of
welfare economics, as we shall see.)
Otherwise, however, the distinction between happiness and welfare is
not very enlightening. From the point of view of social policy, it is imposs-
ible to regard man's happiness, as such, as something very important,
except as it relates to welfare. Man can be truly happy only in connection
with welfare.1
Some authors have not made this distinction at all (see Beim —Peters
1965: 62), and speak interchangeably of happiness and welfare. Although
I shall not employ the term happiness, I consider the distinction itself
to be rather minor, as has been noted.
The multidimensionality of welfare is rather generally agreed upon
(see Rescher 1969: 54). This is reflected by the fact that the majority of
students of welfare describe it with the help of different components.
(This is most clearly seen in the level of living approach, about which more
1 Russell notes that anybody who is unhappy when the basic requirements of his welfare
are fulfilled, is suffering from some psychical maladjustment (Russell 1952: 1972). Although
I feel that this view is perhaps too extreme, it might be appropriate to speak at least of a
situation which obviously will not last long, or which is not serious.
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shall be spoken later.) For instance, Lenski (1966: 37) speaks of five main
ends of man: survival, health, status or prestige, creature comfort and
affection, while Lasswell and Kaplan (1950: 55) enumerate the following
))welfare-values: well-being, health and safety of the organism, wealth,
skills, and enlightenment)). Russell asserts (1952: 197) that the following
things are necessary for man's happiness: food and a place to live, health,
love, successful work, and respect enjoyed in man's own sphere of life.
(see also Gil 1970: 415, Nieminen 1955: 91— 95; it is obvious that these
lists are closely related to the problem of needs which will be the content
of the next chapter.)
Such lists could be continued ad infinitum. Although they may appear
rather arbitrary, it seems clear that most comparable lists would be com-
posed of essentially the same basic elements. Development of the level of
living concept, for instance, has been largely based on this premise; the
ingredients of the good life are, in principle, rather unchanging. Yet the
matter is by no means so simple as that.
We are not concerned here only with the question of which ingredients
shall compose welfare, but also with the way in which these ingredients
are associated, and interrelated. This engenders consideration of such
aspects of welfare as justice, equality, freedom, non-alienation, etc. But
neither is this alone sufficient. We must also ascertain that this multidimen-
sionality does not only refer to ))horizontal)) aspects of welfare, but also
to its wertical)) aspects as well. It is necessary to speak of different levels,
the level of component distinctions being only one of many.
But primarily we can speak of two levels, which might be termed the
quantity and quality of welfare. By quantity would be meant such dimen-
sions of welfare as health, housing, leisure, and so on. The quantity of
welfare would thus be near the concept of level of living as it is commonly
understood.
By quality of welfare, would be meant such aspects of welfare as justice,
equality, freedom, security and so on, and their combinations. This elusive
concept has been used, though undefined, increasingly in analyses of
social problems. For instance Forrester (1968, see also Meadows, et. al.
1972), utilizes the term quality of life in somewhat the same sense, although
the conception of welfare remains unclear in his system dynamics.'
Quality of welfare is in a sense the nucleus of welfare, the most inter-
esting and relevant sector when the Nuantity» requirements have been
1 David G. Gil (1971: 72) has given another, interesting meaning to the term quality of life:
*(Quality of life) refers to phenomena on an aggregate level as encountered by the society
as a whole or by large segments of it.* This is viewed in contradistinction with the term
*circumstances of living)), which refers to specific living conditions of individuals and groups.
Thus Gil is referring to the societal and non-societal aspects of welfare in this distinction.
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met to a certain extent. But the quality of welfare cannot signify merely
the aspects of equality, security and so on, but is essentially connected
to the whole social structure, to the social arrangements and institutions.
The second problem, that of the distinction between individual welfare
and collective, or aggregate welfare (Barry 1965: 224, uses the term gen-
eral welfare), will be the subject of two chapters in this monograph. Usually
the entire problem of defining welfare has been approached from the con-
cept of individual welfare. Individual welfare is taken as a starting point
with collective welfare understood as social welfare, leaving open only
the problem of aggregation, that is how to derive from individual welfares
the collective welfare, the welfare of everybody. (See also Gintis 1969:
4, Baumol 1965: 54-55). In this context, individual welfare is generally
regarded as the state of the individual due to all of the circumstances
that are relevant to his welfare. The nature of individual welfare and its
determinants can best be reflected through the listing of characteristics
such as: the health of an individual, his education, his diet, his employment,
etc. (This is the level of living problem, see chapter 8).
Collective welfare would then be the aggregate of individual welfares
as defined above in some collectivity: society, city, class, etc. The only
problem we confront with regard to collective welfare is the means of
aggregation. It might be a weighted sum of all individual welfares, it might
be a product, or it might be some type of function (see the discussion of
the welfare function in chapter 6). This problem of aggregation has been
at the core of much discussion about welfare, and especially about social
welfare.
But this presentation of the problem immediately shows, in the light
of the foregoing, that the whole problem has been conceptualized in an
overly restricted fashion. We cannot separate individual welfare from social
welfare': in fact the most important thing about welfare is that it is socially
determined, partly by the social activities of the individual, but mainly
by factors beyond his control. And it is exactly the mechanics of social
determination, the nature of this process, that I will be concerned with.
Therefore, to separate individual welfare and social welfare in the abstract,
is conceptually implausible.
However, it must be emphasized that I do not consider social welfare,
nor will I speak of it, as the welfare of the society, assuming society to
be a sort of quasi-person. Society consists of the relationships between
individuals, nature, and the material objects created by the individuals.
Social welfare is specifically a concept related to the individual or to a
1 We can, of course, but not in any fruitful sense. It is hardly interesting to study individual
welfare which would not be socially determined — especially in a social policy context.
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group of individuals. It is possible, therefore, to speak of individual social
welfare and collective social welfare meaning by this, simply that we are
interested in either one individual or in a group of individuals. But social
welfare, or collective social welfare is never only an aggregation of indi-
vidual welfares, but a much more complex phenomenon. In fact, it is
questionable whether aggregation is relevant at all (see chapter 7).
In summarizing the preceding, it can be argued that there are two
fundamental ways of conceiving of welfare:
welfare as a composite of >>good things)) whatever they might be, i.e.,
as characteristics of man's or society's environment and the character-
istics of man and society themselves, and
welfare as the combination of activity and >>good things)>: i.e., as related
to the activities of man himself and largely determined by these activi-
ties, with the good things determined by these activities.
The second point of view implies not only the >>experiencing>> of welfare
on the part of the subject but also >>good deeds)). This second sense is obvi-
ously of much more interest but is also somewhat problematic.
Although lacking in precision, Benn and Peters' definition (1965: 62)
eloquently describes this aspect of welfare: >>Happiness is no extra state
of affairs supervenient of activities. It is a term for describing ways of
life where needs are not grossly frustrated, where there is absorption of
interests and where the interests are mutually compossible>>.
In this sense I shall proceed to analyze the concept of welfare as a
complex of man's social activities. As I noted earlier, welfare cannot be
an >>outside>> concept embodying only things (objects, qualities) in the
possession of man. This is in accordance with the dictum of von Wright
that welfare is not a state of affairs (although von Wright has obviously
meant by this something else; see von Wright 1963a: 91) but more of a
process, or activity.'
One could never say that a healthy, well-fed, well-educated person
having around him all the possible good things that a man may need in
our society, but doing nothing (absolutely nothing, not even relaxing)
would be >>faring
Welfare includes the usage of objects around man, the use of edu-
cation, health, eating of good and healthy food, etc. Likewise the relation-
ships between man and nature, man and society, and men with each other,
are an integral part of welfare. This is precisely what makes the concept
1 For instance Gintis (1969: 5) says ». . . a person's welfare derives, in the last instance, from
the nature and quality of the set of activities — eating, sleeping, loving, playing, praying,
working, creating, hurting, dying — that he undertakes in his daily life>>. See also Haber-
mas (1971): 49) and Russell (1952: 199).
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welfare so interesting. Should we be able to define it merely as a collection
of goods and characteristics of man, the problem would be very trivial
indeed. (See Allardt —Uusitalo 1972, who have presented a similar view
and attempted to operationalize it.)
Therefore, to develop a theory of welfare, we need essentially three
interrelated ingredients: a conception of man, his nature and activities;
a conception of society and its development; and conceptions of man's
relations in and to society (and nature) (see also Gintis 1969: 1-2). This
is an exceedingly exacting requirement which I shall not be able to satisfy.
But some of the properties of these requirements might be mentioned.
As Marx says in an important note in Capital, To know what is useful
for a dog, one must study dog-nature. Tnis nature itself is not to be deduced
from the principle of utility. Applying this to man, he that would criticize
all human acts, movements, relations etc., by the principle of utility,
must first deal with human nature in general, and then with human nature
as modified in each historical epoch>> (Marx 1967a: 609).
If we substitute welfare for utility (which seems legitimate in this
context), then according to Marx, we have to study human nature in
general, and in particular as a historical phenomenon, to be able to make
conclusions about welfare. This has led some to claim that the Marxist,
analysis of welfare is based upon a fixed conception of human nature,
of a species being inherent in man (see Israel 1970: 25-26, Markovic
1971: 5).
Nothing could be further from Marx' actual intention. This can easily
be seen in the »First Premises of the Materialist Method>> in the German,.
Ideology (Marx—Engels 1970: 42-43), where it is noted that before all
else, man must live in order to make history. This requires the production
of the means of subsistence. And it is through this >>first historical act»
that human nature is conceived. Through the production of material life,
man produces himself, new historical needs, and his own nature. This.
means that in order to study human nature, we have to study human
society, and especially the society in which men live at this moment.'
1 See Marx-Engels (1970: 115): ahe connection of the enjoyment of the individuals at any
particular time with the class relations in which they live and the conditions of production
and intercourse which give rise to these relations, the narrowness of the hitherto existing
forms of enjoyment which were outside the actual content of the life of people and in con-
tradiction to it, the connection of every philosophy of enjoyment with the enjoyment actually
present and the hypocrisy of such a philosophy when applied to all individuals without
distinction — all this of cource could only be discovered when it became possible to criticize
the conditions of production and intercourse in the hitherto existing world, i.e., when the
contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat had given rise to Communist and
Socialist outlooks. That shattered the basis of all morality, whether the morality of asceti-
cism or of enjoymentd> See also Gramsci (1967: 55-61, 197).
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Human nature is formed in the interaction between objective con-
ditions and the subjective factors of development, and this forms the basis
of all welfare analysis. This includes the analysis of the relationships be-
tween man and society and between men: the class relations, the production
relations, and so on. In fact, the essential thing to note is that welfare,
when socially comprehended, is never general — universal — but always
particular, connected with the specific nature of men's activities.
Therefore, if the society is divided into antagonistic classes, the con-
cept of social welfare is definitely a class concept (see Narski 1970). The
nature and forms of welfare actually experienced by the different groups
in society are very different from one another (see for instance Marx 1964,
Gorz 1971). But still, we may speak of universal or general welfare as a
historical, necessary future phenomenon, to be realized at a certain stage
of historical development. It is in this sense that I shall approach the
Marxist conception of welfare (see also Myrdal 1971: 195).
A central concept of Marxism, that of praxis, is extremely closely
related to welfare. Praxis is among the most difficult and important con-
cepts of historical materialism. It was utilized by Marx in his Paris Manu-
scripts (Marx 1964), in the #Theses on Feuerbach>> (Marx —Engels 1970),
and in the German Ideology (Marx—Engels 1970). For Henri Lefebvre
praxis is the synonym of sociology in its modern usage (Lefebvre 1968: 47).
But I shall employ the concept of praxis in a more restricted sense, as
a form of human activity. This is the way Markovic (1971: 7) has inter-
preted it, when he attempts to describe >>ideal praxis>>.1 This is definitely
different from Marx' usage, for instance in the #Theses on Feuerbachh,
of say, revolutionary praxis, but as we shall see, there is one way of under-
standing the Markovician analysis which does not make it too divergent
from proper Marxist analysis.
According to Markovic, >>praxis is ideal human activity, one in which
man realizes optimal potentialities of his being, which is therefore an end
in itself>> (Markovic 1971: 7). In essence, then, praxis is the activity that
maximizes man's welfare, and therefore, is welfare. Markovic defines fol-
lowing characteristics of praxis (or in my terminology, welfare; Markovic
1971: 7-9):
L self-actualization, objectification of specific potential capacities and
powers of man;
2. in praxis man is aware of others: he satisfies a need of other human
beings;
Markovic would undoubtably deny this use of the concept »id.eal praxis» in connection
with his ideas. This term was suggested with critical connotations, however, by his opponent
at the International Philosophical Colloquium, Arto Noro.
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praxis establishes valuable and warm links with other human beings;
praxis is universal an the sense that man is able to incorporate in his
activity the whole of nature, and to reproduce the modes of action and
production of all other living beings));
praxis is rational;
praxis is free in a double sense: from coercion, and for self-fulfillment;
7. praxis has definite esthetic qualities.
The purpose of praxis is self-realization and satisfaction of human
needs, which is therefore the apex of praxis, the ultimate quality of wel-
fare.'
One could say that the primary point in the Markovic presentation
is actually that he has distilled from the writings of Marx the end results
of a development Marx saw as necessary. The essential conception here
is the development of man's ability to fulfill himself, free from all the
restrictions of oppressive social relations, relations no more appropriate
in the stage of development presently existing. And the qualities which
Markovic mentions as belonging to adeal praxis)) are essentially the qual-
ities of man's free development.
This presentation is corroborated by Genrih Volkov (no year) who,
in his book Robot or Man, has analyzed in depth the conception of welfare,
especially social welfare. He starts from the concept of social richness
which we could translate as social welfare. This, according to Volkov,
was expressed by Marx in the following way: )>Really, if we throw away
the restricted bourgeois form, what else is richness but the universality
of individual needs, abilities, consumption, and productive forces born
by universal exchange? What else is richness but the completely developed
power of man towards the natural forces, that is, towards both so-called
Nature as towards his own inner nature. What else is richness but the
expression of man's creative abilities without any other preconditions
except previous historical development, . . . when man does not restrict
himself as a whole, when he does not try to stay in some final, stable state,
but lives in an environment of constant change?))
Social welfare can therefore be seen to be the productive capacity of
men, as man's creation of himself as a whole: the universality of individual
needs, abilities, consumption, and productive forces.
1 This Markovician conception of social welfare as praxis is not generally accepted among
Marxist theorists. In the symposium where it was presented, criticism was especially directed
toward Markovic's distinction between ideal, negative and neutral concepts. It is apparent
that this distinction does not hold water: and especially for the Marxists it is a very non-
Marxist piece of analysis. But still Markovic has caught some of the essential qualities of the
Marxist conception of good life, or life in a Communist society.
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According to Marx, welfare is an absolute change in man. How is this
welfare then concretely expressed? It is born in the upheaval (transcen-
dence) of work into free time. As the central category in the capitalist
society is work, the central category in which work is transformed in Com-
munist society is free time (Volkov (no year): 151). The measure of welfare
is free time. According to Marx: »The measure of a truly rich society is
free time, because it gives freedom of movement for the individual, his
abilities and gifts.# See also Mandel (1968: 679). It should be emphasized
again that in historical materialism, this does not represent an indepen-
dent conclusion nor free idea, but follows strictly from the theory of
surplus value. The law of free time is, in a sense, the dialectical negation
of the Law of Value (see Volkov (no year): 154-160). It is therefore wrong
to claim, as Markovic does, that praxis — or welfare — is an ideal concept.
On the contrary it must be seen as a necessary result of objective historical
developments (see also Marx 1970: 593-600).
Free time is the fundamental category of production in Communism,
understood as man's creative, selfconditioned activity.
The concept of welfare in Marxism is obviously strictly related to the
relations of production and to the stage of development of productive
forces in a given society. Ultimate social welfare is only seen in connection
with Communist society. There can be no general social welfare in this
sense in a capitalist society. In fact, according to Marx, the proletariat
in a capitalist society is even deprived of actual needs and not only of
their realization. It follows then, that there can be no social welfare in
any human sense under capitalism (see Marx 1964).
Although capitalism is able to fulfill most of man's basic requirements,
it has become a fetter to the continuous growth of needs, and to the devel-
opment of man. This is essentially what some modern critics (both liberal
and Marxist) have also remarked (see Galbraith 1958: 128-130, Baran
1968, Baran—Sweezy 1967, Gorz 1971: 84-86, Marcuse 1969, Titmuss
1969 and Roos 1972a). Therefore, the analysis of social welfare under capi-
talism necessitates an investigation of the essential qualities of the nature
of possible welfare. This can only occur by means of the concept of alien-
ation. As I shall not be interested at this writing in such a concrete analysis
of the true nature of welfare under capitalism, I will touch the problem
of alienation only in passing.
What are, then, the essential conclusions that can be derived from the
Marxist analysis of welfare? It seems that in the true spirit of Marx, we
would not be interested in the measurement of welfare in particular,
but in analysing social relations as a whole and their importance to the
possibilities for the free development of man. That is, the primary concern
of Marxist research would be analyzing the creation of such political con-
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ditions which would enable man to pursue welfare-activities)), or ))ideal
praxis)); and of course not merely analyzing, but also changing social
conditions in such a direction (engaging in ))revolutionary praxis>>) that
this becomes possible.'
4.4. Welfare and Alienation
The concept of alienation in Marx has recently been analyzed by many-
researchers (e.g., Israel 1971 and 1Vieszaros 1970). This concept is theoreti-
cally very interesting and has many connections with the concept of wel-
fare. What Israel says about alienation is precisely the same as what I
have argued about welfare. 2 It would be therefore easy to claim that alien-
ation is the direct counterpart — or mirror image — of welfare, or more
bluntly, at the opposite end of the scale (see for instance Narski 1970: 405
where he suggests that walue)) and alienation be contrasted). And because
alienation is a much more thoroughly analyzed concept, it would be more
practical to make it the starting point in the analysis. Furthermore, alien-
ation has, in fact, been analyzed in relation with social processes very effec-
tively already by Marx and many others after him (see for instance Gorz
1971: 77, Gintis 1969).
In general, it might prove to be interesting to seek an opposite of wel-
fare, for which alienation is the most attention-demanding candidate.3
Indeed, one should probably find it much easier to describe this than
welfare itself, as the characteristics of a life not worth living should be
1 There are some interesting connections between this and so-called »constitutionalism»
(see chapter 7). However, the differences are also obvious. The constitutionalist argument
is very superficial, being only interested in fixing »rules» of conduct for a certain period.
But more about this later.
2 »I have tried to show in my analysis that the concept of 'alienation', as used by Marx,
presupposes certain theories of man and his nature, theories of the society and its structure,
and finally conceptions of the relationship between man and society>> (Israel 1971: 308; my
translation).
It is on these grounds that Israel (ibid.: 318) suggests the giving up of a theory of alien-
ation in favor of a theory of reification. It seems that this implies a rather mechanical
view of the nature of any theory construction. The three requirements are by no means
independent and to be surrendered at will, but inseparably interconnected: a theory of man
and a theory of society is in the final Marxist analysis one and the same, and thus includes
conceptions about the relationships between man and society.
3 Baratz and Grigsby (1972: 123) have suggested a conceptualization of poverty, in connec-
tion with a description of the dimensions of poverty which comes very close to a definition
of »antiwelfare». It seems obvious that measurement problems in this connection would
not be so severe as otherwise.
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much fewer and less varied. One important point is that while welfare
would require a rather well-balanced fulfillment of many aspects of the
good life, the opposite of welfare can be characterized by the lack of any
necessary ingredient of welfare. For example hunger implies deficient
welfare, but having enough to eat does not yet guarantee it (see also Ahma-
vaara 1970 on this point). But it is possible to take a more general view of
the nature of »antiwelfare».
According to Markovic, »Alienated (abstract) labour is the activity in
the process of which man fails to be what he is, i.e., fails to actualize his
potential capacities and to satisfy his basic needs» (Markovic 1971: 6).
This type of alienation has, according to Markovic, four dimensions in
the Marxist sense:
one loses control over produced commodities;
in his struggle for more property and power man becomes estranged
from his fellow man;
instead of employing his capacities in creative, stimulating work, man
becomes the appendage of a machine, a living tool, a mere object; and
as no opportunity has been offered him to fulfil his potential abilities,
to develop and satisfy various higher-level needs, his whole life remains,
poor, one-sided, animal-like, his existence remains far below the real
possibilities of his being». (See also Struik in Marx 1964).
This is certainly a good description of the opposite of welfare. The
question is, must we choose between welfare and antiwelfare as points of
view, and what are the differences? It should be obvious that if our analy-
sis is conducted from the point of view of welfare, different aspects would
be pertinent than when we look at antiwelfare (for instance, alienation),
With welfare, it is never enough to say: this and this effects welfare. Because
of the multidimensionality of the concept there are always factors that
must be revealed. With antiwelfare on the other hand, it is enough to
assert that for some basic ingredients, this implies antiwelfare, whatever
the state of affairs otherwise. Therefore, we have, in essence, many different
sorts of antiwelfare — hunger, illness, being without shelter — which may
or may not coincide in the same person or group. (In general, of course,
they do coincide.) But with welfare it is never sufficient to say: this man is
well-fed: therefore his state is one of welfare. Some have considered this
an advantage (see for instance Ahmavaara 1970, Johansson 1970: 29-30).
But from the point of view of welfare analysis it implies that we cannot
do without some conceptions of welfare.
It is true that alienation in this modern Marxist sense is not as simple
as the idea of antiwelfare I have presented above. It is also understood
as a total concept; and the isolation of alienation from work, family, group
etc. is not considered very fruitful (Israel 1971). But this makes the analy-
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sis of alienation a complementary, not an alternative approach. And this
complementary analysis I shall not take up here.
I do, however, foresee a theory of the level of antiwelfare which is
based on alienation, and which boils down to conceptualizations similar
to that of the level of living. There is ample interest to this direction already.
4.5. Social Welfare and the Principles of the >Wood Society))
Above, I mentioned that the principles of the good society, such as justice,
equality, freedom, benevolence, etc., are related intimately with the con-
ception of welfare.' This relationship has been obscured by the fact that
most analysts of these principles have completely disregarded its existence.
This has been largely dependent upon their general aptitude to consider
the principle at hand relatively broadly, so that their inquiry, in fact,
covers much of the ground of welfare analysis. This applies especially well
to the analysis of social justice and equality, but also to that of freedom.
That the concept at hand has so much to say overshadowed related con-
cepts so that they have remained unnoticed.
On the other hand, there exists an obvious and self-made compart-
mentalization between welfare theorists and especially the theorists of
justice (one exception is Nicholas Rescher, who has written books both
on justice and on welfare (1966, 1969) and compared both; see Rescher
1966: 29-40).
Many writers have also suggested that all these principles should be
treated separately (see Berlin 1967: 144, Barry 1965: 43, Frankena 1962: 3).
This is very unfortunate. It would be very difficult to think of social wel-
fare without justice, equality, freedom, or in fact any of the fundamental
ethical principles of practical social policy. Up to a point, on the other
hand, it is conceivable that justice, or equality, or freedom would prevail
without social welfare. This would suggest that welfare should be the over-
laying principle, but I shall analyze this question further.
In the classical tradition, the unity of all ethical principles was taken
for granted. For instance, Mill considered justice as a part of welfare (Mill
1965: chapters 3 and 4). This was also accepted by Dalton (1925: 27, 29)
The principles of the good society can also be understood as rights. Man has a 'right' to
equality, justice, freedom, etc. I shall not, however, dwell upon this aspect of the problem,
nor look at welfare as a right. About the nature of rights, see Marx' Zur Judenfrage, (On
The Jewish Question) which contains some very interesting points, especially concerning
whether the concept of human rights implies a conception of man as an isolated monad.
Thus the human rights concept does not lead to unification of men, but to their separation.
In this sense the concept of right is contrary to that of social welfare where the relationships
of men are central (see also Erasaari 1970).
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where he especially noted that the differences between justice and welfare
disappear if we sufficiently analyze their relationships.
But such a distinction was introduced in order to claim that welfare
(or happiness, or utility in Mill) was unidimensional: that there was one
single principle into which all others could be subsumed. As should be
clear from the analysis above, this is not my position. I consider welfare
to be a multidimensional concept, covering, among others, the above-
mentioned principles. But what does this coverage actually mean?
A principle of a 'good society' implies that it is an ideal, a standard
by which societies could be judged and social policy conducted. As has
been repeatedly emphasized, it is not in this way that I am interested in
welfare. I do not consider it possible to create standards (or 'canons' as
Rescher calls them) of a good society independent of the society itself,
independent of the considerations of what that society can achieve, etc.
(see Engels' critique 1958: 550-552).
This is also expressed in the fact that it is never enough to know the
principle, i.e., the ideal position, in order to determine social policy. As
Rescher remarks, one needs to know more than the ideal distribution in
order to determine the just distribution. Therefore, he suggests as the
correct criterion a two-dimensional principle, with dimensions both for
absolute idealization and universal evaluation (Rescher 1966: 7). Marxism
has often been accused of merely containing ideals with no means of real-
izing them; see for instance Little (1958), who speaks of >>socialist economics>>
as the economics of an ideal society. The second dimension then, is actually
the link between the existing reality and the professed ideal.
In these terms, I shall start from the position that social welfare is the
overlaying >ideal>> for all these other principles. Even though all of these
principles have independent characteristics — characteristics that enable us
to speak of justice, instead of welfare — there is a »total» conception of an
ideal society which subsumes all the principles of a good society: in this
sense a just, free, or equal society are all identical with a >>welfare society>>
(not to be confused with the welfare state). In sub-ideal positions, different
emphasis on the different principles (or actually components of welfare)
makes them differ. But this represents nothing else but differences in the
nature and quality of welfare.
In the following I shall consider freedom, justice and equality. Benev-
olence, fraternity, eta. are so intimately connected with welfare that it is
impossible to speak about them without seeming repetitious.
Usually aggregative and distributive principles are distinguished (Barry
1965: 43-44), which seems to act to separate the principles of welfare
and justice, as justice would be a distributive principle and welfare an
aggregative principle. By an aggregative principle we mean a principle
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which is only concerned with the aggregate quantities: the total welfare
of the people, and so on. But it is certainly wrong to consider welfare as
a simple aggregative principle. Considerations of welfare must include
comparisons of all kinds. Therefore this separation breaks down. (Note
that these are also absolute distributive principles, which are only simpler
and do not entail comparison in distribution.)
4.5.1. Freedom
Freedom, or more precisely human freedom, has been suggested as one
component of the level of living concept. Freedom must be implicitly con-
sidered, therefore, as a part of welfare. This assertion is probably rather
widely accepted: freedom must constitute an integral part of welfare;
thus there can be no welfare in the full sense of the term without freedom_
This still leaves the concrete relations between freedom and welfare rather
undefined, especially considering the amorphic nature of the content of
the concept of freedom. There exist very restricted views on what freedom
means (see, for example, the United Nations definition of the level-of-
living concept (1964)), but also such views that tend to see it as almost
identical with welfare.
In a well-known paper, Berlin (1967) divides the concept of freedom
into two categories: negative and positive freedom. Negative freedom
implies that a person is free from something, he is not hindered from doing
something (1967: 142). This concept could be called the bourgeois way of
seeing things (see Engels 1951: 119). The relationship of such a conception
of freedom to welfare is rather trivial; it is clear that to a certain extent,
such freedom is a necessary prerequisite of welfare but that it does not
constitute a part of welfare in itself. Although many economists do actually
classify, for example, freedom of choice — which is a clear type of negative
freedom — as a fundamental part of welfare, this is only partly so. It is
not the fact that a person is free to choose that implies well-being: he may
be free to choose from two equally odious alternatives (see Baran 1968: xii,
who gives some good examples of this type of freedom).
But the second category, positive freedom is much more enlightening.
This concept has elicited much more interest from philosophers and wel-
fare theorists. According to Berlin, it means man's ability to control him-
self and his surroundings. 	 wish to be a subject, not an object, to be
moved by reasons, by conscious purposes which are my own, not by causes
which affect me, as it were, from outside)) (Berlin 1967: 149). Barry (1965:
135), for example, adheres to this type of freedom when he defines freedom
as an ability to satisfy one's wants. This was also supported by Bertrand
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Russell, according to Barry. But even more obvious is that this concept
is exactly the Marxist way of defining freedom. Engels' famous passage
(1951: 121) gives to freedom precisely this content: man's ability to rule
himself and nature in order to satisfy his needs (see also Mandel 1968:
683-685). In this sense, as Berlin notes, »... the conception of freedom
directly derives from the view that is taken of what constitutes a self,
a person, a main (Berlin 1967: 152). This is just what was noted about
the conception of welfare. In this form, therefore, it is easily noted that
the concept of welfare and positive freedom are very closely related to
one another.
What does this mean with regard to the concept of welfare? It is obvi-
ous that an important component of welfare is man's ability to influence
nature and his own actions. That is, welfare must be understood in a much
more active sense than has been customarily the case. It is not only the
passive satisfaction of needs, but the active creation and rationalization
of needs: the production of means to satisfy needs. Although I must reject
the view that welfare and freedom are equal, it would be acceptable to say
that most of what is considered within the boundaries of the positive
freedom concept also applies to social welfare. I would actually say that
it is only the appellative — welfare — that more accurately conveys its
content, which makes it more convenient to use the name Fwelfare# instead
of »freedonD.
4.5.2. Justice and Equality
In justice, we find welfare's most ))formidable# contender as the major
principle according to which societies should be organized. One often hears
claims that if a society is not just (and free), it makes no difference whether
its people are living in abundance or not. In fact, many prefer to think of
justice as completely independent from welfare (Frankena 1962: 19), i.e.,
that it is possible to form criteria for justice independent of considerations
of welfare.
However, if we look at the definitions of justice (which are innumerable),
we soon see that justice independent of welfare is an impossibility. For
instance, Frankena defines a just society as ))one which respects the good
lives of its members and respects them equally. A just society must there-
fore promote equality: it may ignore certain differences and similarities
but must consider others: and it must avoid unnecessary injury, inter-
ference or impoverishment — all without reference to beneficence or general
utility> (Frankena 1962: 19). Frankena would obviously divide the con-
siderations of welfare-affecting factors into those which are based on
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justice and those which have their basis in welfare. This seems to me an
impossible distinction, although not without some merit. According to
the defenders of this thesis, welfare may conflict with justice in many
cases (see Rescher 1966: 43, 120). Rescher claims that we can equally as
well assert that welfare follows from justice than vice versa, and that justice
may be considered as the fundamental criterion: only under conditions
of justice may something which increases welfare be realized. This might
be called a conservative view: this can be used for instance to oppose the
increase of welfare through expropriation of property: because it is not
*just* to take from someone what he owns, we should not undertake such
action.1 But in more general terms, this is of course a rather pedestrian
dispute. Whether we consider justice or welfare as central depends mainly
on matters of definition. As Rescher points out, we may define justice in
restricted way, as merely *fairness and equity* or then, we may define it
in a broad sense, as justice which includes considerations of common good
(Rescher 1966: 91). Such a definition of justice is essentially a definition
of welfare. Thus our quarrel would solely involve a debate about which
one of these terms best expresses the general sense of a good society. I am
of the opinion that it is welfare; some think that it is justice.
However, considerations of justice and equality do entail some inter-
esting aspects which have remained outside the bounds of the forgoing
analysis.
If justice and welfare are inseparable in any broad sense of both con-
cepts, then justice and equality must in their general usage be similarly
inseparable. For instance, for Benn and Peters (1965: chapter 5) the con-
cept of justice cannot exist divorced from a concept of equality, and they
have little to remark about justice over and above equality. For Frankena,
there are some considerations of justice which are not related to con-
siderations of equality. His conception of justice can be seen as the equal
treatment of all persons, *except as inequality is required by relevant —
that is just-making — considerations or principles* (Frankena 1962: 13,
see also 10-12). Thus, it follows that equality is the fundamental prop-
erty of any just settlement of affairs, but that equality cannot be the sole
consideration. On the other hand, it can be noted that the consideration
of justice as a working principle entails a fundamentally congruent ap-
praisal as to whether a simple principle of equality (such as arithmetic
equality) can be sufficient. Therefore, considerations of justice and equality
1 Rescher formulates here a Reformer's Paradox: )>Given an imperfect existing initial dis-
tribution, any redistribution in the interests of arriving, from the standpoint of justice,
at a superior distribution, runs headlong into the pattern of existing claims that cannot —
in the interests of the very justice that provides the rationale for the entire enterprise — be
brushed aside as an irrelevant obstacle.>> (Rescher 1966: 120).
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are hopelessly (or hopefully) intertwined, at least in the modern sense of
justice.
According to Rescher (1966: 119), the most important fault of the wel-
fare principle is its failure to answer to the problem of claims: in other
words, whether two persons are really entitled to equivalent welfare.
(I shall return to this in considering distributive criteria.) This is however,
the fault of principles in general: in a society composed of active individuals,
to speak about principles according to which distribution should happen
is simply erroneous: as Rescher himself notes, human actions are essentially
claim-modifying (Rescher 1966: 55-56). If one considers welfare itself
as an activity, as I have done in the previous sections, this difference be-
tween welfare and claims disappears.
The principles of justice and equality have usually been connected with
distribution (of goods, services, etc.) as it is through distribution that the
principles of justice are thought to be observable (see,` or instance, Benn
Peters 1965: 124, 132-133; Frankena 1962: 10; Vlastos 1962). This was
not always the case: earlier, questions of political and legal equality were
in the foreground. Only in the eighteenth century did the idea of economic
equality, of total equality, including political, social and economic aspects,
rise to the surface (Social policy and the distribution of income in the
nation 1969: 26-27). The originator of this idea is considered to be Babeuf,
Recently we have experienced a revival of the older ideas of political and
legal justice (see especially Rawls 1961; also chapter 7 herein). Nonetheless,
a holistic idea of justice is still dominant (although Runciman complains
that the distinctions between economic, political and social justice are
not observed, and all the inclusive aspects are not noted (1966: 37)). One
remnant of incomplete approach is the idea of equal opportunity, so domi-
nant in American discussion. Here distribution is not pertinent, rather the
original starting points of individuals should be equal when the distributive
process starts (see Benn—Peters 1965: 137-138 for a critique of this prin-
ciple).
Accepting the idea that justice and distribution are connected, the
practice has been to seek for some principles according to which to dis-
tribute. According to Benn and Peters (1965: 126) equal distribution re-
quires that there be some basic human characteristic, such as human nature
or needs, on the basis of which this >xequal distribution)) could be accom-
plished. Some writers have proposed that considerations of distribution
are all based on the principle scum cuique tribuens (to each his own), but
as Rescher (1966: 6) notes, this principle is inadequate if we must divide
something which is not yet owned by anybody. It is therefore wrong to
consider ownership as the basic requirement for justice and see justice
always connected with ownership. There are various other criteria (or
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canons, see above) according to which distribution should be made (see
Rescher 1966: 73, Benn—Peters 1965: 157, Vlastos 1962: 35).
The list by Rescher is the most comprehensive, although not particu-
larly discriminative nor exclusive:
People should be treated either:
as equals,
according to their needs,
according to their ability or merit or achievements,
according to their efforts and sacrifices,
according to their actual productive contribution,
according to the requirements of common good, or the public interest,
or some other like principle, or
7. according to an evolution of their socially useful services in terms of
their scarcity (relative to supply and demand).
Excluding the first criterion which implies the obviously arithmetic
consideration of all people and therefore demands no more involved dis-
cussion, all others could be essentially divided into two groups: need-
based criteria and merit- (or desert-)based criteria, with merit seen in
different ways (Berm and Peters (1965: 157) add one more: that according
to property ownership, but this is only a form of merit). The second and
sixth of Rescher's canons could be considered need-based criteria, with
the latter entailing considerations of collective needs.
It has been conventional procedure after presenting such a list to
eliminate the criteria one by one, utilizing examples which demonstrate
that each criterion is not adequate. It should also be obvious to everybody
that these criteria, presented as parallel, independent criteria, cannot be
adequate .
All merit-type distributive criteria are actually at a different level
than need-type criteria. Distribution according to merit necessarily implies
a standard, by which a given act or property engenders merit. This refers
to precisely some criterion related to the welfare, or needs of people, should
we be concerned with justice. Therefore merit-type criteria cannot exist
as independent criteria. This means, in essence, that we have only one
criterion, that of needs, left to analyze. (Of course it is possible to relate
merit to service done to a dictator, or to the ruling class, — which are of
course real criteria — but here we are concerned with justice.)1
Some writers have also made their own suggestions for new and better
criteria, which are generally composites of other criteria — such as the
Rescher suggestion for a canon of claims (Rescher 1966: 81-83), which
1 The reader should be aware that these problems are here considered rather briefly, and
that there are many complications inherent in distributive principles which I have not men-
tioned.
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is a composite of all the other criteria, although not very satisfactory, as
it does not say what are the justified claims that men may have: another
problem for a distributive criterion — or then is unrelated to them, as the
Vlastos criterion that distribution be according to the agreements men
have made (Vlastos 1962: 35). This criterion is related to the constitution-
alist idea, or the justice-as-fairness principle, which I will analyze in chap-
ter 7.
I shall, however, concentrate on the criterion of needs, as it is nearest
to our problem of welfare. All the researchers mentioned here have been
unanimous in noting that the criterion of need is absolutely inadequate
as a distributive criterion. This is of course true, if it is considered ab-
stractly, independent of the other criteria. The consideration of need,
irrespective of existing objective conditions is of course impossible.'
Depending on conditions prevailing in the society, certain distributive
criteria are more important than others, nonetheless with ultimate regard
to the criterion of need. The function of society is to fulfill the needs of
its members (or better, to provide a frame for maximum fulfillment),
and this is possible only through material production and services which
then entail other distributive criteria, all, in the final analysis, depending
on the criterion of needs.
Rescher and Benn —Peters make special note of the point that the
criterion of need, is a #socialist# or a >>Marxist>> canon (Rescher 1966: 75,
Benn—Peters 1965: 162-163). It was presented by the utopian socialists
Babeuf and Blanqui and then accepted as a Marxist principle. (Social
Policy and the distribution of income . . . 1969: 30, remarks that Robes-
pierre was also in support of this criterion.)
According to the precepts of Marxism, there is no eternal standard of
justice, rather justice is contingent upon the level of development of the
society and of the conceptions of society. (See for instance Marx—Engels
1958: 553, Marx—Engels 1959: 14). Especially Engels criticizes the ideas
of the Proudhon school, who thought that there was a principle of justice,
according to which the functioning of societies could be judged (Marx —
Engels 1958: 550-552). It must therefore be emphasized that the so-
called Warxist» canon of needs is definitely not Marxist. It is true that
the famous dictum 4rom each according to his ability, to each according
to his needs>> was suggested by Marx to describe the Communist stage of
development, but this cannot be considered as a distributive maxim.
If everyone is assumed to take according to his needs, there would be no
'distribution' in the precise sense of the word. And no distribution accord-
1 Rescher admits this (1966: 105), but proceeds to consider the criteria as independent and
abstract principles regardless.
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ing to needs would be possible in earlier stages of societal development.'
Accusations about the inadequacy of the >>Marxist canon of needs)) were
rendered foundationless already when Marx himself remarked that justice
cannot occur beyond the level of economic and cultural development of
a given society, and that in socialist society, many other criteria should
be observed in order to allow for justice. In actuality Marx and Engels
considered the idea of canons of justice meaningless. It is only due to a
complete ignorance of the basic principles of historical materialism that
one could present a separate >>Marxist>> canon of justice, valid in all cir-
cumstances and therefore to be criticized also in all circumstances.
Marx espoused the 'modern' idea that justice must treat people differ-
ently to ensure equality (Benn—Peter 1965: 126-128, Barry 1965: 120).
Were people given complete equality, they would be in practice unequal,
because they are different. Justice cannot be use of a static yardstick for
all individuals, but the employment of different justice for different people.
In other words, Marx emphasized the principles of relative equality. But
for Marx and Engels justice was not a principle, but a property of society,
and particularly a property of a classless society. The content of a socialist
requirement of equality is the elimination of classes, says Engels (1951:
113). Anything that goes beyond this leads to absurdity. This assertion
could be perhaps claimed to be an equality of opportunity thesis in an
other form, but obviously this is not so. For the elimination of classes is
fundamentally different than solely providing or completely equal oppor-
tunity. The former of course, involves constant re-evaluation for pre-
venting the creation of classes.
For Marx and Engels, then, justice and equality were one and the same
thing, but the content of equality was extremely complicated and a great
deal more than a simple principle of absolute equality.2
But according to a Marxist standpoint, to approach justice as dis-
tributive justice is fallacious. Distribution has always been, as Marx notes,
only a consequence of the distribution of the requirements of production,
which is actually embodied in the nature of the mode of production (see
Marx—Engels 1959: 17, Marx 1970). Therefore, to analyze distribution as
independent from production is wrong, and thus is the whole approach
of distributive criteria. Marx divides the totality of production into three
1 See the »Critique of the Gotha programme>> (Marx—Engels 1958), also Social policy and
the distribution of income (1969: 37-38); also Lenin (1971: 67): »There will be no need for
society, in distributing products, to regulate the quantity to be received by each; each will
take freely according to his needs. >>
2 Lenin (1971: 63-64). See also Della Volpe (1970), who compares the views of Marx and
Engels with those of Rousseau, who, according to Volpe, was the first to acknowledge the
impossibility of arithmetic equality.
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main groups according to its use: the economically necessary part which
is needed for replacement and new production; nonindividual consumption:
administrative expenses, collective consumption to satisfy collective needs,
such as health and education; and individual consumption (Marx 1959:
14-15). The sectors available for distribution in the sense meant above,
are clearly those of collective and individual consumption. The Marxist
*criterion* of distribution demands that collective consumption (i.e., with
the exception of administrative expenses) be expanded and that indi-
vidual consumption diminish. This would mean simultaneously the elim-
ination of commodity production, which is perhaps a more accurate ex-
pression of the entire process.
But it is clear that any one distributive principle in itself is inadequate
to regulate all these aspects of consumption. In other words the whole
idea of distribution is wrong, as it is equally necessary to consider the
productive requirements and the existing mode of production.
4.6. Welfare as a Goal
It is rather obvious that what men want themselves can largely be des-
cribed as welfare. That is to say, the goals of men, each considered separ-
ately »are* welfare. Thus it can be said, if we deny that societies can have
autonomous goals — or goals which go against men's interests — that
welfare should be the primary goal of society. And many seem to take
it as self-evident that welfare indeed is the goal of any society, or at least
of the Western capitalist societies (see for instance Noponen 1971: 1).
It should be noted, however, that depending upon our definition, it
may be impossible to see welfare as an end. For instance, von Wright
(1963a: 91) notes that an end of some action must necessarily be a state
of affairs; welfare cannot be an end, because it is not a state of affairs.
In this context, however, I am referring to the commonsense conception
of welfare as a state of affairs (see above, p. 42). Von Wright also inter-
estingly notes (1963a: 89) that the claim that every end-directed act is
ultimately undertaken for the sake of the acting agent's welfare *has, to
the best of my knowledge, never been defended*. Yet this dep3nds on the
fact that von Wright separates pleasure, happiness and welfare.
Thus what he is essentially arguing is that a really comprehensive
conception of welfare has never figured in the analysis of welfare, which
is certainly true.
Officially, most states have set out to provide for their citizens some
sort of welfare (see International Survey of Programmes of Social Devel-
opment 1955: 3-4. Up until 1955, 45 countries had changed their con-
COMMENTATIONES SCIENTIARUM SOCIALIUM 4
	 59
stitutions in a way which included obligations about social rights and
welfare). Also the recent Declaration of Social Progress and Development
(1969) by the United Nations asserts in its 8th paragraph that ))it is the
primary duty and absolute responsibility of every government to secure
the welfare and social progress of each citizen)). And proceeds to specify
what it means by this welfare (see paragraph 10).
Nicholas Rescher has claimed that at least the following values exist
in Western societies:
the survival of the society,
the welfare of the society,
the progress of the society, and
the reality adjustment of the society (1969: 119).
More specifically, Philip Hauser, in his list of the aims of American
society presents goals which collectively constitute a rather comprehensive
definition of social welfare (Hauser 1968: 449-453).
Thus it can be seen that in the capitalist world and in the United Na-
tions, social goals are seen as closely related to welfare. This is even more
true of the socialist camp, where starting from Marx and Engels, the goals
of society (or the fundamental law of socialism) is seen as the full welfare
and development of the members of society.1
But can we infer from this that there is, in actual fact, a concrete aim
of welfare in modern societies to which all other aims are subordinated?
Certainly not. Already the fact that nobody knows exactly what welfare
is should substantiate this. But even this ambiguity is largely irrelevant
to the problem of whether there would be attempts to realize the welfare
of the people, were it known what such a concept actually consists of.2
To this latter question, the answer is rather certainly negative, at
least with regard to the capitalist countries.
Marx (1970c: 851) has expressed this with respect to capitalism, very
succinctly: ))It is a false abstraction to regard a nation, whose mode of
production is based upon value, and furthermore is capitalistically organ-
1 See e.g., Smirnov (1971: 19), Narski (1970: 405, 396); The Report of the Central Committee
of the CPSU to the 24th Congress of the CPSU: »The fundamental aim of the five-year plan
is to secure the significant rise in the material and cultural living conditions of the people
through the rapid pace of development of socialist production, the increase in its efficiency . . .
emphasizing that the rise in the welfare of the people is the highest aim of the policy of
the CPSU	 (p. 7).
2 Note that, for instance, Zaubermann (1967: 249— 250) claims that in the Soviet Union,
the true aim is simply the increase of the gross national product, of which it is well known
that it is not conceptually related to welfare. But this is certainly erroneous as we shall see.
It should also be noted that the concept of GNP has quite another meaning under rational
production than under uncontrolled production.
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ized, as an aggregate body working merely for the satisfaction of national
wants.))
Adolph Lowe (1969: 35-36), has pointed out that the only available
goals in capitalist societies are the full employment of resources and bal-
anced growth, neither of which are necessarily related to welfare. Although
I cannot quite agree with this, as capitalist society obviously has defined
for itself other tasks and thus is obviously striving to acheive other ends
as well, it is true that complete well-being as an end does not seem to be
possible.
Thus the problem of welfare as a goal has many dimensions. First
is the question whether, in a given society, it is at all possible to have
welfare as a collective goal. Then there is the question of what kind of
welfare societies should be striving for and finally the question of what
factors affect this welfare. I shall be concentrating here on the last two
questions, which are especially relevant to the conception of welfare.
I shall not try to attempt to answer the first question, which is the most
difficult, but which also can best be proved true or untrue by life itself.
5. Needs
5.1. The Importance of Needs
In the previous chapter we noted that needs could not be used as a dis-
tributive criterion alone (and questioned the idea of distributive criteria).
Needs are, however, fundamental to social policy . The reason par excellence
for the existence of a society is that it should fulfill the needs of its members.
Marx and Engels for example, see needs as the historical reason for the
creation of societies (see 1970: 48-49 and earlier). In their view as well,
the main goal of a classless society would be needs fulfillment, as discussed
above. (More exactly, the fulfillment of normal needs, by which they
meant satisfaction of all >>sensible>> needs regulated by the level of devel-
opment of society, and in the final stage, free from even this regulation;
see Rumjantsev 1969: 10-11).
But not every society is able to fulfill the needs of its members. Although
it may have historically developed, and assumed a specific form in response
to certain social needs, this same form may later become a fetter to the
fulfillment of the same need, or of other needs (see Marx—Engels 1970: 87).
From this it follows that we cannot infer that a society always fulfills
the needs of its members, only that it should do so in order to have a func-
tion, that is, a reason to exist in its specific historical form. As Kiviniemi
notes (1971: 1) there are quite a few comments, more or less ritualistic
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in nature, to this effect (see also Gross 1966: 214). On the other hand many
authors have sought to de-emphasize the importance of needs for social
policy (see p. 63).
Etzioni (1968: 623) has pointed out that the use of the concept of needs
enables us to speak of ))deviant# societies, — i.e., societies which do not
fulfill men's needs — thus allowing us to criticize existing societies in terms
of their degree of needs fulfillment, rather than solely the members of
society for not adapting to the social norm. But it should not be forgotten
that not only must societies adapt to men's needs, but that in reality the
source of the creation and moulding of men's needs lies in societal pro-
cesses. Thus we cannot speak of unchanging needs, as an outside criteria,
but must consider much more complicated processes. Therefore the Etzioni
suggestion is essentially a type of meeds-as-a-principlo solution, not
acceptable for reasons delineated above.
5.2. The Theories of Needs
There are innumerable 'theories' or classifications of needs and there is
no point in trying to mention more than but a few of them.
I will here employ the following strategy. First, I shall propose a pre-
liminary definition of need, a definition which is mainly formulated with
a view to the construction of this monograph and the role of needs in this
analysis. The definition of needs is unquestionably contingent on how one
conceives of the role of need in social policy, or in general. In what fol-
lows, I shall discriminate three different roles for need: as a principle, as
a property of the individual, or as a regulating variable. In each of these,
the concept of need is seen somewhat differently.
The primary objective here is to relate needs and welfare. Needs should
#explain# welfare; i.e., if we can demonstrate the existence of a need, then
we may assert that the fulfillment of this need is a necessity should we
wish to affect welfare positively. But it is obvious that this is not enough.
We can too easily lapse into circular reasoning: what is needed is welfare;
that which is welfare is also needed (see for instance Zwanikken 1963: 38,
who defines need as lack of welfare). Therefore, it follows that we must
find an independent foundation for needs.
One important point to which I shall return: by linking needs and wel-
fare we can distinguish the difference between need and want, which is
very important.
One possible solution would be to show that need is the link between
welfare and social action. This type of conception implies a definition of the
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following kind: Need is what determines and is determined by human
activity. It determines welfare in that if some need is fulfilled, welfare is
positively affected. (We are not now concerned with the subject of the
need, i.e., who experiences the need.) Of course, it is possible make the
connection to the reverse direction: that which is welfare determines what
is needed. (This is suggested in Kaufman 1971.) It is plausible to think
that need structure is to some extent determined by the particular idea
of a good life that the subject of need holds. But what is the idea of a good
life? Nothing else but an expectation which is determined by one's needs.
It is obvious that this is a circle which leads us nowhere. The solution
to this problem is of course found in its historical aspects. Needs are his-
torically determined, as is welfare.
This can also be expressed by saying that needs have a dual nature,
a duality of need. They express both man's dependence upon social and
natural conditions, as well as his strivings to develop himself and society.
We could here speak — in Marxist terms — of the dialectics between the
objective conditions and the subjective factor. Needs are embodied in
the objective conditions which regulate man's behavior, but they are
also part of the subjective factor — man himself who actively attempts
to control and regulate his surroundings.
In order to solve these problems we need an applicable theory of needs,
which would enable us to employ them operationally. This, however, is not
yet possible. We are not in a position to investigate men's needs nor the
needs of the collectivities he lives in objectively and scientifically. And
owing to the dual nature of needs it is improbable that we will ever be
able to do so, as the final criterion with respect to needs is man's subjective
activity, — the subjective processes of human cognition and awareness.
One extremely important specification is needed here. The object of
my analysis is needs as distinguished from wants. This is a well-known
distinction upon which many argumentations are based (cf. the famous
Barry distinction between want-regarding and ideal-regarding principles;
see Barry 1965). Also the problem of 'false consciousness' mentioned
briefly above is related to the question of needs vs. wants (see Kaufman
1971, Braybrooke 1968, Marcuse 1969, Marshall 1972: 18). By wants
I understand anything that men may wish to have (i.e., any kind of desires
and preferences). This is precisely what Barry envisages in his conception
of want-regarding prefences.
Need, on the other hand, is connected to a more basic idea: to the
question of what a human being is, to the ideas of a good life, welfare,
and so on. Therefore, needs are more basic, more fundamental than wants.
For every need there usually corresponds a want, or should anyway (unless
men are unconscious of their needs). But for every want there does not
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exist a need nor certainly could there.' Needs constitute criteria for the
desirability of wants (note that the concept of preferences is associated
with wants: what a man wants he prefers, and needs do not enter into
the question at all (Braybrooke 1968: 89).
Want is the central concept in welfare economics. In that field however,
attention is not addressed to the reasons or justifications for a want, only
to whether one exists or not. But from its very definition, it follows that
want cannot be associated, except in a summary, random fashion, to wel-
fare: whatever a man wants may or may not be relevant to his welfare.
This fact is essential to the ensuing analysis. The analysis in chapters 6
and 7 is based largely on the concept of wants, and constitutes an investi-
gation of the nature of welfare on the basis of wants. The chapters con-
cerning the level of living and social indicators, on the other hand, con-
centrate on needs.
The distinction between wants and needs is analogous to the above-
mentioned distinction between welfare and happiness. Welfare is related
to needs and happiness with wants, and the entire utilitarian tradition
has been connected with the concepts of happiness and wants; the needs
approach, conversely, could be spoken of as a 'Marxist' tradition, although
this is not strictly true.
It is well known that some authors (e.g., Rescher 1966, Braybrooke
1968, Barry 1967: 48) have tried to de-emphasize the importance of needs.
According to them needs cannot and should not be the central #criteriah
on the basis of which social policies are persued and distribution is effected.
Braybrooke (1968: 90) has developed a curious argument about the
danger of needs to social policy: because needs continually expand in the
sense that previously momentary activities become transformed into life-
long needs, the available space for preferences and wants is diminished.
This is undesirable he reasons, because needs are less ))democratic*, more
))authoritarian)) and paternalistic in their relationship to social choice and
welfare. (This is also related to the problem of false consciousness analyzed
above.) Kaufman (1971: 201) has presented an interesting argument against
such claims (through it should be recognized that Kaufman is certainly
not the originator of this argument). It is far better, argues Kaufman, to
try to determine people's real needs than to submit to »simply satisfying
wants that develop at random, as adventitious socializing processes permit
and promote)). According to Kaufman, then, wants, being wholly depen-
dent of such social processes and mechanisms, are a much more unreliable
1 Note also that there can be false needs in the sense that they are not connected with a good
life, but there cannot be false wants: that man is conscious of his every want is a tautology,
and a want is a want is a want, as Friedman would say.
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device than needs, which at least in some way separate the grain from
the chaff.
In the previous chapter we noted that needs could not be a distributive
principle by themselves but solely a sort of general regulative criterion,
a foundation for the whole society, connected with the more general idea
of welfare. Diametrically opposite to this, Barry has argued that need
per se cannot be a justificatory principle, as needs always require some
ultimate justification: an answer to the question for what purpose is some-
thing needed? Therefore it is not correct, according to Barry, to speak
of need as a same sort of principle as, say, merit (Barry 1965: 48-49).
Although I agree with Barry that needs cannot constitute a justificatory
principle in themselves, and also that we cannot regard need as the same
sort of principle as merit, it seems to me that Barry has built his con-
clusions on an erroneous foundation. Must we not make the same inquiries
about merit as about need? Merit is attributed to a deed because it has
furthered some cause (see, for instance, Della Volpe 1970: 104). What
makes need interesting is precisely its connection with society's ultimate
purpose, that of welfare.
The true reason for our rejection of need as a principle is its disregard
of the social prerequisites for need-fulfillment. Needs can be fully regarded
only when the society has the material, etc., prerequisites for this. Some
claim that there will always exist a scarcity of goods and services, and
therefore needs will never be fully satisfied, but as it has been pointed
out, some societies could already easily fulfill most of the needs of their
members with no material difficulties.
To sum up: needs are central for human welfare, for social activities
in general. This accounts for the special position of needs for social policy.
This does not mean, however, that needs could be used as a justificatory
principle for aggregative or distributive purposes. The fulfillment of needs
is not solved by manipulating an arbitary principle but by observing real
needs and existing resources and possibilities. Thus it is more relevant
to analyze the true nature of needs than to speak of needs as principles.
5.3. Fundamental Classifications
There is no generally accepted theory of needs (Kiviniemi 1971: 26) nor
does there exist a completely developed Marxist theory of needs, although
Marx and Engels and numerous subsequent students have written about
needs extensively. There are many different and contradictory classifi-
cations of needs, but we lack an analysis of the causes and origins of needs,
i.e., their connection to society as well as an analysis of the actual position
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of needs in social development. Of course the many existing classifications
do imply certain relationships between society and the role of needs.
First, we must distinguish between the need and the subject of the
need, i.e., the person — or collectivity who has a need (not necessarily ex-
periences it) — and the object of need — i.e., the object with which the need
can be fulfilled. The objects of need are not always material objects: such
things as love, knowledge, etc., may also be the objects of need.'
In the following I shall speak mainly of needs in general, but in some
cases it will be necessary to distinguish between the subject and object
of need.
There are two fundamental ways to classify needs, namely according
to 1) the nature of the need, and 2) the origin of the need. Classifications
concerning the nature of the need are those where needs are classified with
regard to their fundamentality and to their content (i.e., health, etc.).
Classifications according to the origin of the need relate to whether needs
are individual, social or biological, etc. But in this analysis it is important
to distinguish between questions concerning whether a certain need is
necessitated by a biological function of man, or whether the need is actually
conditioned and modified by the society: i.e., which is more relevant to
the analysis of the need itself. This problem is made still more complicated
by the dual nature of needs: we must consider both problems simultane-
ously.
5.3.1. Basic Needs
The most important distinction with regard to the nature of needs is
undoubtedly the discrimination between basic and other needs. By basic
needs is meant needs that are, by some criteria, considered necessary
human needs. These needs are imperative for people to be able to live
and develop themselves. There is some divergency about the nature of
basic needs but most would agree that such needs as eating, health, habi-
tation etc., are among the most fundamental. There are also different
views of how basic needs are actually contrived, that is, which criteria
should be used in analyzing and defining them. Some see them as solely
biological in nature, some again as social. This is a controversy we shall
have to return to later.
The distinction between basic and other needs has a long history. Pip-
ping claims that it was first presented by Senior (Pipping 1953: 48), yet
it has never been completely specified. As Robinson notes, in every society
1 Finding the objects of need is certainly the fundamental objective of social policy.
5
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there is some notion of distinction between this daily bread and commodi-
ties beyond this (Robinson 1971: 25).
One important property of basic needs is that they function as the
primary feedback channels through which information of the quality of
the society is directed. If a certain basic need is not fulfilled, there will
certainly result a strong wave of feedback from the affected group (either
in the form of death or of some disruptive activity).
In the analysis of basic needs, the fundamental question to be reckoned
with is that of what makes a need basic. The question of the nature of
a need in itself tells nothing about the causes of the need's basicness.
There are many innate and frequent needs which can not be considered
basic. Examples of such needs are for instance the need to bite one's finger-
nails, the eliminability of which is also questionable. But eliminability
is a concept that is closely connected with basicness. However, it can
hardly be considered a criterion of basicness (see Kiviniemi 1971: 53 for
a discussion of these criteria).
The most obvious and common criterion for basicness is that of bio-
logical (or physiological) necessity. Ahmavaara has provided the most
exhaustive list of biological needs (based on unconditional reflexes), a list
which is probably very typical among psychologists:
the need for air to breathe and an environment necessary for the func-
tioning of the vital organs,
need for food,
need for security,
need for movement, and
5. the sexual need (Ahmavaara 1970: 134-136).1
According to Ahmavaara, biological needs are characterized by the
following properties:
They are inherent and cannot be increased in or decreased by will.
Biological needs are activated through repetitive physiological states
of deficiency with a definite upper limit.
3. The fulfillment of each biological need is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for the biological welfare of the individual (see Ahmavaara
1970: 136).
But as Etzioni (1968: 624) and Benn—Peters (1965: 165-166), for
example, point out, biological needs are completely abstracted from society.
In themselves they are necessary for a person to survive in any circum-
stances. However, basicness is certainly a social concept.
There is nothing in the nature of any need that in itself would demand
that society satisfy it. A society may well let its members die of malnu-
1 Jyrki Noponen (1971) has based his analysis of welfare wholly on this classification.
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trition, or of exposure, even if it is an affluent society. But even though
society would take into consideration most of the basic needs (in the bio-
logical survival sense), it is through society that the amount and nature
of fulfillment of these needs is determined. Merely from the existence
of a biological need we cannot deduce anything about how it is fulfilled
in a given society.
However, it is certainly true that men have such needs the fulfillment
of which is a necessity for simple survival. And precisely these needs must
be seen as basic. The functioning of the society is largely centered around
the fulfillment of these needs. Therefore, in my view the approach exemp-
lified here by Etzioni and Sklair, who define basicness as something com-
pletely different, following entirely from the nature of a given society
and being related to the superstructure of this society, is not very fruitful.
In my opinion a basic need is one related to the survival of man which
causes social activities that in turn create new methods to fulfill basic
needs and which also create previously unknown needs, specific to a given
social formation.
In the view of Etzioni (1968: 624-626), 'basic human needs' are needs
specific to man, human needs are not the 'profane' needs common to man
and animal. He suggests the following basic human needs:
a need for affection (solidarity, cohesion, love)
a need for recognition (self-esteem, achievement, or approval)
a need for context (orientation, consistency, synthesis, meaning, 	 or
»wholeness»), and
repeated gratification, (ibid.).
These needs are obviously specific only to small groups and not to
societal activity (to the »Gemeinschaft», not to the »Gesellschaft»). Any
of them can be fulfilled in a group of three. Therefore I would propose
that these are »needs» basic to the analysis of happiness, but not to the
analysis of welfare. Men will not be completely happy unless these »wants»
are fulfilled, but they do not regulate nor are they alone significant for the
functioning of the society. Any society would function — and some would
say well — without the fulfillment of any fo these needs.
For our purposes, these needs cannot therefore by any means be basic,
only some desirable qualities of social intercourse in small groups.
Thus it follows that the Etzioni description of 'basic human needs'
is very far from what we should regularly consider as basic needs. It is
true that the normal basic needs are common to both man and animal
to some extent, but it is only man who has built an enormous social struc-
ture to fulfill these needs; i.e., it is mostly in man that these needs are
socialized (see also Marx 1964). Therefore, it is wrong to say, as does Sklair
(1970: 191) that with nutrition, shelter and sleep and nothing else, the
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individual could survive as an animal, as a member of the human species,
on the basis of the satisfaction of his biological needs)). Both Sklair and
Etzioni ignore the fact that nutrition and shelter alone imply a fantastic
amount of various social activities. Through these social activities new
needs are created, the base of these needs being exactly the needs of nu-
trition and shelter.
Both Sklair and Etzioni speak of basicness in an essentially unhistorical
context, as a quality of almost any currently prevalent needs. It is obvious
that many definitely non-basic needs can be conceived of as basic by some
people in some circumstances. But what is important here is why certain
needs come to exist and why they seem to be basic in the sense of necessary
(such as a private car, in some instances).
The social quality of basicness is well expressed in the definitions of
basic needs as course-of-life needs — needs for living in a certain manner.1
Course-of-life needs, needs constituting a complex of necessary social
activities expresses well the idea of a basic need. They are not simply
biological, although we can say that their origin is in the biological pro-
cesses. But the biological processes never determine the outcome of the
need in a given society. And from the social policy point of view, this is
what is most important.
The question of how to define the entirety of needs existing in a society
and how to classify them, is of course an extremely pertinent question.
As previously noted, basic needs are only the beginning, the base of a
complete hierarchy of needs created by social activities themselves. One
of the most famous attempts to define a hierarchy of needs comprising
other than solely basic needs is the Maslow needs hierarchy, which, although




needs for solidarity, context and acceptance
need for self-respect and status
need for self-realization
need to know, learn, discover
7. need for symmetry, beauty, esthetical qualities.
Maslow assumes a hierarchical structure with primary emphasis on
physiological and security needs before others. Inspection reveals that
1 See Benn—Peters (1965: 165-166), Braybrooke (1968: 90); both Braybrooke and Benn-
Peters then define another category of needs, called 'adventitious' or 'functional' which
refers to a category of needs not always present, depending on the situation.
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this classification and, for instance, the Ahmavaara classification scarcely
differ. Both include the implicit assumption that needs are autonomous
and independent of society. But if one examines the various needs men-
tioned by Maslow, it is obvious that some of these are clearly inseparable
from society, and all of these needs are social in the sense employed here.
The need to know and learn is definitely a need created by social
development, by the necessity of the scientific-technological revolution.
The need for a certain status is created by the social structure. As pre-
viously noted, needs for security and physiological needs can no more
be fulfilled by the individual, but only by the society.
And what about the need for self-realization, the need which, according
to Marx is the goal of man? It is certainly a fundamental need, if not a
basic need. But it contains certain difficulties: what does self-realization
mean? From a certain point of view it is equivalent to welfare: i.e., man is
well off when he can realize himself. Therefore it is the embodiment of all
needs: if we say that a man's needs are fulfilled this is the same as saying
that he has realized himself and this again the same as saying: he is well-off,
his welfare is absolute.
Therefore we cannot include self-realization into the list of man's
needs for the same reasons that we cannot speak of a meed# for welfare,
as this would imply speaking of a need of all needs, or of a need to fulfil
needs. We merely assume that the fundamental objective of man is his
welfare, or self-realization.
On the whole one can say that Maslow's needs hierarchy certainly
contains elements that are essential to the understanding of the working
of society and man, but these are abstracted out of their context, as when
one tries to specify a first impression. It is thus, in many ways astonishing
that sociologists have for so long been contended to rely on this list.1
If one compares the Maslow hierarchy and the Markovic description
of ideal praxis (see above, p. 44) we can immediately see that they are
somewhat alike. This confirms the assumption that Maslow's catalogue
contains something very essential for welfare analysis. But as needs should
be the central intermediate variables between social activities and social
welfare, their hierarchical listing is obviously inadequate. We must try
to get a conception of how these needs are, in reality, related to each other
and to social welfare.
1 Erik Allardt has remarked that it is somewhat unjust to criticize the Maslow classification
on these grounds as Maslow developed his classification for clinical practice. What is
interesting, however, is that it has gained an immense popularity and has been used much
more widely, as well as by Allardt himself.
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5.4. The Marxist Conception of Needs
The subject of need in historical materialism is one of profound compli-
cation. On the other hand, many claim that need is the central concept of
Marxism and the tenet of the whole Marxist system; some have made
needs as a point of separation between Marxism and other philosophical
and ethical systems. This has been disclaimed by Kaufman (1971) who,
on the contrary, claims that Marxism and liberalism converge on human
needs and that liberalism is essentially interested in needs and not wants.
In any case the problem of needs is not the pivotal point of argument for
historical materialism in comparison with other philosophical systems.
For instance Etzioni (1968: 623) distinguishes between the Meadian
and Parsonsian, and Marxian and Weberian traditions, of which according
to Etzioni, the former does not speak of 'basic' needs in the sense of things
which are necessary for human existance and the latter of which starts
from alienation and basic needs. Here Etzioni in effect claims that needs
are autonomous; social, yes, but at the same time independent criteria to
determine what is the proper functioning of society.
But Etzioni is mistaken in his claim that his approach is related to
the Marxist conception of needs. For Marx did not fall prey to Etzioni's
'easy' solution where certain needs are postulated and a critique of society
is thus possible. Marx saw needs as continually changing depending on
the level of developing of the society, and on the nature of the needs
fulfillment processes. But Marx did not only see that needs are dependent
on social development but also that social development was dependent
on needs, that needs regulated the definite form of social production
(Marx 1963).
Note that the problem here is of the unhistorical nature of Etzioni's
analysis. The creation of needs and production are both closely inter-
twined historical processes and cannot be analyzed independent of each
other at a certain moment of history.' Thus it seems that the Etzioni
solution is an overly simplicistic one in relation to the nature of needs.
There cannot be a universal standard according to which societies could
be compared or assessed. This has definite implications for the concept
of welfare and for the use of welfare in social policy.
The study of man and his activities naturally leads to the problem of
needs. And it is unquestionably true that the fulfillment of men's needs
is the central objective of communist society (see for instance Rumjantsev
1 I am not saying that there is a complete polarity. Etzioni and other bourgeois sociologists
do not claim that needs are not at all related to society, nor that they are totally without
historical context: my argument is that although this may be conceded their emphasis is
still on the autonomous, unhistorical aspects of needs.
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1969: 10-11). But it is not so simple as some would believe: just estimate
needs and then determine production, etc. It is a gross oversimplification
to treat needs as independent criteria for social policy, and Marxist analysis
has especially centered around this problem.
It is obvious that Marx never developed (nor have any subsequent
Marxists) a complete theory of needs. But needs played, however, a very
central role in the Marxian system. Expressed abstractly, they serve as
a link between the material basis of the society, material production, and
the totality of human activity, praxis (see for instance Markus 1969: 56,
Lefebvre 1968: 48-50). But the nature of the relationship between ma-
terial production, needs and praxis is not a simple one, and in the following
I will attempt to clarify it.
We may begin with the following definition: >Needs are the requirements
for the existence and development of social and individual life which are
expressed and develop historically primarily in the production and repro-
duction processes)) (WOrterbuch der marxistisch-leninistischen Soziologie
1969: 53). In the needs of man the dependence of man upon his natural
and social environments is expressed, according to Marx, in the production
of material conditons of existence, in production and reproduction and
simultaneously in striving to develop physical and psychological strengths
and abilities in the productive activity and social and human relations.
The satisfaction and development of needs are connected inseparably
with the entirety of the activities of the members of society. They serve
in a many-faceted way to provide for the development of personalities
with a greater capacity for living a fuller life (WOrterbuch der marxistisch-
leninistischen Soziologie 1969: 54).
This definition seems to be the most adequate from the point of view
of the ensuing analysis. What separates it from usual definitions is its
connection with the processes of production and reproduction. This is
what especially interests me here.
In general, the contribution of Marxist analysis to the theory of needs
lies especially in the analysis of two processes: the process of social creation
of needs and the process of the fulfillment of needs. It is obvious that these
two processes are central to a needs theory. Especially the process of the
social creation of needs has been subject to much misunderstanding)) (or
mispresentations) as we shall see. In both of these processes the concept
of praxis plays a very important role: through praxis, needs are being
formed but needs also regulate praxis in the form of needs fulfillment.
The major insights gained through this analysis are first, the connection
of needs with material production and the understanding of needs as a
historical process, and secondly, the association of needs with specific
social formations implying that there are no arbitrary needs: there are no
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needs without a social wrigin>>. This latter point is especially relevant as
many, in connection with needs, emphasize non-social, biological and
other factors.
The item of greatest centrality in the Marxist theory of needs is the
emphasis on the historical nature of needs. Needs are developed historically,
in social action and are in no way innate, constant, nor given by nature.
)>The various shaping of material life is, of course, in every case dependent
on the needs which are already developed, and the production, as well as
satisfaction of these needs is an historical process)) (Marx—Engels 1970:
87) .1
The only independent, original need, is the meed» for survival (see
the famous passage in the German Ideology (Marx—Engels 1970: 48).2
This implies the fulfillment of such needs as eating, drinking, shelter,
etc., which form the basis of material production. Production, therefore,
arises out of needs, out of the necessity for survival. But when men enter
into material production, when they begin to work, they simultaneously
affect their needs: production begins to create and alter needs. And as
these needs do not necessarily relate to material production, the thigher-
level)) needs are created. These needs are therefore in no way innate: as
Marx says, it is not important whether these needs come from the stomach
or from the head, their origin is social all the same.3
In his well-known analysis of the relationships of production, consump-
tion and distribution, Marx notes that production in the first place instigates
consumption (the fulfillment of needs) along with its material object.
»Comsumption without an object is not consumption», hence from this
point of view production creates and produces consumption.
))13ut it is not only the object that production provides for consumption.
It gives consumption its definite outline, its character, its finish. Just as
consumption gives the product its finishing touch as product, production
1 sThe consumer is no freer than the producer. his judgement depends on his means and
his needs. Both of these are determined by his social position, which itself depends on the
whole social organization. True, the worker who buys potatoes and the kept woman who
buys lace both follow their respective judgements. But the difference in their judgements
is explained by the difference in the positions which they occupy in the world, and which
themselves are the product of social organization.s
sIs the entire system of needs founded on estimation or on the whole organization of pro-
duction? Most often, needs arise directly from production or from a state of affairs based on
productions (Marx 1963: 41— 42). See also Marx (1965: 41— 42), Rumjantsev (1969: 8— 9),
Gorz (1971: 81, 103).
2 It should be noted that Marx and Engels were followed by, for instance, Marshall in this
view of the nature of needs (about this, see Myint 1948: 134-135).
3 Marx (1967a: 35). Thus, the development of schemes where for every human activity-
(class of human activity) there is a corresponding biological need, must be considered errone-
ous from the Marxist point of view.
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puts the finishing touch on consumption. For the object is not simply an
object in general, but a definite object, which is consumed in a certain
definite manner prescribed in its turn by production. Hunger is hunger;
but the hunger that is satisfied with cooked meat eaten with fork and
knife is a different kind of hunger from the one that devours raw meat
with the aid of hands, nails and teeth. Not only the object of consumption,
but also the manner of consumption is produced by production not only
objectively, but also subjectively. Production thus creates the consumers*
(McLellan 1971: 25).
This point has been emphasized, for instance, by Gorz (1971: 82),
and Markus (1969: 55). According to them, it is not possible to compare
situations where the *same* need is fulfilled in two different, socially-
conditioned ways. As Gorz notes, it is meaningless to ask whether a man
who eats red meat, white bread, travels by car and is clothed in manu-
factured fibres lives better than a man who eats black bread and potatoes,
travels by bicycle and is clothed in cotton. The existing forms of production
simply do not allow a choice. One can only live in a certain, relatively
well-defined manner (of course there are possibilities to deviate, but these
are not available to the majority of people). In other words, material
production, and society in general, define rather conditionally the needs
of man. But not of course completely. As Marx notes, continuing the above-
cited passage from the German Ideology (Marx—Engels 1970: 87):
*The conditions under which individuals have intercourse with each
other, so long as the above mentioned contradiction is absent, are con-
ditions appertaining to their individuality, in no way external to them;
conditions under which these definite individuals, living under definite
relationships, can alone produce their material life and what is connected
with it, are thus conditions of their self-activity and are produced by this
self-activity. The definite condition under which they produce, thus cor-
responds, as long as the contradiction has not yet appeared, to the reality
of their conditioned nature, their one-sided existence, the one-sidedness
of which only becomes evident when the contradiction enters on the scene
and thus exists for the later individuals.*
Thus production relations and the form of production come into con-
tradiction; i.e., it is not always possible to fulfill needs under given relations
of production, under given forms of production.
Marx analysed very efficiently precisely the process in which capitalist
society creates needs which actually are inhuman, which come into con-
tradiction with the socially-conditioned nature of man.
In the Marxist analysis, what distinguishes man from animal are not
the so-called human needs as distinct from 'animal' needs (such as eating,
shelter, etc.) but the fact that while animal is an immediate needs-satisfier,
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man satisfies his needs indirectly, through social activity, through work
(see Markus 1969: 48-49). Therefore one of the most important theor-
etical-philosophical mistakes of 'Marxist' analysis is to claim that Marx
saw man as the victim of biological needs (for instance Kolakowski; see
Markus 1969: 50 and Marcuse 1969: 10-11, 16-17).
These presentations ignore the fact that Marx especially emphasized
the historical nature of needs. It is of course true that .man is a creature
of needs, but these needs are created through material production, through
work. As Markus notes, when we forget this historical determination
of human needs, when we see needs as primary and absolute, then the
opinions of Marx are biologized and anthropologized>> (Markus 1969: 51).
Thus, in a sense we can say that work is the essence of man, and not
needs. Man exists, not through needs but through work. Needs are only
intermediary processes from this point of view. But in the final analysis
it is the combination needs-work-needs which is important, i.e., needs
come first and last with work as the central process related to needs.
The Marxist analysis of 'higher' needs therefore is not that there exist
some 'higher' biological needs, to which some of man's activities correspond,
but that starting from the fulfillment of the basic needs for existence
through material production, in the process of this material production,
new needs are created.'
Only because of this is it possible that alongside material production,
other forms of human 'production' are born, as well, such as religion,
family, state, justice, morals, science, etc. According to Marxist analysis,
biological needs by themselves would only create material production,
and nothing else, only through material production are other needs created
which cause other forms of human activity, or the totality of human activ-
ity, praxis.
It is no surprise that Marxists themselves are not unanimous about
the analysis of needs in Marx. It is fairly obvious that, for instance, the
analysis of Mandel deviates noticeably from the above view. According
to Mandel, needs are extremely stable. All throughout history there has
existed half a dozen basic needs such as food, clothing, shelter, exercise,
and maintenance of the species. When one adds to this list the needs for
hygiene and health plus the needs for the enrichment of leisure, we have,
according to Mandel, reached the point where almost all consumption is
explained (Mandel 1968: 660).
Nor is there an infinite variety of means to satisfy these few basic
needs. >Mere is first, the problem of the quantity of the products required
1 Markus 1969: 56: »Es entwickeln sich in den Menschen Bediirfnisse ihres Zusammenlebens,
die keine biologische Gegebenheiten, ja nicht einmal die Humanisation biologischen Bediirf-
nisse sindh, see also Lefevbre 1968: 49).
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to meet these needs. On this point, history has already provided an answer,
on the part of the possessing classes of our era. Between the stout country
squire of the early nineteenth century stuffing himself with roast beef
and swilling port wine, or the big bourgeoisie of the *Belle Epoque* with
his twenty course dinners, on the one hand, and on the other, the rich
capitalist of today, slim, devoted to sport, and constantly watching his
weight, the change is undeniable* (Mandel 1968: 661).
In fact, needs and the ways to meet them are diminishing — becoming
more rational with the result that the variety of production can be dim-
inished accordingly, says Mandel.
To fall prey to this sort of argumentation is very understandable.
As innumerable critics have pointed out, the determination of needs is
a complicated process and the existing alternatives are not very interesting
(asking people, defining needs 'scientifically', and so on; see Waltuch
1972: 13-19, Soviet Economic Reform: 26-29).
There is a temptation to regress, therefore, into claiming that needs
are actually simple, easy to determine and so on. But this is certainly not
a truly Marxist solution to the problem.
Mandel's argument is very interesting. With respect to the thrust of
his argument, it seems obvious that there should at least be a tendency
towards simpler and more rational consumption for environmental, cul-
tural, egalitarian and other reasons, but whether there actually exists
such a tendency is rather doubtful. On the contrary, even the rich capitalist
does not shy the comforts of life, and to reach his level of comfort for
everybody, we can say that needs, and the means to satisfy them are prac-
tically unlimited.
This is the factual side of the argument. Theoretically, some important
defects of the analysis should be clear by now. In the first place, Mandel
explicitly ignores everything else except material production. In another
passage he even points to a source of *dangerous confusion* with respect
to needs. Such needs as the need to investigate, know and create, teach,
etc. are, according to Mandel, not needs at all. *What we have here are
more and more complex and elevated forms of activity, of human praxis
becoming more and more universal. Including these in the same category
of *needs* can give rise to many misunderstandings* (1968: 664).
In other words, Mandel seems to deny the connection of praxis with
needs. He does not see that through material production, through the
satisfaction of his few basic needs, a variety of needs is created. It is true
that these needs do not have the same status as the need for eating, but
from the point of view of society, and of social man, they are inseparable.
Without the combination of needs and praxis, needs carry little interest,
except for the *3imple* determination of what to produce (but even this
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determination is definitely not possible unless the totality of man's activity,
praxis, is regarded). The temptation of this argument is obviously under-
standable from the economic point of view (also Bettelheim has succumbed
to the same error, see Bettelheim 1967: 58-65).
The second important defect is seen in the point made by Gorz: The
historical form taken by the basic need must not be confused with the
proper historical need)) (1971: 93); i.e., the existing production levels and
relations determine how the need is satisfied, determine the nature of the
need. Therefore it is erroneous to assert that throughout history there have
existed half a dozen basic needs, when actually these needs have been
constantly changing their nature and their appearance. As Marx himself
notes (1963: 40):
ahe estimation of our needs may change; therefore the utility of things,
which expresses only the relations of these things to our needs, may also
change. Natural needs themselves are continually changing. Indeed, what,
could be more varied than the objects which form the staple food of dif-
ferent peoples!)>
The importance of the second problem mentioned by Gorz comes espe-
cially to the foreground when we analyze the actual formation of needs
in capitalist society, a problem which was rather prominent in Marx.
6. Welfare Economics and Welfare
6.1. What Is Welfare Economics?
Welfare economics has been compared with astrology, the relationship of
economics and welfare economics being the same as that of astronomy
and astrology (Boulding 1952: 5). This is in many ways a very accurate
comparison,' and the main reason for studying welfare economics in the
traditional sense is either to see the uselessness of economics in problems
of policy-making at the highest level or to study some of the most elaborate
parts of economics (especially the social optimum). But there are various
concepts and classical problems in welfare economics that still deserve
attention and that are closely bound up with the problems presented in
the previous sections.
1 Boulding probably had in mind only the attempt to give a scientific basis to a problem not
amenable to scientific analysis, or to create scientific propositions from nothing, but as
astrology usually only gives a favorable prediction of one's future, in the same way welfare
economics is concerned with giving a good impression of the society in which it exists.
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Here we may cite William Vickrey, who, albeit pessimistic of the
potential of welfare economics, notes that even if the tools of research
are not perfect, research in welfare economics provides guidance with
respect to the directions wherein answers may best be sought (Vickrey
1960: 535).
In welfare economics proper there are two traditions which cover the
whole field: these are classical welfare economics and the 'new welfare
economics' or neoclassical welfare economics.' In a strict sense, or to keep
matters clear, that is all there is to welfare economics: what happened
before or after 1950 (see footnote) does not entail a development of welfare
economics proper, but either scrutiny of the old principles or development
in a wholly new field. This will be elaborated in the following section, but
in what follows it must be borne in mind that 'welfare economics' covers
only classical and neoclassical welfare economics, and this is what is studied
in the present chapter.
There are many varied views on the actual goal of welfare economics.
They range from claims that *. . welfare economics deals with the ways
in which economic phenomena, activities and institutions affect organisms;
personality systems; social structure; the body of cultural forms; the
natural and artificial physical organic environment as unit-objects in
instrumental and relational modalities; and the development of individual
capacities for welfare-relevant activities* (Gintis 1969: 7), to the more
modest objective of defining a social optimum. On the latter there seems
to be relatively wide consensus. For instance, Arrow (1951: 923) says that
welfare economics has tried to answer four questions:
What is the content of the 'maximization of social welfare'?
What are the 'optimum' conditions?
In which circumstances are these not identical with the conditions of
perfect competition? and
What are the practical consequences of the answers to questions 2 and 3?2
It can probably be safely said that the concept of welfare has not been
an object of study in welfare economics. Contrary to the claims of Arrow,
1 According to Sen (1970: 56), new welfare economics has reigned between 1939 and 1950.
The former marks the year of the publication of Nicholas Kaldor's article on his compensation
principle, and 1950 denotes the year of the first presentation of the Arrow theorem.
2 According to Boulding (1952: 2 — 3) new welfare economics has had such objectives as
1) to clarify and quantify the vague concept of »riches», and 2) to clarify what it is that econ-
omists have to say on matters of public policy, which has led to a search for a definition of
an economic »optimum». Judgments have also been passed by outsiders: Parsons and Smelser
(1965: 30) see the objectives of welfare economics as the study of individual satisfaction of
happiness and the problem of the social optimum. 	 •
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above, welfare economics has actually concentrated on the problem of
a 'social' optimum and on finding criteria to compare different social
situations. The finding of these particular criteria has been connected
with the problems of applying welfare economics — a subject of much
heated discussion.
Welfare economics has been seen as a discipline with a function identical
to medical science: the objective of both is helping mankind, which does
not change the nature of the discipline itself (Reder 1947: 14). This parallel
is somewhat suspect because the subject of welfare economics is society,
which presents very different problems with respect to application from
those encountered by medical science.
There is also the belief that welfare economics as a subject is completely
neutral: whatever the political leanings of the practitioners of welfare
economics, it serves them equally well.' This claim is based on the existence
of socialist writers who have in fact made significant contributions to wel-
fare economics (Lange 1964, 1969, Lerner 1944).
This leads us directly to the problem of what is 'value-free' and 'scien-
tific'; problems that have busied welfare economists past and present.2
I shall not pursue these problems here. Yet, it can probably be said
that the majority of the views presented by welfare economists on these
matters are either incorrect or insignificant.
It is interesting to note how welfare economists have pondered the
problems of applying welfare economics even while they have been the
first to admit that the practical application possibilities are not very good
(see de Graaff 1957: 168, Little 1963: 1). But some of them have been
rather optimistic. Mishan, for example, believes that in the main, welfare
economics should direct itself to showing the negative side of economic
growth, and take up the problem of whether the existing system is accept-
able or not (Mishan 1964: xiv, 1968: 81). Even more extravagant claims
have been cited above (p. 77). From what follows it will become obvious
that the belief that the application of welfare economics is possible in
a harmonious society, where conflicts are efficiently suppressed, and the
controlling of conflicts happens according to generally accepted means
(Sweden and Netherlands are given as examples; Adler —Karlsson 1970:
47) is not realistic.
». . . a comprehensive system of scientific welfare economics provides welfare economists
of all shades of political opinions with the basic tools of analysis they require, its foundation
and methods are largely independent of the 'philosophical preconceptions' of any group of
these economists» Myint 1948: 219.
2 Boulding (1952: 3); for a review, see Nath (1969). Nath's views, however, are not free from
naive beliefs in the separability of value and fact. See also Sen (1970: 56 59).
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6.2. The Development of Welfare Economics
6.2.1. General Remarks
Thorough treatment of a subject such as the development of welfare econ-
omics would require a great deal of space. What is attempted here is a
survey of the highlights of its development. There are many interesting
connections between social policy and welfare econimics: i.e., to the extent
that welfare economics can claim to be the counterpart of Sozialpolitik as
it came to be known in Germany, or at least lay claim to a common origin,
viz. an attempt to utilize economic theory in solving public issues.'
It is customary to approach the origins of social policy (in the sense of
Sozialpolitik) as stemming from the Verein fur Sozialpolitik (see Nieminen
1955), but historically it is evident that the Verein was only one of numerous
tendencies long existent in the development of classical economics. Just
as the Verein was an answer to the development of capitalism in Germany,
so was the development of classical economics a response to the rise of
capitalism in England. The writings of Adam Smith as well as those of
Ricardo, Malthus, and Mill were occupied not only with the problems
of discovering the fundamental laws of capitalism, but also with giving
recommendations on how to solve the problems that arose along with
capitalism.2 The opposite of these responses, although originating from
the classical tradition as well, is Marx' attempt to expose capitalism's
laws of motion, and its derivative practical social consequences (see Marx
1967, 1970).
Historically, then, the study of welfare economics originated in a con-
cern for a broader economics that would include the entire social organism.3
1 Relatively few comments on welfare economics exist in the literature on social policy and
these comments do not emphasize the connections between social policy and welfare econ-
omics, being content simply to mention the existence of welfare economics (cf. Nieminen 1955:
177, Dich 1964: 43). For an exception, see Liefmann —Keil (1961), where the author uses
some methods of welfare economics.
2 See Herz (1961), Myint (1948), Ruotsalainen (1971). Erdsaari has pointed out that it should
not be forgotten that Sozialpolitik was born out of a criticism of traditional German econ-
omics. I concede this, but this critique was particularly directed against the uselessness of
the extant economics for studying the modern economy.
See Myint (1948: 206-207), who credits J. M. Clark, Frank Knight and Thorsten Veblen
in particular with such views, and assumes that it was probably in the discussion at the
beginning of the 20th century that the term welfare economics came into being. Although
these economists (Clark and Knight) were rather conservative, they were nonetheless critical
of the existing theories of economics and of the narrowness of their assumptions.
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This is not far from the originally Smithian view that production must
serve social needs rather than being a goal in itself (Pipping 1955: 41).
This has been especially emphasized in Marxist literature simultaneously
showing that capitalist production is not at all adapted to serving social
needs, and in this sense, we can argue that welfare economics reflects
a response to the same kind of interest as #Sozialpolitilo. The results,
however, are different, and it can probably be said that welfare economics
was the one that remained furthest from its objectives.'-
6.2.2. Welfare Economics and the Utilitarian Tradition
Before going into the actual development of welfare economics, a brief
digression on the relationship between welfare economics and utilitarianism
must be made. There seems to be an overall consensus about the fact that
welfare economics is based on utilitarian principles.2
The connection between the principle of utility and the maximization
of social welfare is, by intuition, obvious. 3 Rescher divides the principle into
two parts: 1) the greater good and 2) the greater number, i.e., an aggre-
gative and distributive part (Rescher 1966: 25— 26). If one concentrates
on the greater good principle, one may ignore the problems of distribution.
According to Rescher, Bentham himself in his later writings emphasized
the former, and this much may be said about welfare economics, as well.
The principle of utility or general utilitarian ethics is not considered cur-
rently adequate.4 It seems that the relationship between welfare economics
1 Of course there are other differences: while welfare economics was an academic, abstract
and formalistic phenomenon (i.e., the new welfare economics), Sozialpolitik was decidedly
historical and rather concrete, and in a sense related to working class interests.
What is meant by the above comparison is that from a welfare theoretical point of view
there is a certain similarity, as in the reformist science tradition. 	 •
2 Arrow (1963: 22-24): )>This ideal seems implicit in Benthamite social ethics and its latter
day descendant, welfare economics.* According to Arrow, welfare economics is a combination
of utilitarianism and psychological hedonism. In utilitarianism, common good is based on
individual good (one of the main tenets of welfare economics), and in hedonism, individual
good is based on individual desires). About the relationship of psychological hedonism and
economics, see also Pipping (1953: 27-28). Pahlke (1960: 18-19) also emphasizes the con-
nection and for a very complete survey, see Bohnen (1964).
3 As Bohnen (1964: 4) points out: welfare economics is an attempt to elaborate utilitarian
ethics in concrete terms.
4 See Rescher (1966) on the critique of this principle; but also see Baumgardt (1952: 521)
and Robbins (1965: 11-12), who consider it very relevant.
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and utilitarianism exists mostly on an imaginary level: the connection has
been made partly because welfare economists speak about utility, which
has nothing to do with utilitarianism, and partly because most of the
actual developers of welfare economics were decidedly not -u.tilitarianists
(for example, Pigou as a student of Marshall; see Pipping 1953: 24, Little
1957: 8).
As Arrow would have it (1963: 22-23), one reason for relating welfare
economics and utilitarianism is the belief that utilitarianism leads to the
laissez-faire principle. This appears to be an erroneous assumption. It would
be just as acceptable, going by the utilitarian principle, to have society
completely regulated according to said principle, and it does seem to have
been created for precisely such a purpose, i.e., as a governing principle of
social control (cf. Robbins 1965: 11). On the other hand, the laissez-faire
principle of perfect competition and the Paretian optimum demonstrably
lead to the self-same requirements, but it can also be shown that complete
regulation may bring about the fulfillment of the optimum conditions,
thus shattering the argument in both ways.
The most important connection between utilitarianism and welfare
economics is certainly the emphasis on wants rather than needs. Both
the utilitarian tradition and welfare economics stress that >>good)) is related
to human wants. Useful is what is wanted by man, regardless of whether
the need is real or not. Welfare economics has driven this approach to its
logical conclusion, by showing what it is possible to infer by analyzing
solely what man wants.
6.2.3. Pigou and New Welfare Economics
While the members of the Verein fur Sozialpolitik were also called
Catheder socialists because, while believing in capitalism, they advocated
some thalf-way socialist measures)), and believed that socialism could
grow out of capitalism (see Nieminen 1955), the same cannot be said of
the welfare economists proper. Of these, Pigou certainly had some social
sympathies towards the poor etc., but he was clearly not a socialist, and
his teacher Marshall was a very ardent advocate of liberal capitalism.'
So while in the Verein there was interest in social reforms, welfare econ-
omics showed no concern about social reforms at all. The main question
was how, under existing conditions — or conditions of perfect compe-
tition — the welfare of society could be maximized.
The development of welfare economics proper began with the publishing
1 See Levin (1956: 124), although in his youth Marshall entertained some radical ideas.
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of A. C. Pigou's The Economics of Welfare' in which he attempted to de-
velop 1Viarshallian economics in the direction of non-market effects. For
example, he emphasized the distinction between private and social cost,
and non-market effects in general. On the other hand, he mainly used
criteria of efficiency and production in his analysis, thereby staying closely
within the classical tradition (see Levin 1956: 125-126).
Thus he defined economic welfare (the object of his study) as that
part of social welfare that can be brought directly or indirectly into rela-
tion with the measuring rod of money)) (Pigou 1962: 11), and saw the
national income (national dividend) as the objective counterpart of econ-
omic welfare, i.e., the operational measure of economic welfare (ibid.: 30).
Although he admitted that economic welfare was not the same as general
welfare, he believed that they usually varied together (ibid.: 12). This
type of definition which clearly separates the 'economic' and 'total' welfare
concepts cannot be considered adequate, as is noted in chapter four. Yet
it is obvious that the Pigovian definition can be interpreted as falling in
accord with the usual definition of economic welfare, as welfare stemming
ceteris paribus from economic causes2 (if we emphasize the indirect measur-
ability of welfare by money). In this sense, then, Pigou cannot be said to
differ so much from later welfare economics, and the crucial difference
between him and the later welfare economists can be found in the com-
position and the main tenets of the book.
Firstly, Pigou was explicit in his sympathy for the plight of the poor,
both in his verbal expressions (Pigou 1962: 5) and choice of subject matter.
The larger part of the book is about questions that were left completely
intact by later welfare economists, such as problems of labor policies,
social security, income transfers, minimum pay, and poverty. These mat-
ters were precisely the ones that, prior to this, had been the domain of the
German )>Sozialpolitiken. In fact, Pigou's book can well be considered as
belonging to the same tradition. But of course in Pigou's case it was a
solitary phenomenon in the backlogs of welfare economics.
Secondly, Pigou accepted the comparability of interpersonal utility.
(ibid.: 89-90), which was later to fall into disrepute among welfare econ-
1 (1962; first edition, 1920); for a good review of Pigou's ideas, see Dobb (1969: 80 et seq).
2 Majumdar (1958: 5, 8, 13) critizises the Pigou definition for reasons that are extremely
general and do not particularly seem to apply to this definition. According to Majumdar,
the Pigou definition is not acceptable because:
welfare is not unidimensional as Pigou implies it is;
the Pigou definition ignores the distribution of income, and
3) the Pigou definition is restricted only to consumption and production of the national
income.
These three criticisms apply equally well to any definition of economic welfare analyzed
in this monograph; especially the second and third.
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omists. In this of course, he did not differ from the classical economists or
Marshall, who saw nothing wrong in comparing the utilities of different
persons nor in making decisions about the social worth of some certain
action.1
These beliefs were crystallized in the famous propositions that appar-
ently continue to govern much of the discussion on income distribution:
Increases in national income, provided the share of the poor is not
diminished, increases economic welfare.2
*Any cause which increases the absolute share of real income in the
hands of the poor, provided that it does not lead to a contraction in
the size of the national dividend from any point of view, will, in general,
increase economic welfare* (ibid.: 89).
The first assumption is a clear Paretian assumption, although only
a certain group, the poor, is specified. The second assumption is much
stronger than any Paretian assumption, in that the redistribution of
income is central (although, characteristically, on the condition that
national income does not decrease).
Therefore it can safely be said that later welfare economics, the so-
called 'new' or neoclassical welfare economics, does not have much in
common with Pigovian welfare economics, a matter that cannot be empha-
sized too strongly. But as we are mainly interested in neoclassical welfare
economics, these facets will not be probed here.
The chroniclers of welfare economics have implied that it was Robbins'
article ((*Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility)), 1938); see Mishan 1964: 38,
Little 1957: 56) which marked the beginnings of the New Welfare Econ-
omics. It was in this article that Robbins challenged the possibility of
making interpersonal comparisons of utility (as this would imply value
judgements) and so paved the way for the Paretian assumptions.3 It must
1 Note that Pigou was already aware of the 'apologetic' critique which argued that because
of the greater ability to discern utility of the rich, income differences were acceptable. Pigou
did not believe this to be true in the long run (ibid.: 90). But he emphasized that even if the
greater capacity for enjoyment of the rich were true, the large actual differences in the in-
comes of the population would be cause enough to ensure redistribution of incomes thereby
increasing welfare. (If 18,000 families in England in the 1920's had 1/15 of the total national
income, and several million families together less than half, it would be certain that an in-
crease in income would be much more important to the latter than to the former (ibid.:
93 — 94)).
2 However, Pigou (ibid.: 82, 84) takes care to note that an increase in national income may
mean increase in welfare only in the short run: in the long run the increase may be question-
able.
3 Myint (1948: xiii) provides an example of the acceptance of Robbins' proposition: *. . . al-
though, speaking for myself, I am convinced by the arguments of Prof. Pigou and Mr. Lerner
that economic welfare would be increased by a transfer of income from the rich to poor,
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be said that the idea of 'objectivity' in social science in this sense was due
to Weber, as Robbins was well aware (1952: 90-91); the ideas of Pareto
were not very new either.1
 But it seems true that the Robbins article may
have been a sort of a catalyst for a latent process long under way.
The program of positive economics culminated in Friedman's definition
of economics as a positive science which is not interested in normative
assumptions or arguments, and which concentrates on what is, rather
than on what ought to be (Friedman 1953: 3-5).
Robbins' program gained general acceptance among economists, and
soon after the Robbins article, Nicholas Kaldor published his article on
welfare propositions in economics (Kaldor 1969 (1939)), where he proposed
to >>examine the relevance of this whole question (the Robbins argument)
to what is commonly called 'welfare economics')) (Kaldor 1969: 387). The
idea was to completely eliminate normative assumptions from welfare
economics, while at the same time continuing to offer recommendations
in the field of social policy. 2
 This was to happen on the basis of certain
reputedly universally acceptable assumptions, the so-called Paretian
assumptions .3
Occurring almost simultaneously with the introduction of the Kaldor
compensation principle (developed by Hicks, Scitovsky and innumerable
others; see section 6.3.), Bergson presented his deservedly famous social
welfare function, the formulation of which signified a completely new
outlook on the problem, as compared to the compensation principle. As the
function of the compensation principle was to enable policymakers to see
whether a certain decision was acceptable or not, the function of the social
welfare function was to enable them to systematize all policies (strictly,
to find a set of optimal solutions that fulfilled the optimum conditions, see
I am bound to admit that these arguments still involve interpersonal comparisons of utility
and cannot therefore be regarded as scientific propositions.>>
1 Nor should the relevance of the Hume guillotine be forgotten (see for instance S. Kivinen
(1972)).
2 It is interesting to note that these extreme 'positivists' in economics were unaware of the
implications of the Hume guillotine, which pre-empts the possibility of making recommen-
dations based on mere statements of fact; cf. Nath (1969: 95) who comments on this.
3 Sen (1970: 57) notes that unanimity does not ensure freedom from normativity, in spite
of the fact that most welfare economists at that time seemed to think so (cf. also Dobb (1969:
77 — 79)).
This was already noted by Radomysler in 1946, when he claimed that while Pigovian
welfare economics was positive, in the sense that it made strict distinction between normative
and positive, Kaldor-Hicksian welfare economics was only obfuscating this separation
with its belief that unanimity implies value-freedom (Radomysler 1969: 90). Although I
cannot agree that Pigou separated normative and positive statements and was unconcerned
about what ought to be, it is true that the analyses of Kaldor and Hicks were not value-free
in any sense.
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section 6.4.). Yet both were based on the same principles, with the welfare
function being of a more general nature.
The development and analysis of the optimum conditions marked the
high point of New Welfare Economics.' The first major setback was the
Arrow theorem (see chapter 7), the impact of which was long resisted on
the grounds that it was irrelevant to New Welfare Economics. Yet the
Arrow theorem dealt a blow to the concept of a social welfare function,
and greatly lessened its attractiveness. From within, the books of De
Graaff (1957) and Little (1951, 1957) did much damage to the belief of
the usefulness of welfare economics. After a prolonged silence (according
to Baumol 1965), there has been a revival of interest in the problems of
welfare economics, but not within the old framework. Mackenzie depicts
this revival as an attempt to move from the logic of political economy to
the logic of economic politics (Mackenzie 1967: 139). More specifically,
the new approaches utilize newly developed methods of analysis (such
as operations analysis, systems theory and related disciplines) but also
a new approach that emphasizes problem of social structure, power and
political processes. In effect, this means abandoning many economic
abstractions (for a contrary solution see Downs 1957 and Rothenberg
1964, who utilize economic analysis in the analysis of political processes).
In this sense, we may say that the crisis of welfare economics has given
way to the development of a policy science as defined above, and to a more
realistic view of social reality — one which makes the analysis of welfare
economics interesting.
For instance, in the first edition of his book, Baumol (1965: 2, 204-207)
had an excessively negative view of the prospects open to welfare econ-
omics, which, in the second edition changed to more positive outlook.
This may be understood only on the basis that in his introductory essay
to the second edition, Baumol has chosen to understand the domain of
welfare economics rather broadly. The original, >classical>> welfare econ-
omics is as barren as ever.
1 Although welfare economics belongs exclusively to the Anglo-Saxon tradition and has had
little outside influence, some monographs do exist in German, wherein the field is reviewed_
and several original points are brought out. Particular mention should be made of Pahlke
(1960), Miiller-Groeling (1965) and Bohnen (1964). Astonishingly enough, in Sweden there
are quite a few economists who apply welfare economics to practical problems and even make
it a basis for very concrete suggestions concerning social policy. See e.g., SOderstrOm (1972a,
1972b), Niklasson— SiiderstrOm (1970), Stahl (1968). We might even say that in Sweden
social policy is intimately connected with welfare economics.
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6.2.4. The Concept of Economic Welfare
What does economic welfare mean in relation to general welfare? The
commonly accepted solution is to restrict the scope of welfare to the factors
that influence (or )>cause))) welfare (this we might call a von Wrightian
solution). Thus, economic welfare would be the welfare that is caused by
economic factors, ceteris paribus, i.e., when other factors are assumed to
be constant (Little 1957: 51, Graaff 1957: 6),1 although earlier it was com-
mon to think of economic welfare as a distinct part of welfare.2
Majumdar (1957: 15) has ventured a definition of his own which differs
significantly from the two versions presented above. He wants to connect
economic welfare to such factors as choice and scarcity, both of which
hold a notable position in economics; of these, choice may indeed be said
to constitute a part of the actual operational definition of welfare utilized
in welfare economics. According to Majumdar, )>By economic welfare, we
may choose to define not a portion of general welfare, but certain tangible
aspects of it which are capable of being described in terms of choice of
ends and scarcity of means)). Majumdar also claims that this is the defi-
nition used by the new welfare economics. As is clear from the above,
this is not so as far as explicit definitions go, but as we stated, the actual
operational definition does bring the Majumdar definition to mind. It is
obvious that the Majumdar definition is not particularly lucid and does
not leave much room for other 'parts' of welfare, and since we shall con-
centrate more on an analysis of the problems of choice and welfare, I will
not go into the Majumdar definition further.
On the other hand, there are some interesting points to be made about
the two alternate ways of defining economic welfare presented above.
It is by no means self-evident that the 'modern' definition is decisively
better than the classic one. Although from a von Wrightian point of view
it is acceptable, the ceteris paribus condition implies that changes in
Little (1957: 51) presents a parallel, that may serve to illustrate this idea: ». . . it is imagined
that the mind is like a well of unknown depth, partly filled with water, the level of which
could be altered by turning on various taps labeled economic, political etc. Once the water
is in the well there is no way of saying which tap it came from, and also it is impossible to
say how much water is in the well. One cannot therefore significantly ask how much economic
welfare someone has; but one say that the level of the water has risen or fallen as the result
of turning the economic tap, if the other taps are not touched, i.e., one can say that economic
welfare increased or decreased.* See also Radomysler (196P: 93 — 94).
2 This was particularly true of the utilitarian tradition Little (1957: 51); but for example
Dalton (1952: 9) was still of the opinion that: *Human welfare is divisible into economic, or
material, welfare on the one hand, and on the other hand, various kinds of welfare which
are not economic. This division will be sufficiently intelligible without further discussion,
though by the nature of things the dividing line is not clear cut.>>
COMMENTATIONES SCIENTIARUM SOCIALIUM 4	 87
economic welfare do not affect other factors of welfare, either directly
or indirectly through welfare itself. I.e., this definition abstracts important
interrelationships between the 'welfare factors' and welfare.
On the other hand, the concept of welfare as a divisible whole is not
to be completely rejected. It is obvious that there are components in wel-
fare that can, to a certain extent, be analyzed separately. This is already
implied by the multi-dimensionality of the concept. It is another question
whether or not these dimensions can be distinguished along the same lines
as distinctions between 'economic', 'social', etc.
It would seem, therefore, that the best definition of economic or social
welfare would recognize both the existence of social and economic causes
and the existence of social and economic components (among others).
This problem finds its 'natural' solution in the concept of level of living
and its analysis, but it is clear that from the point of view of welfare econ-
omics such a concept does not have much relevance.
6.2.5. The Concept of Utility
It was mentioned above that the popular solution for defining partial wel-
fare was to refer to the causes of welfare. For instance, economic welfare
was considered that part of welfare caused, ceteris paribus, by economic
factors. But this does still not convey the idea of welfare that the welfare
economists had in mind. For this, we must take up the concepts of utility,
preference, and choice. The starting point for the welfare economist was
the concept of utility. Practically, we may regard it as a synonym for
welfare in the eyes of the welfare economists. The literature on utility is
vast and more recently the theory has been developed mainly by statis-
ticians and psychologists.'
In this monograph I shall not go into the problems of modern utility
theory. This field has grown very quickly and has become extremely
technical, especially where more complicated situations are concerned.
Typically enough, all this has very little relevance to problems of welfare.2
We are interested solely in the concept of utility taken from the welfare
economic point of view. This implies that definitions of a more technical
type do not convey much that is of interest. Rather, the relevant question
1 But note that utility and welfare, per se, imply completely different concepts on the nature
of well-being and the 'good' life. Utility is linked with what is useful, what is practical, and
not necessarily with other qualities of a good life; cf. Gouldner (1970: 62-73).
2 For an elaborate presentation on the nature of utility theory see Fishburn (1968); for the
applications of utility theory in decision making, see Fishburn (1970a), which is also a rela-
tively complete survey of developments in utility theory.
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concerns the connection between utility and welfare on the one hand,
and how this concept was applied in welfare analysis, on the other. This
entails such problems as the problem of cardinal utility, additivity of
utility, measurability of utility, etc.1
But even utility in its original sense was much too 'normative' for the
welfare economists. Utility had to be reduced to choice: i.e., if a person
prefers one good to another, the preferred good provides him with more
utility (see Little 1957: 19).
Thus, the concept of utility may be put to one side, or given only a
superfluous meaning as the guiding principle for choices. Even preference
was superfluous; preference was nothing but hypothetical choice — one
spoke of preferences when denoting choice between all the possible alter-
natives.2
Welfare, therefore, is identified simply with choice and preference (de
Graaff 1957: 5, Archibald 1969: 319, Armstrong 1951: 259). The welfare
of the individual is increased if
the individual prefers A to B
A becomes a possible alternative.
A may be a good, or a service or conceivably an even more complicated
commodity. This is the welfare content of the New Welfare Economics,
and once combined with the Paretian assumptions, we have the whole
concept of social welfare in welfare economics before us.
The problems discussed above may be put into another frame of refer-
ence — by considering the concepts of uninterpreted and interpreted
theories. We may define an interpreted theory simply as a theory whose
basic concepts have been given explicit content. Alternatively, we may
speak of 'theories' as uninterpreted theories and 'models' as the inter-
preted theories (see Mates 1965, Rudner 1966). In welfare economics it
was alleged that theory should be seen as uninterpreted, and that interest
should be centered around relations between the concepts. (This was
especially emphasised by Archibald in his well-known article (1959: 317,
320)). Welfare theory, then is seen as a theory interested in choice mech-
anism and choice potentialities. Leaving the theory uninterpreted means
that there is no normative content in it at all. Nevertheless, we may say
something interesting about choice, asserts Archibald (ibid.: 316-317).
This seems to be a mere illusion: what is logically meant by uninter-
1 For the history of the concept of utility see, for instance, Edwards (1967). Robinson (1962:
48) has remarked: >>Utility is a metaphysical concept of impregnable circularity: utility is
the quality in commodities that makes an individual want to buy them, and the fact that
individual want to buy commodities shows that they have utility.#
2 See von Wright (1963b, §7) for a critique of the identification of utility and preference,
which applies very well to the situation in welfare economics.
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preted theory does not apply in this case. There is actually so much inter-
pretation in even this version of welfare economics, that we cannot cor-
rectly speak of an uninterpreted theory in any formal sense. The concept
of choice is already an interpretation of, say, the relation Pxy. That Archi-
bald's version is completely irrelevant is another matter: while thinking
that he is presenting a non-normative theory, he is in fact approaching
total triviality (see Little (1965) and Archibald (1965) for a discussion in
which Little presents approximately the same argument as above).
In fact, it is true that the enchantment with choice common to nearly
every economist is in itself very suspect, especially from the welfare point
of view. The emphasis on choice presupposes giving up all extraneous
means of considering a certain thing's effect on welfare. If it is chosen,
that is all that matters. This is considered an advantage by many econ-
omists: 'consumer sovereignity' is not violated, and nobody is making
valuations for the consumer (except the producer of course). In fact, the
principle of free choice, as we shall see, is not extended to consumers alone
but also to the producers, which renders it even more suspect.
If, then, only the individual's opinion counts, and that only through
his choice of goods and services, what can be said about the connection to
welfare? First of all, it is obvious that potential choice of goods and services
may involve a simultaneous deterioration of other conditions, such as
breathable air or other environmental commodities (see Mishan 1964: 96,
1969 where he emphasizes the problems of external effects and social
cost in connection with choice).
Secondly, it is quite obvious that an individual may make choices that
are detrimental to his welfare. This point has been made by countless others
over along period of time.' Veblen, for instance, has written a book about
it.2
1 More recently Mishan (1967); Baumol (1965: 28— 29), who however defends the principle
of consumer's sovereignty; Scitovsky (1951); and Galbraith (1958). Baumol (unwittingly)
gives a fitting example of the impossibility of the principle: »On the one hand I must sharply
disagree with the implications of Scitovsky's view, for at its worst it offers unrestricted
licence to the bluenoses and those who would impose on myself and others their own standards
of good taste and good behaviour. Though I am also repelled by huge chrome protuberances
on automotive vehicles I will fight assiduously (though not to the death) for other people's
right to have them.» This example is interesting because just such protuberances have al-
ready been forbidden as endangering other people's lives in cases of collision in many coun-
tries.
2 Veblen (1953: 80): »Many items of customary expenditure prove on analysis to be almost
purely wasteful, and they are therefore honorific only, but after they have once been incor-
porated into the scale of decent consumption, and have become an integral part of one's
scheme of life, it is quite as difficult to give these up, as it is to give up many items that
relate directly to one's physical comfort, or even those such as may be necessary to life and
health>>.
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Consumer sovereignty (or, 'the individual is the best judge of his wel-
fare') has been criticized in detail by many writers. It is extremely easy
to ascertain instances where an individual simply cannot be the best judge
of his own welfare. Zeckhauser and Schaefer (1968: 41-42) point out the
following:
In uncertain situations a person cannot know all that is relevant to
his choice.
Experience and education may be preconditions for a 'correct' under-
standing of certain questions.
A person may simply not understand the alternative choices (noted
e.g., by John Stuart Mill, Levin 1956: 122).
The individual may have strong habits that restrict his choices.
5. Certain things are forbidden by society whether the individual likes it
or not (like marijuana).
These problems have also been discussed a great deal by the authors
of 'socialist economics' (see e.g., Bergson 1966: 196-197, Dobb 1969,
Lange—Taylor 1964).
What is difficult, however, is to point out the alternative, i.e., on
what grounds human welfare should be judged if the individual is not
considered the best judge. In any case, it is obvious that in many cases
society has already taken the possibility of choice away from the indi-
vidual — one attempt to solve the problem would be to try to find criteria
for dividing the existing alternatives into those that may be left for the
individual to decide, and those that may not. One could hazard a guess
that in capitalist society, such a list of actual possibilities of choice would
be much shorter than it is usually imagined to be.
The origin of the debate on value-free economics was the question of
so-called interpersonal comparisons of utility. This meant simply that
previously economists had believed it possible to add 'utilities', and thus
compute collective welfare from individual welfare. The utilitarian prin-
ciple clearly required such additivity because otherwise it would not be
possible to say what was the greater good for the greater number. And at
the core of the additivity problem lay the question of whether or not one
could compare the utilities of two different persons.
This problem was usually presented in the guise of a decision-maker's
problem, but from an individual's point of view we may easily see that
'interpersonal comparisons of utility' were basically the same as problems
of relative deprivation and reference groups in sociology.'
1 For deprivation and reference groups, see Gurr (1970), Israel (1971), Runciman (1966: 10),
For an early attempt to show the existence of reference groups, see Katz' hen experiments.
Pipping (1953: 67).
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This discussion has two distinct parts: the attempt to show that com-
parison was unnecessary and that all interesting results in economics were
available by using ordinal utility; and secondly, the measurability-of-
utility problem, whose central question is whether or not cardinal utilities
exist.
The definitive blow against cardinal utility in economics was dealt
by the Slutsky —Hicks—Allen indifference curve approach, where it was
shown that no cardinal utility at all was needed, in order to obtain adequate
results in consumer theory.'
To construct individual indifference curves, the sole requirement was
that the individual should be able to compare the objects of his prefer-
ences pairwise. This should result in an ordinal preference ordering. The
utility of an object, or the differences between utilities were things that
could be ignored. (For the presentation, see Hicks 1964: 14-15). The
concept of marginal utility could be replaced by the concept of marginal
rate of substitution, but most important was that now economists could
safely discard the notion of cardinality.
This remained the dominant theme for a long time; in fact it still is
(see Quirk—Saposnik 1968: 115), although with certain reservation.2
But Arrow, for example, noted as late as 1963 (1963: 9) that interpersonal
utility comparisons had no meaning, and that no supporter of the cardi-
nality principle has produced anything that could not be analyzed through
ordinal utilities. Such extreme views are hardly supported any more, but
there are still many who accept a more guarded anticardinalist approach
(see for example Drewnowski 1970: 83, Fishburn 1970b: 218).
On the other hand, even among economists the acceptance of cardinal
utility and interpersonal comparisons has steadily gained ground (for
a steadfast supporter, see Frisch 1964: 418; Coleman 1966: 1117, Boulding
1952, Rothenberg 1961: 137, for reasons for this), but it is mainly others
who have emphasized the necessity of interpersonal comparisons for any
kind of useful political and social analysis. First of all, it is obvious that
interpersonal comparisons are a reality: they are made all the time and
an analysis that does not take this into consideration is seriously impaired
(Barry 1965: 44-45, Boulding 1952: 32). Secondly, it has been claimed
1 The Slutsky (1915) paper came into renown subsequent to the Hicks—Allen paper (1934).
See Fishburn (1970b: 218) for the references. The classic statement is in Hicks (1946 (1939)).
Hicks himself (ibid.: 12) refers to Pareto.
2 Quirk and Saposnik note that although ordinal analysis is good in positive economics,
it does not mean that it is good in other fields, such as welfare economics. •
See also Rescher (1966: 332), and Stevens (1959: 52), who compares the measurement of such
things as clarity and noise with the measurement of utility. For the strategic implications
of the cardinality-ordinality discussion, see chapter 7, where these are discussed in con-
nection with the independence-of-irrelevant-alternatives condition.
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that interpersonal comparisons and cardinal utility are not such insur-
mountable problems after all, and that they can in fact be measured rather
easily.'
It should be noted that the problem of cardinality can be divided into
two parts: whether it is possible to measure utility with an interval scale
for an individual, and whether it is possible to use an interval scale for all
individuals, i.e., to have a common (but arbitrary) zero point for all indi-
viduals. I do not consider the true cardinal scale, the ratio scale, relevant,
as it is beyond our present resources to find an absolute zero point (an
absolute point of dissatisfaction).2
Neurath (1970: 36) complicates the problem even further by noting
that we may consider the same individual in different points of time as
different individuals, thus bringing up the problem of comparability in
these cases as well. In principle, comparability here is different because
a person himself may make the comparisons. The real, or 'true' cardinality
problem is, of course, the problem of the inter-personal comparability of
utility.
All the problems referred to above have a common starting point,
that being individual comparability. There is no concern with collective
action, with problems of society. As Neurath (ibid.) notes, even if the
interpersonal comparability of utility were possible, this does not mean
that we could be able to compare different social orders and their relation
to the welfare of people. I.e., the problems of social structure and so forth
are abstracted out of existence. This, of course, is the central problem in
all welfare economics and also in the Arrow theorem, as we shall see.
Majumdar (1958: 47) distinguishes the following stages in the debate
on ordinality-cardinality:
introspective cardinalism (Marshallian cardinalism; this is of course
the classical view, also)
introspective ordinalism (the Slutsky —Hicks —Allen indifference curve
analysis)
1 According to Majumdar (1958: 38-39), Marshall represented 'absolute' (i.e., ratio scale)
cardinality in assuming complete additivity of utilities with absolutely defined units.
2 Presumably it is safe to say that originally the abandoning of cardinal utility was seen
as a certain loss by the economists. It was only later that the more eager apologists turned
the whole business upside down in attempting to show that restricting welfare to choices
was only good. It was fine that one need not care about utility, welfare, happiness etc., as
they are irrelevant. Only choices mattered (see Archibald (1959: 320) who whole-heartedly
approved this; also de Graaff (1957: 34)). The problem — ignored by economists — was
that choices are not identical with welfare nor with utility. Thus there is no reason to speak
of welfare economics, but only of 'choice economics'.
On this basis welfare economists were also able to deny being utilitarians, because for
them utility was an empty word (see Graaff (1957: 38)).
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behaviorist ordinalism (Samuelson's revealed preference theory)
behaviorist cardinalism (von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory).
After these distinct stages there have been attempts to revive the
introspective cardinality notion (Majumdar 1958: 48), while modern utility
theories are mostly axiomatic variants of the von Neumann-Morgenstern
approach, although ordinalist approaches are also to be found (Fishburn
1970a).
The differences between behaviorist ordinalism and introspective
ordinalism are very slight: in the latter approach, one assumes certain
ordinality qualities for the individual's preferences; in the former, the
starting point is observed behavior. Neither approach postulates anything
on the nature of utility or welfare (Majumdar 1958: 80). In a Hicksian
sense, the revealed preference approach can be considered even more
sophisticated than the Hicksian version itself, because it assumes even
less.
Of the two main approaches to the solution of the cardinal utility
problem the first is that of Pareto—Fisher—Frisch (Vickrey 1960: 522-23;
Fishburn 1970a: 81 et seq., 1970b; Frisch 1964). Going by this assumption,
a linear utility function may be defined and can be determined on the
basis of observing individual choices. To make interpersonal comparisons
possible, we still must assume that average consumer behavior in each
income bracket can be taken as typical for those income and price cate-
gories.'
Ragnar Frisch has continued along these lines (the latest development
occurring in 1970), his interest being centered around the possibility of
practical application. His attempts are not very highly revered in the
field of utility theory (see Fishburn 1970a,b, where they are ignored
outright).
The second approach is that of the Neumann-Morgenstern expected
utility hypothesis (see Vickrey 1960: 523: 524, Rothenberg 1961: 201 et
seq., Luce —Raiffa 1957). Put simply, the expected utility hypothesis
begins with the assumption that a person wants to maximize not utility,
but the mathematical expectation of his utility. This was first presented
by Bernoulli, and von Neumann-Morgenstern presented it in a precise,
axiomatic formulation which included other assumptions as well (Rothen-
berg 1961: 203, Luce—Raiffa 1957). The original von Neumann-Morgen-
stern formulation contained four axioms, some of which can be regarded
sceptically (Fishburn 1970a: 191, Rothenberg 1961: 217-220). As this
1 These assumptions are not unproblematic; for instance, Vickrey (1960: 523) notes that
we may construct examples of such welfare functions where the marginal utility of income
is an increasing function of income.
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is not the place to discuss expected utility, I shall restrict this presentation
to the nature of the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms, and their impli-
cations.
Rothenberg (1961: 201) considers this approach the most promising,
as it obviously is due to the empirical testability of the axioms. The axioms
are very simple:
The first axiom assumes that individual preferences depend only on
the probabilities of different outcomes and not, for example, on how
the outcome was deduced. This means that preferences for gambling,
etc., are ignored (ibid.: 250).
The second axion assumes that the preference orders are complete
and transitive (ibid.: 227).
The third axiom is the continuity axiom; its most important impli-
cation is that lexicographic utilities are impossible; as was noted,
however, contrary to this assumption Chipman defined utility as
lexicographic. The importance of lexicographic preferences lies in the
fact that the multidimensional nature of utility and welfare is not
taken into consideration when lexicographic preferences are excluded
(ibid.: 232-233). A need hierarchy, for instance, implies a lexicographic
ordering.' According to Rothenberg it is natural to assume that utility
functions are lexicographic. This means that the applicability of the
expected utility hypothesis is rather limited (ibid.: 233 — 234).
Axiom four, or the strong independence axiom, denies that combi-
nations of goods have any interaction effects and depend only on
the preferences of the elements, which is clearly rather unrealistic (ibid.:
235-236). It does not make all complements impossible, only those
that effect two or more prospects.
It is clear then, that the axioms are rather restrictive. Once accepted,
however, we arrive at linear utility functions for each individual. That
is, we get cardinality, not comparability, for each individual. To attain
comparability we must still make some very strong assumptions about
the identity of tastes, etc., or other arbitrary assumptions (see Vickrey
1960: 524).
It may surprise the reader to note that Pareto is mentioned as the
developer of both the ordinal indifference analysis and cardinal utility
analysis. This apparent incongruity is due to the fact that Pareto devel-
oped a measure of cardinal utility first and later discarded it when he
A simple example of a lexicographic ordering is as follows Sen (1970: 35): we have two
individuals with welfare levels W 1 and W2
 and the social ordering is formed in the following
way: first maximize W1
 and given this level of W1 maximize W2 . Lexicographic orderings
are also analyzed by Debreu (1959).
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found that ordinal utility was sufficient in his analysis of static and risk-
free consumer demand theory (Fishburn 1970a: 82).
Rescher (1969: 103) does not consider the expected utility approach
useful because, notwithstanding mathematical benefits, the application
difficulties are considerable. There are many other approaches the diffi-
culties of which are very great. 1 Rescher has advocated very practical
measures, a la Frisch2 but the difficulty with these measures seems to be
that they are rather arbitrary, representing 'raw' empiricism with a prob-
lem that requires a much more theoretical analysis. It seems obvious that
cardinal preference, or interpersonal comparison of utility is a necessity
for any policy-making system that attempts to be realistic. The problems
of which type of cardinal preference is necessary have not yet been solved.
It may be an insurmountable problem, pointing to a need for fresh research.
What then, does giving up cardinal preference and interpersonal com-
parisons of utility indicate? First of all we dispense with additive utility
or welfare functions. This does not eliminate welfare functions completely
but changes their nature and narrows their scope.
We should note that especially 'social welfare functions' are prac-
tically eliminated in their entirety. What is called social welfare function
bears in the following only a faint resemblance to it as such, being appli-
cable to only a very restricted type of situation.
Secondly ordinal utility implies that most of the central problems of
social decision making are simply theorized out of existence. As Rothen-
berg (1961: 142) notes, in addition to ordinal utility functions, ordering
of different distributions is needed: a rule for combining production and
distribution effects, etc., i.e., for all essential problems. To use Rothen-
berg's words: The use of ordinal indices solves the problem of securing
an acceptable social ordering by assuming it away!# (Rothenberg 1961:
142; this is true in general, see Cropsey 1954: 120). As a corollary to this
point, we may note that it is not possible to analyze problems of income
distribution or welfare distribution in an ordinal frame of reference.
Rescher (1966: 333) gives a good example of how insignificant ordinal
preference truly is. Assume that person A has the following preference
ordering:
1 For example the Armstrong 'bare' preference approach, or an attempt to measure cardinal
preferences in terms of a minimal preference unit, Rothenberg (1961: 146-147), Vickrey
(1960: 519-520). For a statement of the fundamental difficulty in the Armstrong approach
see Fishburn (1970b: 215) or Vickrey's own approach (1960: 526-527).
2 See for example Rescher (1966: 333-335), Rescher (1969); see also Tinbergen (1959),
Theil (1964) for practical approaches where utility functions are constructed and connected
with decision-making models.
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Let us imagine that we may see this preference on the following scale:
Excellent Very good







	 b	 a	 c
Clearly all of the above alternatives are possible under the same ordinal
preference ordering (and infinitely many others). It is obvious that all of
these orderings may lead to different conclusions when compared to other
orderings. In fact, we know nothing about the absolute order, nor of the
differences between alternatives on the basis of an ordinal preference
ordering.
It should be noted, as Fishburn (1970b: 218) emphasizes, that there is
nothing in interval measurement, per se, that implies the possibility of
measuring preference intensities. Even the interval scales are based on
such simple preference measurements that they do not allow for inferences
on preference intensities.
In the following, we shall be concerned only with ordinal preferences
as the bases for welfare decisions. What has been said thus far indicated
that the possibilities to infer anything on the basis of ordinal preferences
alone are very limited. In spite of this, however, it is astonishing to note
how much has in fact been said.'
6.2.6. The Pareto-Optimum
The economist's solution for individual welfare was to identify welfare
with choice; as for social welfare, his solution was the famous 2 Pareto
optimum, which is the trademark of the so-called New Welfare Economics.
The principle of interpersonal comparison of utility is very important in Marxist theory.
As Johan Willner (1971) points out, without interpersonal comparability of utility the central
concept of surplus value would be left undefined.
2 Perhaps infamous would be a more apt choice of terms.
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There are explicit definitions of the New Welfare Economics as a science
of the Pareto optimum and its conditions (Mishan 1964, Little 1957: 84).
This discussion will commence with a presentation of the Pareto-optimum
assumptions since, as stated earlier, they form the basis of the New Wel-
fare Economics as a whole, and are by no means confined to that sector
dealing strictly with the assumptions themselves.
The Optimum is based on the following assumptions:
1° The individual is the best judge of his welfare (note that this goes for
all components of welfare: e.g., the productive activity of a private
entrepreneur (see Nath 1969: 8)).
2° The welfare of society depends only on the welfare of the individuals
and is a monotonically increasing function of the latter (Little 1957:
118).
3° The non-economic factors affecting an individual's welfare can be
ignored with respect to 'economic' welfare.
4° If at least one individual is better off (his welfare is higher) without
anybody being worse off, then society as a whole is better off (has
a higher welfare). It is specifically this assumption that makes the
optimum 'Paretian' (Nath 1969: 8-9, Mishan 1964: 6-7).
In addition to these assumptions it is implicitly assumed that the welfare
of society is to be maximized (that is, the welfare of the set of individuals
that form society). This is in no way unique to the Pareto-optimum. With-
out this assumption there would be no need for a welfare theory.'
We say that a situation is Pareto-optimal if it fulfills the Pareto cri-
terion; and that there is a Pareto improvement if we move from a sub-
optimal (in the Pareto sense) to a Pareto-optimal position.
Some of these assumptions clearly refer to the conception of individual
welfare (3°). Yet the crucial assumption, which contains the most import-
ance from a social welfare point of view is the fourth, which may be called
the Paretian assumption. In the form presented above it does seem very
naive and generally acceptable (as its advocates emphasize). But if it is
formulated in the following alternate way, we gain a better picture of its
implications:
4' If all individuals in a society either prefer or are indifferent to a given
1 See also the statement of the Pareto-optimum by Pareto himself (Pareto 1909: 617— 618;
cited in Rescher 1966): *Consider any particular position and suppose that a very small move
is made . . . (If) the well-being of all the individuals is increased, it is evident that the new
position is more advantageous for each one of them; vice versa, it is less so if the well-being
of all the individuals is diminished. The well-being of some may remain the same without
these conclusions being affected. But if, on the other hand, the small move increases the
well-being of certain individuals and diminishes that of others, it can no longer be said that
it is advantageous to the community as a whole to make such a move.*
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change, then the change may be approved (i.e., it increases the welfare
of the society). In other words, the Paretian principle requires un-
animity in the sense that nobody is against change.
As Sen (1970: 22) notes: ))Precisely how incomplete the Pareto criterion
will be depends on how unanimous the individuals are. At one extreme
lies the case in which everyone has the same preference, when the social
ordering will, in fact, be complete for this special case. At the other end
lies the case where two individuals have diametrically opposite preferences,
in which case no alternatives whatever could be compared with each other
using the Pareto rule.))
In the light of these reformulations we may see the full impact of the
Pareto criterion on the economics of welfare and on the conception of wel-
fare in economics:
Very few changes are tolerated by the Pareto criterion. I.e., the scope
of welfare economics is extremely limited when it is based on the Pareto
criterion. This should be borne in mind when the Pareto optimum and
its conditions are considered in the following. In no sense does the
Pareto criterion provide a universal principle for the evaluation of wel-
fare (see Dobb 1969: 10-12, 20; Armstrong 1951: 259, 262; Zeckhauser-
Schaefer 1968: 52; Rescher 1966: 13; see Buchanan—Tullock 1962 for
an attempt to expand the scope of this principle).
In particular, the criterion has nothing to say about distribution.
For instance, according to this principle, a change which increases the
welfare of the rich but leaves the welfare (illfare) of the poor intact
is acceptable nevertheless, since the aggregate welfare is increased
(Nath 1969: 127, Dobb 1969: 23).1
The Pareto criterion says nothing about the means of creating an un-
animous situation. I.e., the comparison of suboptimal states is not
possible with the Pareto criterion, as noted in the first point (Arrow
1963: 37, Rescher 1966: 14).
On the other hand it is not possible to compare Pareto-optimal situa-
tions with the Pareto criterion. We cannot, therefore, choose from two
Pareto-optimal situations (Arrow 1963: 37, Rescher 1966: 13, Zeck-
hauser—Schaefer 1968: 51-52).
The Pareto principle has been defended on the grounds that it permits
a separation between efficiency and equity, the latter not belonging within
the realm of economics (Brownlee—Buttrick 1968: 237). In fact, it is true
that the concept of economic efficiency is usually defined by the Paretian
To be exact, this requires the additional assumption that all Pareto-optimal states are
indifferent to each other. This has been usually implicitly assumed in welfare economies.
The omission of this assumption implies a need for additional criteria to compare the Pareto-
optimal states (Sen 1970: 23; see also point 4 in the following).
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criterion (Nath 1969: 152-153, Scitovsky 1951: 4-5). As we shall later
point out, such separation is not justifiable on the grounds that a concept
of efficiency cannot exist without an inherent notion of equity. Also, the
Pareto principle does imply a certain notion of equity in its assumptions;
we shall return to this.
Yet the Pareto principle has elicited astonishingly wide support. It has
been advocated by philosophers and economists alike (Brandt 1959: 319 —
320, Buchanan—Tullock 1962: 171-173, Brownlee—Buttrick 1968, and
innumerable other economists).
Considering all of its implications this is truly surprising. One of the
reasons may be found in its similarity to the Braybrooke —Lindblom
disjointed incrementalisnm, and Popperian ))piecemeal social engineerinp
notions which implicitly dominate most policy discussions in the capitalist
countries.
As Brownlee and Buttrick note, the Pareto criterion forms a two-step
procedure: using the Pareto criterion the first step enables one to choose
between social states that fulfill the Paretian criteria; the second step
entails choosing the best alternative by some other criteria (Brownlee —
Buttrick 1968: 237). I.e., the criterion implies a restricted choice, a ))piece-
meal)) choice at its best.
From what is said above, it follows that the criterion is also a very
conservative one, its implication being actually that no policy can be
instated if there are some who oppose it. In any society where we may
speak of a fundamental divergence of interest amongst the citizens, the
Paretian principle is necessarily biased in favor of those who may be
said to benefit from existing injustices, as they may easily prevent their
correction.'
Boulding (1952: 18) has said that ))the real significance of the Paretian
welfare economics, then, is that it sets forth explicitly the distinction be-
tween those changes in social variables which can take place through
'trading', i.e., through a mutual benefit of all parties — and those changes
which involve #conflict#, or the benefit of one part, at the expense of an-
other.#
1 Barry (1965: 51) contends that the criterion is ultra-conservative. If one considers the
implications of the Buchanan— Tullock, Calculus of Consent (1962), one must concur with
this judgment. See also Baran (1952: 357-358): »It was left to Pareto, who was contem-
plating social reality not through the looking glass of English moral philosophy but from
the more austere position of a »disinterested» aristocratic observer, to formalize an attitude
that expressed adequately the monopolistic answer to the Mill — Marshall — Pigou »revolt,
of the middle classes». By repudiating the validity of interpersonal comparisons of utility,
Pareto purged political economy of all the reform implications disturbing the British (and
German) economists. As it was impossible (in his opinion) to make any scientific statements
concerning cardinal utility, any judgment on distribution of wealth and income became
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According to Boulding, it is understandable that welfare economists
have been interested in trading alone. This may be so, but Boulding cer-
tainly exaggerates the role of mutual benefit in trading (both parties may
 reaping benefits without actually getting any). Much of the sub-
sequent defense for using the Paretian principles in analyzing problems
of social choice is based on this notion: all social choice has been conceived
of as trade, leaving no room for conflict (especially in Buchanan and Tullock
1962).
6.2.7. Critical Notes
This section consists of some additional critical notes about the essential
basis of welfare economics. When some of the central theories are presented
in the following, these criticisms should be kept in mind, because they
insinuate severe restrictions on the theoretical adequacy and applicability
of welfare economics.
First, as is obvious from the above, the theories of welfare economics,
beginning with Pigou, are individualistic and atomistic in character.
They represent methodological individualism in its crudest form, e.g.,
the denial of any social or collective influence apart from the individuals
themselves whatsoever. They also wholly ignore these same influences
even in the context of methodological individualism, i.e., dealing with
the extent to which the social factor affects the individual, and through
him, society itself. The ))atomistio view of society (according to which
every man is a Robinson Crusoe) is an integral part of the classical tradition
(see Herz 1961: 57) although it has been developed to its extremity in
modern welfare economics where formal constructs are completely devoid
of any 'structure', in the sense of social structure.' It would be impossible
to him an ethical value proposition beyond the realm of economic science. Taking from the
rich and giving to the poor became nothing that could be recommended by economics, since
even the notion »rich* and »poor» lost meaning in the Pareto frame of reference. What ap-
peared as common sense to Smith, Ricardo, Mill, Marshall, Pigou — not to speak of the
uninstructed man in the street — turned out to be a nonscientific ethical preference, with
the economist's preference counting no more than anyone else's.>>
1 This has been said very eloquently by Parsons and Smelser (1965: 23, 31), although of
course in a way that no doubt leaves the economist, or indeed anyone, slightly confounded:
»Only through the institutionalized value system of the society and its various functional
subsystems which develop in accord with specific exigencies is concrete meaning given to
the concept of welfare. It follows that to define economic, much less social welfare in terms
of some aggregate of allegedly independent individual welfare functions or in terms of some
elaborate system of comparison of individual functions is theoretically untenable.>>
For an example of the nature of the problem, see Knight (1969 (1924): 227) where he
says: »In the perfectly ideal order of theory the problem of management would be nonexist-
ent!>> Knight already very strongly criticized the individualistic assumptions, to say nothing
of Veblen and the institutionalized economists.
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to discuss here the problems of methodological individualism; this principle
can be formulated in many ways.
It is clear, however, that the principle expounded by welfare economists
is an instance of such crude methodological individualism that very few
philosophers and social scientists are ready to accept it. Especially when
coupled with other assumptions about the nature of individual choices,
the result is an extremely unrealistic picture of the workings of society
and the economy. For example, individual preferences are considered
fixed and exogenous to the economic mechanism, although they certainly
are neither. In some cases they may be considered fixed but then the
ongoing changes must really be infinitesimally small.'
Both Radomysler (1969: 91) and Baran (1968: 26) emphasize the point
that a realistic welfare economics should begin with an analysis of welfare
and its causes. This has been completely overlooked by welfare economics.
As Neurath (1970: 39) has so aptly remarked: »Representatives of political
economy tried to teach people something about human happiness. And
a kind of hybrid, partly dealing with human happiness, partly dealing
with bookkeeping, was evolded. But the scientific means they tried to
apply have been inferred from bookkeeping and not from happiness analy-
ses.» This refers to an earlier period but fits nicely in the welfare economics
context.
Welfare economics has been criticized very harshly even by people
who are »inside» the tradition. In this criticism, all of the specific points
that have been mentioned above, such as the extreme restrictions in the
definition of welfare, etc., have come up. For instance, Myint (1948: 220)
notes that »welfare economics has followed the line of least resistance in
restricting itself to valuations of separate individuals which can be meas-
ured in terms of money, while a more comprehensive study of human wel-
fare requires a revision and sometimes even a replacement of market
values by the valuations of Society as a collective whole which, although
not so accurately measurable are more fundamental». The same point
about the restrictiveness in the definition of welfare is brought home even
more forcefully by A. Radomysler (1969: 92, originally published in 1948):
In current writings of welfare economists, it is true, the matter is simpler
than this. However, they are hardly concerned with the problem of welfare;
in fact they are not. . . . Welfare, or happiness (i.e., Radomysler equates
welfare with happiness), however, is no simple thing. That which our wel-
fare economists consider is only one part; and what they see in this, more-
1 See Gintis (1969: 1 — 2) who explicitly assumes the contrary. It is interesting that the assump-
tions Gintis calls Marxist are actually identical to the ones endorsed by such conservative
economists as Frank Knight and J. M. Clark; Knight (1969), Levin (1956: 117-118), Myint
(1948: 209---210).
102	 J . P. Roos, Welfare Theory and Social Policy
over, is quite simply not there. All the things that matter, on the other
hand, are left out.>>
Radomysler's chief claim is that welfare economists have lost touch
with reality. None of the actual problems relevant to individual and social
welfare are actually argued about. Radomysler lists the following: »Lock-
outs and strikes? Industrial relations? The control of wages and the control
of prices? . . . Private ownership or nationalization? The problem of justice
in the distribution?>> (Radomysler 1969: 93). This list could be continued
indefinitely, and here we already arrive at the threshold of a Marxist
critique: e.g., one concerning the relationship of social reality to welfare
economics.
It might be said that welfare economics is in an impasse, as is noted
by many critics, friendly and otherwise (see for instance Little 1957: 1,
Leibenstein 1965: 39, Pahlke 1960: 79). Pahlke suggests that welfare
economics has only two ways out: either to preserve the assumptions and
restrict the area of application, or to give up the assumptions. Essentially,
the latter line is not only a way out but it is a way out of welfare economics
altogether, because it would imply giving up not only one of the assump-
tions but practically all of them. This is probed in the following, when
welfare theory proper is analyzed.
It is clear that in the present situation, where the opinion that welfare
economics has no future is rather widespread, there are innumerable
suggestions as to how to develop the field. I shall take up a few of them in
the following sections, but by no means all, of course, as that would be
impossible.
By way of a general conclusion, one could say that historically, the
study of welfare economics originated from a concern for a broader econ-
omics that would include the entire social organism (Myint 1948: 206-207).
This was especially true of the first decades of the twentieth century.
Later, welfare economics degenerated into a mere defense of private capi-
talism, an apologia for the existing conditions.
For a considerable length of time there have been suggestions made
concerning the development of welfare economics along its originally
intended lines. As far back as 1948, Kenneth W. Boulding made a pre-
diction that, still today, is appropriate only as a prophesy: »Thus we seem
to be on the verge of an expansion of welfare economics into something
like a social science of ethics and politics: what was intended to be a mere
porch to ethics is either the whole house or nothing at all. In so laying
down its life welfare economics may be able to contribute some of its
insights and analytical methods to a much broader evaluative analysis
of the whole social process>> (Boulding 1948: 34).
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6.2.8. Political Implications
However, sharp the criticism against the assumptions and theories of
welfare economics, there has seldom been any attempt to explain why
welfare economics is such an impotent and useless discipline. The »inside>)
critics of welfare economics, such as Graaff and Little, avoid drawing con-
clusions about the origins and causes of this impotency. Only recently
have remarks about the problems become open. One of the earliest is by
Paul A. Baran (1968: 26) who simply notes that welfare economics is one
of the most apologetic disciplines of all social science and the one most
directly engaged in defending capitalism by all means. In particular,
this has involved the direct omission of matters such as might implicate
capitalism, e.g., the problem of equality. Almost all of the above-presented
features of welfare economics, such as the Pareto principle, the separation
of efficiency and equity, of distribution and production, the denial of
interpersonal utility comparisons, etc., can be conceived of as means
toward this end.'
It might be said that overall, welfare economics was mainly an activity
of the more conservative type of economists, especially in later times.
This has been disputed, by pointing out that Lange and Lerner, as well
as other socialist economists for example, were interested in welfare econ-
omics and were even involved in its development. It is obvious, however,
that this was based on mistaken notions of the #system indifference# or
neutrality of the concept of welfare. It was presumed that the objective
of the maximization of welfare was perfectly apolitical and the question
was only which of the two, a centralized planning mechanism or private
capitalism, could realize it better (see Lange—Taylor 1964).
It is painstakingly obvious that the writings of Lange and especially
those of Lerner at that time can not be considered particularly socialist
or Marxist (see especially an effective refutation by Bettelheim 1958:
chapter 1). In effect, we may say that a comprehensive Marxist critique
of welfare economics does not exist. Yet the problem is very interesting,
because welfare economics may be conceived of as one of the well-devel-
oped theoretical attempts at defending the fundamental precepts of capi-
talism, namely, the free consumer choice in a system of private enterprise.
Even Dobb's book, Welfare Economics and the Economics of Socialism,
(1969), does not amount to such a criticism.
Quite obviously this is due to the fact that Marxists have looked on
the field of welfare economics as blatantly reactionary already on the
1 See Dobb (1969: 77-78) who notes that after the classics, such problems as equality have
become repulsive for economists in general.
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political level — a continuation of the worst tendencies in classical econ-
omists. What Marx said about Utilitarianism has later been reiterated by
Paul A. Baran on the topic of welfare economics, almost verbatim.' Thus,
an outside critique of welfare economics has often merely consisted of argu-
ments not directly related to the actual content of welfare economics.
Recently, however, there has been a full-scale attempt at a critique
of welfare economics from a relatively new (although not so original as
the author himself claims) point of view.
In his unpublished work, Gintis has attempted to show the failure of
the concept of welfare in welfare economics. As pointed out above (p. 101),
some of his assumptions are very closely related to the classical tradition,
although he presents them as Marxist, but in most of his analysis he intro-
duces a novel approach to welfare economics.
According to Gintis, neo-classical welfare economics is only a faithful
reproduction of the contradictions of capitalism. Just as capitalism is based
on the efficient production of goods and services, so is welfare economics
based on a view of welfare that sees goods and services as final ends in
themselves; *non-physical, non-market unit-objects are treated as 'means'
toward the maximization of marketable products in capitalist institutions,
the justification for these institutions on the part of neo-classical theory
requiring theory devoid of welfare-relevant attributes* (Gintis 1969: 10-11).
Gintis starts his analysis from two *Marxist* principles: *First, we take
'preference structure' as endogenous to the economic mechanism, following
the dictum that 'men develop according to their social relations of pro-
duction . .
*Second, we extend the scope of welfare-relevant entities from goods
and services to the gamut of social roles, relations, activities and objects,
in the belief that economic activity has a formative influence on all aspects
of social life. Social welfare depends on the structure of environment,
community, and work activities, as well as the pattern of individual psychic
development, and this fact must be incorporated in a welfare model*
(Gintis 1969: 1-2).
As pointed out above, these assumptions are not new or *Marxist*
in the sense that they were accepted exclusively by the Marxists. It is
obvious that precisely these qualities have been essential to welfare theory
for a long time, and are not limited to a Marxist point of view. In a Marxist
approach, both of these assumptions should obviously be much more
1 Marx—Engels (1970: 114): »The economic content gradually turned the utility theory
into a mere apologia for the existing state of affairs, an attempt to prove that under existing
conditions the mutual relations of people today are the most advantageous and generally
useful. It has this character among all contemporary economics.» cf. Baran (1968: 26).
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specific, and the role of economic institutions should be especially empha-
sized.
But Gintis is even more traditional in abstracting the content of wel-
fare and concentrating only on its form — this being exactly the argument
of the more conservative wing of welfare economists who wanted to ignore
all relevant considerations (ibid.: 4).
Despite the traditional outlook of Gintis' approach, his requirements
for welfare economics are rather radical. First of all, he quite correctly
interprets *welfare economics* to mean the study of the outcome of econ-
omic activity and economic phenomena for individual welfare (ibid.: 4).
He specifies by noting *. . the crucial set of conditions that must be
satisfied by any adequate welfare theory. Such a theory must consider
the effect of a particular organization of economic institutions not only
on the implied set of marketable physical unit-objects, but on the properly
economic unit-objects in the form of economic roles and collectivities, on
the other relevant social unit-objects, and on the implications of this
economic organization for the compatible 'bundles' of unit-objects on the
level of physical-organic, personality and cultural systems* (ibid.: 25).
These requirements are very demanding indeed, if one considers what
welfare economics has thus far accomplished, but this could indeed be
considered a partially *Marxist* program, although the restriction of
emphasis to individual welfare is not acceptable. Gintis correctly notes
that this is not only a program for welfare economics but for welfare theory
in general (or welfare sociology as he prefers to call it (ibid.: 36)).
It must be said that the constructive development of welfare theory
is not adequately emphasised in the Gintis paper referred to above. But
he manages to pinpoint all of the crucial failures of welfare economics.
For example, Gintis points out a fact that has not been noted elsewhere:
welfare economics actually takes data * — as the given prerequisites for
analysis — precisely what must be one of the outcomes of the analysis*
if it is to be more than a *simple apology for existing relations of produc-
tion* (ibid.: 38); i.e., it takes as data the preferences of the individuals
and considers them given.
Some areas of Gintis' criticism are rather traditional (see for instance
pages 17 — 18 where he criticizes the neo-classical assumptions in a very
conventional way) but all of his paper is a very radical critique of the
foundations of classical and neo-classical welfare economics. It cannot
be called a Marxist critique, but it deals with certain related points. It is
very understandable that a Gintis-type critique which is clearly prejudiced
cannot be accepted by the more traditional welfare economists. It is against
the accepted paradigm in so many ways. But I feel that it incorporates
a much more fruitful starting point than the existing structure of welfare
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economics. This belief may be arbitrary, but some credence is of course
gained by the fact that traditional welfare economics has proved its fruit-
lessness.
6.3. Compensation Principles
The principle of compensation and discussion about it is mainly historical
now (see e.g., Little 1957: 84), yet it is of interest from the normative
science point of view and especially from the point of view of social policy.
As mentioned above, compensation criteria were based on the belief that
it is impossible to compare interpersonal utilities and therefore one must
look for possibilities to make recommendations based on unanimous con-
sensus (Rothenberg 1961: 62, Kaldor 1969: 387).1 In believing that consen-
sus would provide an opportunity for 'objective' and 'scientific' recom-
mendations, economists were of course in error (see Nath 1969: 95).
Compensation criteria may, interestingly enough, be seen as an attempt
to get around the famous Hume guillotin which formed the basis for sep-
aration between 'positive' and 'normative' science. But at least for some
economists, the wish to make recommendations clearly overrode the wish
to stay inside the confines of positive science.
Another interesting connection is that compensation criteria are a
clear example of the division of economics into two distinct parts: pro-
duction and distribution. The original idea behind the first compensation
criterion developed by Kaldor was specifically to reduce all problems of
welfare economics to production and completely eliminate the distribu-
tional aspects (Kaldor 1969: 388-389).
Although the compensation principle does not seem to be very useful,
it has some important qualities. First, it calls attention to the problem of
externalities and their solution (Baumol 1965: 25). Brownlee and Buttrick
(1968: 249) emphasize this side of the compensation principle in their
analysis of its possible uses. There are many actions in society that affect
citizens in different ways. Brownlee and Buttrick recommend the esti-
mation of compensatory taxes and bribes needed in every social action.
Some elementary compensation (in most cases to landowners) occurs
constantly, but applied in full this principle might have interesting con-
sequences. On the other hand, the total application of compensation anal-
ysis would make it indistinguishable from cost-benefit analysis.
This is the question that already strikes at the foundations of the whole
criterion. It is obvious that one cannot separate production and distribu-
1 The important articles of Kaldor and Hicks are reproduced in Arrow— Scitovsky (1969)
which the references cite.
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tion with respect to welfare. The manner of distribution is clearly dependent
upon the relations of production, as the price system is not only a distribu-
tive mechanism but also a control mechanism for productive resources
(see Dobb 1969: 26, Graaff 1957: 155). On the other hand there is no con-
cept of total product that would not be dependent upon income distribu-
tion.1
Thus there is no way of separating production effects from distribution,
effects while considering welfare. This is essentially what the Pareto prin-
ciple, on which all compensation criteria are founded, disputes. In accord-
ance with the Pareto criterion, distribution would have no welfare effect:
this is also what compensation criteria assume (or that distribution may
always be neutralized). We shall return to this problem because it has
far-reaching consequences especially for politics: that is, what is politically
acceptable and what is not.
The compensation principle may be said to be based on the following
assumptions (Rothenberg 1961: 69):
State A is socially preferred to state B if every member of society
prefers A to B.
State A is socially preferred to B if at least one person prefers A to B,
and nobody prefers B to A.
3. The society is indifferent with regard to A and B if nobody prefers
neither A nor B.2
In other words, the states A and B are not comparable if there is at
least one person who prefers B to A while others either prefer A to B or
are indifferent. The fundamental principle of compensation, then, is simply
that if the individuals who prefer (for instance) A to B can compensate
(bribe) those individuals who prefer B to A so that these become at least
indifferent while the compensating individuals still prefer A to B, a change
from A to B is an improvement, or is socially preferred. All interpersonal
comparisons of utilities are therefore avoided.
This is roughly the original principle (or criterion) of compensation,
presented by Kaldor (1939: 385), and elaborated by Hicks (1939), and
called the Kaldor —Hicks criterion. Later, Scitovsky (1969 (1941)) pointed
out some anomalies in the principle and suggested a new version that
intended to correct these. Samuelson (1947) however, was able to show
that even the Scitovsky version was vulnerable to intransitivity. It might
be said that with Little's attempt (1951, 1957) to develop a 'final' version,
the creative period of compensation principles was ended (see Dobb 1969:
1 See Arrow (1963: 40). Note that Marx has also analyzed this problem well in Grundrisse
(1970); see also Rescher (1966: 15), Rothenberg (1961: 102).
2 Note that this is precisely the fundamental Paretian assumption. Thus the compensation
principle is nothing but an application of the Pareto principle.
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82-85). Currently, few seem to consider compensation principles worth-
while,' although there might be some limited use for them in, for instance,
problems of social policy.
There are two kinds of compensation: actual and potential. The dif-
ference between them is not particularly significant, although previously
there has been some intensive discussion about whether there should be
actual compensation or not (see e.g., Bau.mol 1965: 163). This discussion
has some ideological and political relevance in the sense of who would
benefit more from actual or potential compensation. For instance, Little
(1957: 120) though that potential compensation would be more progressive
as the consequent reforms would probably be biased for the poor, for
whom it would be difficult to make compensations to the rich. In addition,
the effects of actions would not be entirely clear, and the process of com-
pensation would be difficult in practice, although easy to calculate in theory.
Consequently, potential compensation would not hinder the execution of
actions as much as would actual compensation. On the other hand it is
equally possible to imagine that most reforms would benefit the rich and
therefore actual compensation would be a necessary condition for their
acceptability (for an example, see page 112).
Most of the students of compensation principles seem to regard potential
compensation as the more practical. In addition to the practical advantages
mentioned above, there is also the consideration that if compensation were
actually to be made for every change, the resulting situation would prob-
ably not vary significantly from the original; i.e., the principle of actual
compensation is very conservative in character (Little 1957: 96, Scitovsky
1969: 393). It was also defended by the implausible argument that dif-
ferent changes would cancel themselves out, with the result that, in the
end, no compensation would be necessary and everybody would be better
off (Zeckhauser —Schaefer 1968: 59).
When considering the operation of the compensation principle, it makes
no difference whether one envisages actual or potential compensation, as
long as practical problems are not important. In the following it may
therefore be assumed that compensation is potential.
The Kaldor compensation principle may be illu,strated2 graphically
(figure 6.3.a) using the device of welfare frontiers (or utility possibility
curves).
1 Except maybe Mishan (1969), and of course the more conservative wing of economists
such as Buchanan who represent the point of view that the only acceptable system of rec-
ommendations is based on the compensation principle; Buchanan (1960: 114 116). See
also Buchanan — Tullock (1962) where an entire text is built on this principle.
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The shaded area is that which is acceptable under the assumptions.
This means that any change is acceptable where those who gain may
compensate the losers so that the final situation falls in the shaded area.
This, of course, is not always possible.
It was not long after the presentation of this criterion that Scitovsky
was able to demonstrate ambiguities in the Kaldor —Hicks criterion in
some situations. The so-called Scitovsky paradox may be formulated as
follows: in certain situations it was possible that under the Kaldor —Hicks
criterion both the change and the return to the old situation would be
recommended. The explanation of the paradox was simple:
If the welfare frontiers intersect, it is possible, in the first instance,
to move from situation I to situation II because by compensation the
acceptable situation III can be reached. But from situation II it is also
possible to move to situation I, because from it, it is possible to get to
situation IV by compensation (Rothenberg 1961: 80-82, Zeckhauser —
Schaefer 1968: 58-59). There is nothing astonishing in this result. If a
change affects the distribution of welfare-relevant factors (as is indicated
by the slopes of the welfare frontiers), it is perfectly understandable that
a criterion such as the compensation principle falls astray.
This problem was solved by demanding that the welfare frontiers
should not intersect in the relevant area under consideration. (Strictly,
the number of times that the curves do intersect should not be odd). But
even after this requirement was suggested by Scitovsky (and therefore
named the Scitovsky criterion), it was possible to show that there were
situations when the result would be ambiguous (Graaff 1957: 86-87).
This was based on the fact that if the curve was allowed to intersect an
even number of times, the recommendations would no longer be based only
on compensation arguments: there would also be a distributive argument
present. Between points II and III (see figure 6.3.c) lies a section of the
original (pre-change) curve which is, in the Paretian sense, better than the
respective section of the new (post-change) curve. Its rejection is therefore
possible only on distributive grounds (Samuelson 1947: 251, Graaff 1957:
87).
The end result of these developments is that the compensation principle
is ambivalent. Of course one might argue that such situations where the
welfare frontiers behave in the way assumed by Samuelson are relatively
rare, but this is not important. The fact is that welfare frontiers are scarcely
known, if at all.
It might be said, therefore, that the compensation principles were
defeated on their own grounds. But these were not the only possible grounds
for criticism. The most important external reason for the breakdown of
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In the first place, it is apparent that the compensation potentialities
of the rich where quite superior to those of the poor and therefore compen-
sation principles were biased towards such solutions that benefit the rich
and had to be compensated to the poor (see Rothenberg 1961: 87). Assume
that A is very rich and B is very poor. The two-man community would
have the kind of welfare frontier shown in figure 6.3.d and the starting
situation would probably be of the type shown in the figure.
Secondly, the compensation principle would entail distributionally
very suspect solutions. For instance, if an act would increase the property
of John D. Rockefeller by one million dollars and 1000 individuals of
average incomes would thereby lose 999 dollars, according to potential
compensation the change would be recommended because Rockefeller
could (but he would not have to) compensate to the others the losses
sustained, yet still have 1000 dollars left (Zeckhauser —Schaefer 1968: 59).
The above implications are related to the fact that compensation prin-
ciples are strongly biased for growth: they favor policies for growth and
are biased against policies that implement distribution (i.e., policies that
change the slope of the welfare frontier). It has been said that the basic
premise of compensation principles is that one should forget about dis-
tribution and concentrate on growth (Rothenberg 1961: 116— 117). I point-
ed out in the previous chapter that economists disliked problems of income
distribution, especially egalitarian problems. The compensation principle
is an outstanding example of this dislike.1
A more symphatetic explanation for the growth emphasis is given by
Rothenberg (1961: 118), whose argument is rather elaborate: If we assume
that the growth potential of policies is independent of who gains and who
loses (i.e., there is no built in propensity for a certain party to win and
another to lose), then the result of who loses and who wins occurs com-
pletely at random. And if the policies affect growth, it is obvious that,
in general, more people are likely to win than to lose. Rothenberg himself
notes that this explanation is not adequate: there is no certainty that
gain and loss is a random process, and that the expectation of gains are
larger than the expectation of losses for the same individual in any one
policy.
1 This has been emphasized by Rescher (1966: 17), who points out: sWhat (the Kaldor —
Hicks criterion) does is to serve as a smokescreen, hiding unconcern with a certain set of
problems and as an excuse for passing these unwanted problems on to somebody else . . .
The tendency of welfare economics is simply to divest economics of concern with the very
problem we set ourselves here — that of evaluating distributions. Apart from a dutiful,
polite bow in the direction of egalitarianism, modern Anglo-American economics has tended
to refuse to confront our problem on the relevant terms, and thus provides little guidance
toward its solutions.
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It should be mentioned that Kaldor himself emphasized that because
it is not possible to give recommendations on the grounds of interpersonal
comparisons, they should be avoided. That is to say, he was inspired by
the Robbins dictum (Kaldor 1969: 387).
The more recent development of compensation principles has been based
on an explicit recognition of the distribution problem. But their solution
to this problem is more imaginary than real. It is however, instructive
to see how the problem of distribution was actually solved.
Little (1951, 1957) has tried to develop a criterion that would also
contain distributional effects. This criterion is rather simple in principle:
is the Kaldor —Hicks criterion satisfied?
is the Scitovsky criterion satisfied?
c) is the resulting income distribution #gooth? (Little 1957: 101).
The idea was based on the precept that it should be possible to make
a value judgment about the distribution, because in principle this would
not conflict with the Paretian judgments: they explicitly eliminate all
considerations of distribution. The main problem is, of course, whether
it is possible to separate the distribution effects from other effects, specifi-
cally from growth effects. Previously I have indicated that this is not
possible. According to Rothenberg, however, it would be possible:
1° if pure distributional judgments are simpler than judgments about
social states;
2° if it were easy to measure changes of distribution; and
3° if it were easier to construct and observe judgments about distribution
(Rothenberg 1961: 111).
Nonetheless, these conditions are not satisfied, says Rothenberg.'
The Little criterion also ignores all the problems of the Scitovsky
criterion, which are very real. Arrow has also noted that while the Kaldor-
Hicks — Scitovsky criteria purport to compare different levels of production
independent of distribution, Little tries to compare different income dis-
tributions independent of income (or production) levels. This is as equally
impossible as the original attempt (Arrow 1951: 928).
Later, some additional difficulties of the Little criterion have been
pointed out by, for example, San and Lyda11. San (1963: 772) remarks
that in reality, the Little criterion is not based on the separation of dis-
tribution and production but only on the use of criteria, one of which is
Paretian and the other unspecified. These criteria together lead to certain
1 An example on the interdependence of distributional and absolute judgments is given
by Rothenberg (ibid.:111) A person may disapprove of the existing distribution of income be-
cause he thinks the poor are too poor, but given the same distribution, he would accept
it if the poor were in an absolutely better position, i e., if the whole distribution would prevail
on a higher level.
6
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conclusions about policies. What is fundamental in the Little criterion is
that the complete transitivity of policies is assumed, i.e., transitivity of
welfare comparisons. In effect, the Little criterion is not a criterion at all
but only a transitivity assumption, says San (ibid.: 776). From a practical
point of view (the comparison of distributions) this is certainly true. But
from a theoretical point of view it may be denied. Little assumes also the
possibility of actual comparison and not only the existence of comparable
alternatives.
Yet this has not prevented E. J. Mishan from considering the Little-
type criterion as the best welfare criterion developed in welfare economics.
Although he admits that the results are very meagre, there are, in his
opinion, some practical advantages in the Little compensation criterion
(Mishan 1969: 67-68, 73). This is certainly a minority opinion. Most
students of compensation criteria do not consider them as viable alter-
natives in considering welfare-theoretical problems.
Generally speaking, it can be said that the compensation criteria are
extremely restricted in application: any middle-level decision-maker has
to employ criteria much more complex and applicable to wider problems
than compensation criteria (Zeckhauser — Schaefer 1968: 60, Rothenberg
1961: 71-72). The crucial restrictions of compensation criteria may be
summarized as follows:
1° Compensation criteria are only sufficient conditions for acceptable
actions; they are not necessary for finding policies that are 'good'
(Arrow 1951: 924).
9° It is possible, therefore, to choose only the best state or policy among
those that are compared: not the best possible policy. If the recommen-
dation of a policy simultaneously prevents the execution of another
policy that is better, the opportunity costs of compensation criteria
are great.
30 The conditions of compensation criteria are extremely restrictive.
They are founded on all too strict assumptions; specifically, they are
too simple.
4' The practical difficulties are also great. For instance, to calculate the
amounts that actually should be compensated is an impossible task.
Rothenberg (1961: 77) remarks that it is not at all certain whether it
would be easier to calculate how much to compensate than to form
a welfare function.'
1 Rothenberg's critique that, on the basis of the second best theorem the area of the criteria
is still more restricted, is however misplaced. It is not required that compensation criteria
be applied only to optimal situations (see Graaff 1957: 87). In fact, it is questionable whether
compensation criteria could be applied to optimal policies.
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5° It is implicit in every compensation criterion that they break down if
we want to compare large changes (see Arrow 1951: 929-930). It is
obvious that most welfare economists prefer small changes to big
ones. But theoretically it is interesting that the compensation criterion
is a typically disjointed-incrementalist criterion (see Braybrooke —
Lindblom 1963), although the conscious cross-references do not exist.
Although it is agreed that compensation principles are not widely appli-
cable, there are extremely interesting theoretical connections between
some approaches to social policy, and compensation principles.
According to a rather popular school, social policy was the distributional
aspect of general policy-making (see Nieminen 1955). In other words, one
could say that social policy theorists concentrated on the distributive
aspect of the Little criterion. On the other hand, they were little acquainted
with the developments in welfare economics.1
There are two pertinent problems here. First, the interest of social
policy theorists was, as previously mentioned, in the redistributional
aspects of policy (this is not true now, but was earlier). This was exactly
the point against which the compensation criteria were directed. The
primary idea behind the Kaldor —Hicks criterion was that a redistribu-
tional policy alone would be damaging. And it might be mentioned that
the social policy theorists were struck with the same disillusionment about
distribution problems that was to be seen in the compensation criteria
(see for example Kuusi (1964) where this disillusionment and the emphasis
on growth is very marked).
On the practical level, it seems as if social policy problems would be
planned to defy application to compensation criteria. For instance, in
sickness benefit programs the beneficiaries and the losers are actually
very much the same group. In fact, many of the newest measures in social
policy (in Finland) such as the work-pension provisions (tyijelakejdrjes-
telma) run counter to the spirit of compensation. There is nothing to
compensate as there is no redistribution.
This is probably related to the same fundamental reason why compen-
sation criteria in general are not popular. The social policy of a capitalist
country is especially geared to avoiding problems of compensation and
uses ))comprehensive» solutions meant to avoid these problems entirely.
In fact we might say that the compensation approach is not a realistic
one in any society where there is no possibility for compulsory compensa-
For instance I)ich (1964: 43) only mentions welfare economics when speaking about a
subject that in no way is related to welfare economics. Liefmann-Keil (1961) has a longer
reference to compensation theoretical problems but only as a digression. Nieminen's (1955)
extensive book was published just when the discussion about compensation criteria had
reached its height, but did not contain any mention of the subject.
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tory arrangements. Rescher, for exampler, notes that the principle of
compensation has an obviously mythological basis: ;There is no reason
in theory, and little evidence in practice to think that the beneficiaries of
a new economic arrangement are likely to compensate those who sustain
losses thereby. Rosy opportunities for general improvement often turn,
in the cooler light of morning, to grey actualities that advance special
interests, doing so in ways that could and should have been foreseen.
If one is going to motivate economic measures in terms of a social-contract-
for-the-general-advantage conception, one must undertake the responsi-
bility to assure in advance that the terms of this contract are reasonably
realistic ones)) (Rescher 1966: 15).
What is wrong in Rescher's presentation is that the compensation
principle is especially meant for cases in which special interests are ad-
vanced in such a way that they should be compensated for. The general
improvement programs, on the other hand, deny the possibility to handle
them by specific compensation.
6.4. The Social Welfare Function
6.4.1. General Remarks
In the following we shall analyze the most important and interesting con-
cept of welfare economics, that of the welfare function. It is in this concept
that all the fundamental problems of welfare economics are centered.
There is nothing special about the concept of a welfare function in itself.
It is only natural to express a relationship in a functional form, through
which some fundamental mathematical qualities may be used, and the
structure of the problem can be clarified.
The welfare function implies simultaneously a definition of welfare.
Through it are specified the actual ways to define welfare in economics.
Astonishingly, the welfare economists have avoided the observation that
they are defining welfare by the welfare function. On the other hand this
type of definition is largely empty, because neither the variables in the
function, nor the relationships between the variables are specified. The
fundamental question solved by the welfare function has been that of the
conditions of its maximization. These conditions can be seen to be rather
restrictive, although the assumptions of the welfare function itself are not
particularly extensive. Not even the form of the function, or its compo-
nents are specified except to a limited degree.
The welfare functions presented in the following are all Paretian. In
other words, they are based on the Paretian assumptions presented above.
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First the general formulation of the welfare function will be presented,
after which we will examine the class of welfare functions defined by the
Paretian assumptions. It is obvious, therefore, that there are many more
general welfare functions, although there has been no theory developed
for them (cf. Inada 1964: 316-317). The use of Paretian welfare functions
has been defended on grounds that they define a relatively large class of
functions while making relatively few assumptions. Furthermore, these
assumptions are supposed to be very widely acceptable (Graaff 1957:
9-10). It is plausible to assume that a welfare function that supposes
unanimous consensus would be accepted by the individuals of whose wel-
fare functions it is constructed. This is of course a tautology. Yet it can
be said that the possibilities for application cannot be very extensive.
Indeed, there are very few occasions that allow for the construction of
such functions.
It should be noted that the Paretian assumptions do not specify the
welfare function completely. As a result of the maximization, we get an
infinite amount of points. This is due to the fact that the assumptions
are not enough to define a complete ordering (Lange 1969: 26-27).
The famous formulation of the welfare function by Bergson in 1938
is as follows: Take two consumer goods x and y, two kinds of labor
a and b, two other factors of production C and D and all other factors
affecting welfare R, 8, T , . . . Assume the society consists of s individuals
(0, = 1 , . . . , s).
The welfare of the society W can be given as a function of these vari-
ables:
(6.4.1)	 W = W(x,,y,, a7 , b7, a , b , . . . , x„ ys ,
a: , b:,a:,b:,Cx,Dx,CY,DY,R,S,T,•••)
In other words, the welfare of the society is a function of the goods
consumed by the individual, work performed by the individuals, the inputs
of other factors of production and of other relevant factors (Bergson 1966: 5;
some of the symbols have been slightly revised to avoid confusion).
The interpretation given to economic welfare above is here very simply
formalized; we assume that the factors, R , 8, and T are constant and
all changes analyzed are ceteris paribus with respect to these factors. This
is defensible if the changes in the factors are small, although the factors
are certainly interdependent (see Bergson 1966: 5-6, Rothenberg 1961:
8-10). In the following I shall assume a perfectly general formulation
except, for simplicity, in maximizing the function I shall regard only the
>>economic# factors (see App. 1).
It is evident that the formulation given by Bergson is rather remi-
niscent of a production function (except for the consumer goods used,
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and one might well imagine them belonging in a more general production
function). But concerning the maximization of the function, it is insignifi-
cant by what names the variables are called.
The formulation 6.4.1 is perfectly general: it is merely a function that
defines what factors affect welfare. Because of this, Rothenberg claims
that it entails no value judgm'ents (Rothenberg 1961: 11). This is of course
erroneous, because it is certainly not only factual considerations that
determine which factors affect welfare and which do not. For an example,
it is not a simple matter of fact whether a certain type of work positively
affects social welfare. But these assumptions aside, there are no consider-
ations referring to the connection of individual and social welfare; it is
probably this that is envisaged by Rothenberg. And here the Paretian
assumptions enter the picture. On the basis of the first assumption (see
p. 97) the welfare function is transformed into the following:
(6.4.2)	 TV = TV(U l , . . . , US)
where Ug = the utility of the gth individual. TV is assumed to be a mono-
tonically increasing function of Ug , i.e.,
(6.4.2b) ow >Ug 0
(Bergson 1966: 58, Nath 1969: 8-9).
The social welfare function is assumed to be composed of individual
welfare functions and the direct formulation of 6.4.1 is substituted for the
indirect formulation where all the given factors of welfare affect social
welfare only through individual welfare functions.
These individual welfare functions, in terms of 'economic' welfare, may
be formulated as follows:
(6.4.3)	 Ug	Ug(xf ,	 i	 1 , . . . , n
j= 1 , . . . , m
where xf is the share of the gth individual of the itli consumer good
and of is the productive input of the gth individual in the j th form
of labor (Nath 1969: 9).
The maximization procedure is based on this form of utility function,
but there is, of course, nothing that could hinder a more general formulation
(see, for instance, Alberts 1970: 47-49).
The Bergson welfare function, then, is an individualistic — and in its
content rather restricted — function which, however, does not obscure the
essential problems in connection with welfare functions. It can be inter-
preted as a means of giving a numerical value (of social utility) to each
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social state with the aim of society being the maximization of the function
under technological and resource, etc., constraints. In other words, it is
supposed to help the society to choose that social state conducive to the
highest possible social welfare in a certain environment (Arrow 1963: 22,
Alberts 1970: 40-41). The idea is simply to express the ordering of the
states of society in the set of real numbers.
Note that even this is not strictly necessary: as Sen (1970: 34) points
out, a social welfare function need not be a real-valued function; it is only
necessary that it be an ordering (for example, a lexicographic ordering
cannot be represented by a real-valued function).
The form of this function has been a point of much interest. If we assume
that it is simply the sum of the individual utility functions perhaps weighted
by some appropriate numbers, we are in a solution where the interpersonal
comparability of utility is assumed (see the Lange formulation, p. 129).
We may assume more complex forms for this function, some of which
do not require interpersonal comparability, some of which do. The form
of the function is, in essence, a problem of aggregation, i.e., the problem
of how to combine individual utilities. This is precisely the problem given
an exact formulation by Arrow and analyzed in the next chapter.
The essential quality of the social welfare function is that it specifies
the goals of society. W (normally a vector)' gives the goals of society,
Whereas the variables in the argument are the means to be manipulated
by the society or by the individuals themselves (Nath 1969: 139-140).
If the goal is simply the maximization of W, the problem is as presented
below. If the goal is a specified value of W, the problem is more com-
plicated.
From the above, one may get the impression that the problems involved
are rather small. As can be seen in the following, this is not true. The
maximization as a mathematical problem is simple enough; even taking
into consideration anomalies such as corner maxima, the problem of the
global maximum, etc. The essential problems are in the specification of
the function, the selection of its variables, and the relationships between
these variables, i.e., problems that have not bothered welfare economists.
On the other hand, there has arisen a degree of criticism against the welfare
function even among welfare economists.2
A typical example is probably represented by the view of Dobb (1969:
1 We may either assume that W is a real number, or that it is a vector. In the latter case,
the problem of maximization is slightly more complicated in form, but not in substance.
2 Some of it is self-defeating, such as that of Brownlee and Buttrick (1969: 235). They 'dis-
card' the notion of a social welfare function in favor of a ))partial ordering of social statesA.
In fact, the Bergsonian social welfare function itself is nothing but a partial ordering of
social states, as can be seen in the following.
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110) that the welfare function is simply an elegant instance of a formalism
that greatly eases the analysis by assuming important problems to be
solved by some ingenious but unnamed way without, in fact, giving any
clues for their solution. The formal solution is therefore no solution at all,
because all the real problems remain unsolved. The simple technical prob-
lems receive all the attention and the corollaries are given an economic
interpretation although the function itself is devoid of any economic
content.
This has been stated also by, for example, Zeckhauser —Schaefer
(1968: 54) and Little (1957: 123). In the defence of the mathematical
formulation it should be said that without it there would be no clarity
about which problems are solved and which are not, and also that
mathematical formulation gives some specificity to the problem (Debreu
1959: viii). This is, of course, not to be taken for granted: we may also
say that the formulation of the welfare function has obscured the view
of the real solution to the problem and some of the central aspects of it,
such as the problem of the politization of the problem. In fact, the meaning
of the Dobb critique lies in the idea that the importance of the welfare
function should not be exaggerated: it does not solve anything in itself.
It is only a frame of reference, and faulty as such.
6.4.2. The Welfare Optimum and Its Conditions
In this section I shall analyze the maximizationl of the welfare function
and the problems in this connection. We shall not, however, go into the
technical details of the maximization of the welfare function at this time
(but see Appendix 1, where the maximization procedure is presented and
the optimum conditions are formulated mathematically).
In the following I will interpret the optimum conditions and analyze
their importance, especially from the point of view of policy. From this
analysis certain negative conclusions concerning their relevance emerge.
There are three groups of conditions, the production optimum, the
exchange optimum and the total (or top level) optimum. These can also
be combined, but is it more illustrative to consider them separately. The
optimum conditions are, of course, only necessary conditions for the Pareto-
1 Some students (for instance Simon) have presented the view that maximization is an incor-
rect term and that we should speak of satisficing: people attempt to achieve satisfactory,
though not necessarily maximum solutions (see Zeckhauser— Schaefer 1968: 92— 93). It seems
that this is only juggling with words. Maximization is maximization even if you take heed
of the restrictions and constraints; satisficing is just maximization with respect to the con-
straint: one should not restrain oneself too much. This goes for the 'modern' economists as
well, who claim that firms no longer maximize their profits.
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optimum. We need also second derivatives and conditions about them to
make sure that what we have is a maximum and not a minimum. It can
be shown that these conditions are those required from an equilibrium
point in static equilibrium theory. As mentioned previously, even these
only guarantee the existence of a local maximum; there is no certainty
that the point is a global maximum. In the framework of the classical
approach this has been solved giving a set of additional conditions which
restrict the end result even further (Mishan 1964: 25-26, Nath 1969:
31— 34).
It will not be necessary to analyze these additional conditions, as the
analysis of the optimum conditions themselves is enough to show the
futility of this approach (note that there are attempts to show that these
conditions are more widely applicable (Arrow 1951)).
The production optimum (which also expresses the condition of tech-
nical efficiency) may be interpreted as follows (Nath 1969: 14, Little 1957:
136, Mishan 1964: 18): For any two production factors, the ratio of their
physical marginal product must be the same in the production of all those
goods to which they contribute. Or in other words, the marginal substi-
tution rate of any two production factors in the production of every good
must be equal. The reverse is also true: for every good, the marginal rate
of substitution for every pair of factors must be the same. This may be
illustrated in figure 6.4.a (a so-called box diagram).
J
v X h
H   
X	 Vk
Fig. 6.4.a
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The notation follows the usage above. PP and QQ are isoproduct
curves (convex to the origin), i.e., curves where the production of the good
stays constant while the ratio of the factors is changed. Only in the point
of tangency of these curves is it possible to increase production without
increasing the total amount of factors used, thus this is the production
optimum defined above. This also explains why the optimum conditions
are often (and also here) presented as the ratios of derivatives (i.e., angular
coefficients of the tangents). In the situation of figure 6.4.a, G units of
factor Vi are used in the production of Xi , and F units of factor Vk •
Moving down on the curve PP we can increase the production of the
good Xh (move to a higher isoproduct curve) without decreasing the
production of X1.
It has been claimed that production does not require other value judge-
ments than the assumption of rationality (Nath 1969: 12-13). Yet it
clearly contains assumptions that have marked political and social rel-
evance. For instance, workers are assumed to have no preferences about
types of employment, which is certainly not true, although a typical capi-
talist assumption. Under the production optimum, the efficiency of the
workers is also independent of the income distribution, yet this condition
is least problematic of all. Its main content is the rather innocent pre-
supposition that all enterprises should buy material factors of production
at the same prices. It is also possible to formulate the production optimum
in such a way that entails that the workers are not indifferent as to their
occupations. In such a situation, it is required that the differences of
prices between human factors of production in different occupations depend
upon preferences regarding work (see Little 1957: 155).
In any case, even in this form the actualization of the condition is very
uncertain. Already the effect of regional differences is very noticeabk.
But we may still note the social content of the condition: it would require
very little division of labor and there are no conditions about leadership.
In fact, it is a rather democratic condition.
The following interpretation may be given to the exchange optimum
(Nath 1969: 18, 1VIishan 1964: 18, Little 1957: 129). For any two goods
Xi and Xh, the ratio between their marginal utilities for every individual
must be the same. It is also required that in production the marginal
rate of substitution for any pair of productive services must be equal
for all individuals (who are engaged in these productive services).
This can be illustrated by a box diagram (figure 6.4.b).
The individuals are r and g , the products are Xi and Xh. PP and
QQ are here regular indifference curves. From the intersection of the
curves we have the distribution of goods for the two individuals. Just as
in the previous condition, it is possiblefn move down along the other of





the two indifference curves so that the situation of the other individual
improves without impairing the position of the second. Only at the point
of tangency is this impossible.
Let it be noted in passing that with the aid of compensation criteria,
we can also show that the point of tangency is recommendable (a sufficient
condition): it fulfills both the Kaldor —Hicks and Scitovsky criteria. From
any move toward it regression is not possible. Instead it is possible that
the distribution gets 'worse' (with respect to equality, for instance) when
we move to the optimum point. This shall be analyzed slightly more exten-
sively in the following (see also Little 1957: 130). The exchange optimum
in no way depends upon whether there are external effects for the consumers
or not (these are contained in the rates of substitution). Instead, these
affect the production optimum.
The unrealistic character of this condition is obvious: for example,
if we accept leisure as one of the goods among which the consumer may
choose, we get into trouble. Most people are not free to choose as much
leisure time as they would wish. In general the marginal rate of substi-
tution does not reflect the free choices of an individual in many cases
(Little 1957: 133-135; and not only free choices but also conscious or
rational choices). On the other hand the exchange optimum implies severe
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restrictions in the means of economic policy; for instance, all kinds of
regulations are proscribed unless one wishes to reach the optimum.'
In addition, progressive taxation is forbidden, as it interferes with
the marginal rates of substitution of goods and services to different indi-
viduals.
The total optimum may be formulated as follows (Nath 1969: 19, Mishan
1964: 19, Little 1957: 141). For any two goods the subjective marginal
rate of substitution between them must be the same for all individuals,
and this ratio should be the same as the marginal technical rate of trans-
formation in the replacement of one good for another by moving any factor
of production from the production of the first good to the second.
On the other hand, this condition also requires that the subjective
rate of marginal substitution between any factor of production and good
must be the same (see appendix 1: equation A.1.20); and this common rate
must be the same as the marginal technical rate of transformation of the
factor of production and the good in question. The former part of this
condition (see appendix 1: equation A.1.19) may also be expressed in such
a way that the common subjective marginal rate of substitution must
be the same as the marginal rate of transformation of all pairs of goods,
i.e., the objective rate of substitution (Mishan 1964: 19). This optimum
condition may be illustrated by the following diagram (figure 6.4.c).
QQ is the transformation curve which expresses the efficient transfor-
mation between goods Xi and Xh, and PP is the indifference curve of
an individual g. QQ is concave to the origin and PP is convex to the
origin. It is easy to see that the utility of the individual may be increased
until PP and QQ are tangent to one another, so that the first part of the
total optimum condition is fulfilled. The second part may be illustrated in
the same fashion by substituting a factor of production for the good in
one of the axes (Little is clearly in error in this regard, cf. 1957: 141).
The realization of this condition is not reasonable without the simul-
taneous realization of the two previous conditions, because otherwise the
total optimum has no meaning (Little 1957: 141).
Above I have analyzed the content of the optimum conditions. The
next step is to analyze their collective importance. If we compare these
conditions with regard to their difficulty of actualization, the production
optimum is clearly the easiest to reach. The exchange optimum is more
1 Little emphasizes this in connection with his criterion of income distribution: it is precisely
because of the considerations of the distribution of income that some regulative measures
are taken. This shows, according to Little, that income distribution is more important than
the optimum conditions (Little 1957: 153). See also Lange (1964 (1938)), who presents the
same argument.






difficult, but possibly achievable under some special circumstances. The
realization of the total optimum, conversely, is extremely difficult.
In general, the practical significance of the optimum conditions are
restricted by the following axioms (Little 1957: 145, cf. also Mishan 1964).
1° All of the conditions must be simultaneously fulfilled, otherwise the
optimum has no meaning. Only the production optimum may have
independent relevance.
2° The supply of all factors of production must be perfectly elastic.
3° The conditions proscribe income tax, indirect taxes and subsidies
(especially the total optimum).
4° The distributive effects of moving to the optimum must be positive or
neutral, otherwise the conditions cannot be accepted (it is obvious
that this depends on who decides about the distributive effects).
5° There may be no external effects in production or consumption (see
also Little 1957: 137- 139 and Mishan 1964 for an analysis of this).
Points three and five are very concrete with respect to the existing
reality: income taxes, subsidies, etc., are here to stay, as are also external
effects. The latter might always be eliminated by proper taxation, the
imposition of costs, etc., but this is forbidden by point three. Also the
optimum conditions may be amended so as to reflect some externalities,
but this is not very fruitful. In the following we may observe that even
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if the optimum conditions were all realized, their significance would be
slight with respect to social welfare (in fact it might be negative). It should
also be noted that such problems as savings and investment are wholly
exterior to the optimum conditions. However, conditions for them may
be constructed, so this does not constitute a problem (see Little 1957:
145— 151) .
The crucial fact is that the optimum conditions define a Pareto-opti-
mum. In other words they define only an extremely elementary social
optimum. We can achieve at best a dichotomous classification between
optimal and non-optimal states. Even if we had a state that realized all
of the optimum conditions and even the second order conditions, we would
still not have determined a unique state: there is an infinite amount of
Pareto-optimal states, among which we may choose. This can be illus-
trated by figure 6.4.d with the help of the welfare frontier concept.
All of the points of the frontier are Pareto-optimal, they differ with
respect to the existing distribution.' So the movement from a suboptimal
state to an optimal state may in reality be a deterioration because the
distribution may be less desirable (see Mishan 1964: 27).
In figure 6.4.e it may be seen that only a part of the Pareto-optimal
situations is allowed when we start from a sub-optimal point. This implies
that the path to the optimum, which is ignored in the optimization process,
has a very critical importance to the end result. The original limits cannot,
however, be crossed. So if we happen to start from a situation very near
an optimum point, we have few possibilities to influence the distribution.
In other words, the optimum conditions cannot be regarded as even
necessary (not to speak of sufficient) conditions for welfare (although
Little (1957: 117) seems to think that they are necessary conditions).
Necessary they are not, because we may demonstrate that a suboptimal
state is, on the whole, better than an optimal state. Clearly, then, neither
can they be sufficient conditions.
Little notes that sufficiency is completely disregarded in optimization.
In effect this means that one is not interested in how to define a state of
social welfare nor in how to achieve such a state. This is considered by
Little as the advantage of compensation criteria, which concentrate on
the sufficient conditions (Little 1957: 117).
It is astonishing that although the restrictions of the Pareto optimum
have been generally recognized, there has been a long discussion about
which economic system, the socialist or the capitalist, better fulfills the
conditions of a Pareto-optimum. The traditional view was that only per-
1 Distribution is not the sole factor that causes the nonuniqueness of the Pareto-optimum,
but it may be used as an illustration.
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feet competition could bring about this ideal (Mishan 1964: 27). On the
theoretical level this problem has been clarified, although even Mishan
has some mistaken conceptions about it (he claims that perfect compe-
tition is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for Pareto-optimum).
It is obvious that perfect competition is not a necessary condition (as
under state monopoly, or socialist ownership, the conditions may be real-
ized equally well and probably better; see Lange—Taylor 1964). But it
has been shown that under very general conditions it is a sufficient con-
dition for the Pareto-optimum (see Quirk —Saposnik 1968: 125, Arrow
1951). In a sense, however, Mishan is right. Perfect competition is not
a sufficient condition if we assume that individuals are not free to adapt
their supply of labor to the equilibrium level of wages (which is a realistic
assumption). But to assume the contrary is a meaningless addition to the
other unrealistic assumptions already mentioned, so the question of whether
or not perfect competition is a sufficient condition is rather academic
(Nath 1969: 30-31, cf. also Mishan 1964: 176-177).1
Thus, the final, and most important general implication of the Paretian
welfare function is that it is, in an oblique way, not related to society at all.
It is actually only a skeleton of a truly social welfare function. As will be
remembered, in the Paretian assumptions we explicitly exclude all such
situations where we should have to compare the welfares of different
individuals. This means that we cannot speak of a social welfare function
at all, only of a collection of independent individual welfare functions,
which are applicable only in very restricted situations. Basically, then,
in the process of optimizing the welfare function we are abstaining from
aggregation; instead of aggregating welfare we only consider situations
where aggregation is not necessary.
It follows then, that not only the conditions of optimization of the
welfare function are restrictive, but so is the entire framework of the
1 In passing I might mention the connections between the Pareto-optimum and the optimal
allocation rule. The allocation rule says that the marginal value of all factors of production
needs to be the same in all uses. It can be shown that we may deduce the optimum condi-
tions from this rule and vice versa, i.e., they are equivalent (Mishan 1964: 18-20).
It can also be shown that a sufficient condition for the fulfillment of the allocation rule
and the optimum conditons is that the price of the product equals the marginal cost, that
is, the conditions realized under perfect competition. This is, however, not a necessary con-
dition (Mishan 1964: 20) as the allocation rule is theoretically equally possible in a com-
pletely planned economy as in a perfect competition situation. The Central Planning Board
may determine how the factors of production are transformed. In fact, because it can be
shown that the information provided by markets is always imperfect, in a market economy,
as we try to adjust the defects in condition fulfillment we must use forced optimization as
well (Mishan 1964: 24, Zielinski 1968: 89-90, Lange—Taylor 1964 (1938): 8-9, Bergson
1966, Dobb 1969).
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Paretian welfare function. And the restrictions are concentrated upon
the problem which the Paretian welfare function purports to solve, namely
that of the construction of a social welfare function. We may therefore
consider the idea of establishing a complete determination of the maximum
as actually contrary to the idea of a Paretian welfare function.
Having discussed above the optimum conditions of the social welfare
function I may shortly consider the problem of the complete determination
of the maximum.
Assuming that all conditions (also second order) are fulfilled, what
is needed for the comparison of the Pareto-optimal states? It is obvious
that additional ethical and social assumptions are required. In a classic
discussion the following alternatives are presented (Lange 1969 (1942): 32):
1° We might undertake a comparison of interpersonal utilities, i.e., for
every Pareto-optimal state we would estimate the total utility and
choose the state that gives the highest total utility.
2° Some organ of the society might make a social valuation of the Pareto-
optimal states and in this way decide what state is chosen.
30 We might have an immediate social valuation based on the distribution
of goods and services.
In all cases the finding of the real maximum means that we have to
relate the individual welfare evaluations to each other. Formally, the
problem may be analyzed as follows:
The Paretian welfare function,
(6.4.2)
	
w = w(ul ,	 , us) ,
must be maximized on the condition that
(6.4.4)	 P(U1 , . . . , US) = 0 ,
i.e., from the welfare frontier (utility possibility curve) P, we must find
a maximum point. This condition assures that we are on the frontier.
Let
(6.4.5)	 M	 W(Ul , . . . , Us) + P(Ul , . . . , U'),
which we may solve by differentiation (taking partial derivatives) and get
(6.4.6) awiaUg	 aPla Ug awiaur	 OP IOU"
or, if we define the marginal social significance of the utility of the gth
individual as the partial derivative
OW IOUg ,
9
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we may express this condition in words as follows:
For any two individuals, the ratio of the marginal social significances
of their utilities must be equal to the marginal rate of substitution of
their utility levels (on the welfare frontier; Nath 1969: 22-23, Lange
1969: 32-33).
As is easily recognized, the practical problems in this connection are
immense. How to determine the marginal social significance the utility
of an individual is a problem that remains to be solved.
We may illustrate this maximization procedure by the figure 6.4.f.
Define the welfare evaluation curve of the society (the Bergson contour)
as the path of the points where the society does not distinguish (is indif-
ferent) between the utilities of different individuals (Zeckhauser— Schaefer
1968: 54— 55).1
 Consider a society of two individuals r and g , and com-
pare the welfare frontier of the society with its welfare evaluation curve.
That point where the welfare evaluation curve on the right touches the wel-
fare frontier is the maximum point (cf. Vartiainen 1967: 49).
ug
Fig. 6.4.f
It should be noted that the welfare evaluation curves may also intersect
because of the many possible distributions of welfare. This means that
1 This definition is rather hypothetical: such a curve does certainly exist in rough outline
but theoretically its construction is an impossibility.
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maximization is possible only when the social indifference curves are
constrained to the effect that they cannot intersect. These constraints
are possible, but not very practical (see Samuelson 1956).
7. The Arrow Impossibility Theorem and Related Approaches
7.1. General Remarks
In simple terms, the Arrow problem is as follows: Is it possible, under
certain general conditions, to construct a device which, when given the
preferences of the members of society (their choices over various alter-
natives), produces a set of solutions which is transitive, i.e., within which
it is possible to find the best choice (see Blau 1957: 303).
This is a very fundamental question. It goes to the heart of the whole
problem of democracy and social welfare in that the ultimate goal of
a democratic decision-making system is to produce decisions founded on
the wishes of the members of society, i.e., social welfare on the conditions
of the members of the society. But there is also a more technocratic aspect
to this problem. If we can construct such a device, then all the indirect
decision systems now in use may be said to be superfluous.
The Arrow Impossibility theorem (or paradox, as it may alternatively
be called) is clearly connected with other impossibility results known in
philosophy and mathematics (Hintikka 1970), such as for example, the
GOdel result. I shall not, however, go into this aspect of the problem. It is
natural that our central point of interest shall be on the policy relevance
of the Arrow theorem. This is why I shall employ the simpler notation
utilized by Arrow instead of a more strictly logical notation.
Historically speaking, the origin of the Arrow theorem can be found
in the so-called voting paradox, known already in the 18th century. It was
probably first formulated by Borda and Condorcet. Later it was analyzed
by, among others, Nanson, Laplace, Galton and the famous C. L. Dodg-
son (Lewis Carroll).1
We can illustrate the voting paradox as follows. Assume there are
three voters, 1, 2, 3 and three alternatives a, b, c. The voters order the





1 See Black (1958: 156 —161, 180 —189), Guilbaud (1966), and Sen (1970: 38), who gives
a slightly different account.
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If we consider the majority principle, the community of the three voters
prefers a to b and b to c. Therefore, by transitivity, it should prefer a to c,
but actually the contrary is true. We are therefore confronted with a con-
tradiction.
The voting paradox itself has been a subject of much scrutiny (see, for
instance, Riker 1961). It is a relatively common phenomenon especially
in multidimensional questions. The thing that the voting paradox and the
))impossibility theorem)) have in common is that both lead to a situation
where the choice of the community cannot be deduced from the choices
of the members of society. The Arrow paradox is thus actually a gener-
alization of the voting paradox. In the first place, the Arrow paradox is
not concerned solely with majority voting. Secondly, the Arrow paradox
gives the general.: conditions under which the type of paradox illustrated
above prevails.
The importance of the Arrow theorem is still under discussion (see for
instance Tullock 1967). There are and have been many kinds of criticisms
against it. The first, and most general type, is that which wholly denies
the relevance of the theorem, of which we have many alternatives. One
type, mentioned here only because I have given the theory of welfare
economics a relatively comprehensive treatment, asserts that the Arrow
theorem is not relevant because it does not belong to welfare theory (see
for instance Little 1952, 1957, Mishan 1964: 63-66, Bergson 1966: 36,
Nath 1969: 135-136 and Graaff 1957).
This criticism, in its simplest form, is based on the principle that as
welfare economics is founded upon the Pareto-optimum, and the Arrow
theorem is not, the Arrow theorem has nothing to do with welfare economics
and welfare theory in general. In a strict sense, this is of course true. Tra-
ditional welfare economies can gain little from the Arrow theorem. But as
Arrow himself has shown, on the other hand, the theorem may be formu-
lated in such a way that it subsumes the conditions of Pareto-optimum
and may comprise the basis for the formulation of compensation principles
(see Arrow 1963, Sen 1970).
More important is the claim that the Arrow theorem is not relevant
to welfare theory but rather, to the decision-making process (see for in-
stance Little 1952: 427-428, Buchanan— Tullock 1962). This is admit-
tedly more to the point. In the context given by Arrow, the theorem
has a content more general than that of welfare theory. Yet Arrow him-
self has cogently critized this assertion by pointing out that the attempts
to separate welfare theory and the theory of social choice are fruitless.
It is clearly beyond the scope of scientific analysis to claim that the Arrow
theorem is on this or that side of an arbitrarily drawn borderline (see
Arrow 1963: 108). It is typical of economists to try to ignore a variety
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of problems on the premise that they do not belong to their field, but
if we are interested in the concept of social welfare, we must realize that
the Arrow theorem, as well as welfare economics, are extremely relevant
to our discussion.
If one assumes that the theorem is indeed relevant, it is possible to
criticize its assumptions. This is by far the most popular form of criticism,
which is natural, considering the challenge represented by the formulation
of the theorem: that of resolving a paradox. Assuming that it is formally
correct, one must show that the assumptions are not acceptable or that
the contradiction depends upon some merely technical points in the assump-
tions. This type of approach shall be analyzed extensively when I discuss
the assumptions.
The third type of criticism relates to the mode of expressing the entire
problem. It can be said that the theorem is actually rather restrictive in
the long run, although it purports to be extremely general. This has also
been a popular way to evade the theorem, or to circumvent it — by claiming
that a given procedure is not comprised in the theorem, and therefore the
theorem is not applicable. A most comprehensive criticism along these
lines is given by Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963). My critique in fact,
shall be of this type as well. It is namely so that the theorem has certain
restrictions which are rather important from the vantage point of our
discussion of social welfare.
These restriction were also known to Arrow, the most important of
which were the following:
Strategic aspects of individual choice are not analyzed (Arrow 1963:
6-7, Luce —Raiffa 1957: 330). This is a very pertinent omission.
It essentially eliminates the processual nature of social choice, thus
resulting in an exceedingly mechanistic view.
The values of the individuals are assumed to be unchanging: this is
the economist's classical assumption and must clearly be considered
unrealistic. There is no reason to assume that individual preferences
would be autonomous and constant except, of course, for simplicity
in the analysis.
3. Cardinal utility and interpersonal comparisons of utility are essentially
denied (see Luce —Raiffa 1957: 330). 1 There are ways to take these
into consideration, but in the original version of the theorem these were
clearly ignored.
In addition there are several minor points that need not concern us
1 Vickrey (1960: 508) considers this the essential quality of the Arrow theorem: »Arrow's
theorem is in effect an attempt to examine just how far one can get in constructing social
welfare functions that will consider only ordinal preferences.>>
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here (such as the rules resulting in a probability distribution; Luce —Raiffa
1957: 330), but it should be obvious that in this form, the Arrow theorem
is actually marred by many restrictions, the seriousness of which has already
been noted.
Yet there are those who criticize the theorem not for its restrictiveness
but for its generality, claiming that more restrictive assumptions (and
therefore eliminating the impossibility result) are necessary (Tullock 1967).
More recently, the Arrow theorem has been developed in such a way
that the whole problem complex cannot be described by referring to Arrow
alone. It has been shown that the conditions of the Arrow theorem apply
only to a restricted subclass of all possible collective choice procedures.1
Yet the original Arrow consideration — that the conditions introduced
by him are too mild — is still relevant. 2
 As Sen notes, even if a social deci-
sion function would fulfill all of the Arrow conditions (1970: 50), it could
still look very unappetizing. What Sen has attempted to do is to weaken
some of the conditions to be able to introduce additional conditions that
would produce more plausible collective choice functions.
7.2. Choice and Preference
The impossibility theorem is concerned with social states and preferences
over them. A social state is >>a complete description of the amount of each
type of commodity in the hands of each individual, the amount of labor
to be supplied by each individual, the amount of each productive resource
invested in each type of productive activity, and the amounts of various
types of collective activity . .» (Arrow 1963: 17). In other words, by a
social state is meant an exhaustive description of the conditions prevailing
in the society.
A state may be represented by a vector x , whose content elements
are all the possible components of the social state. The set of all possible
social states is called the set of alternatives S . All alternatives are exclusive.
At a certain time an individual can choose among a subset S' of the set
of alternatives. That is to say, some of the alternatives do not exist for him.
The individual is assumed to order the existing alternatives with respect
1 Sen (1970: 48) makes a distinction between social welfare functions and social decision
functions. The latter require acyclity of preference instead of transitivity (for a definition of
the concept of acyclity, see p. 152). It can be shown that the impossibility theorem is valid
for social welfare functions but not for social decision functions.
2 It should be noted that Arrow himself considered the conditions as necessary conditions
for social choice, and that more conditions would be required to make the conditions sufficient.
This is only partly true.
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to his preferences by comparing all states in consecutive pairs.' Note that
no conditions are prescribed for the formation of preferences. According
to Arrow, it is not essential to specify the standards according to which
the individual orders the states. He might be a member of the Veblenian
elite, or a supporter of absolute equality (Arrow 1963: 17-18). There is,
in effect, no presumed model of preference formation. As noted in the
previous section, this is a grave deficiency. It essentially means that we
must completely ignore an important part of the social choice (in the
classical manner of economists).
7.2.1. The Preference Axioms
Instead of describing a model for their determination, conditions for pre-
ferences are given. Although we are not concerned with how preferences
are formed, it is necessary to make some assumptions about their sub-
stance. First some general points. The first is that any preference is always
the preference of some entity: it is connected with some individual or
society consisting of individuals.
Secondly, the term preference implies nothing more than 'liking better';
i.e., a person prefers x to y because he likes x better than y (cf. von
Wright 1963b: 12-15, Schick 1969: 130-131). In other words one makes
a typically behaviorist assumption by disconnecting preferences from all
considerations about the nature of welfare. Although Arrow refers to the
relationship of preferences to values, there is nothing in the preference
axioms themselves that would connect them with values, or with welfare
in general (Arrow 1963: 18, Hansson 1968a: 424, Murakami 1968). The
axioms are typical axioms for »pure> preferences. They are presented in
the following.
It is, of course, possible to present other axioms in addition to those
given by Arrow (cf., for instance, von Wright 1963b, Hansson. 1968a,
Koskela 1970: 8-9). These axioms are not directly relevant for the impossi-
bility theorem, so I shall not be concerned with them. 2
 Hansson gives a
1 Comparison by pairs is nearly impossible according to the preference axioms, if we have
a set of larger than, say, 10 alternatives. Arrow himself concedes this, but in his opinion
»at least conceptually, it makes sense to imagine the choices actually being made from
pairs of alternatives>> (Arrow 1963: 20).
2 As Ilansson emphasized (1968a: 441), the two axioms presented here are shallow from the
point of view of a preference theory and additional axioms are needed 'which carry the theory
beyond the level of the trivial'. But here we are not interested in preference theory but only
in utilizing some axioms for the purposes of the impossibility theorem. These additional
axioms, however, may also be suspect.
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very plausible example of the insufficiency of one of Wright's axioms
(1968a: 428-429).
We define the relation R
(7.2.1)	 xRy 4-÷ — (yPx) .
We may translate R into word form as 'at least as good as' (cf. Arrow
(1963: 13), Hansson (1968a: 426)).
For the relation R , two properties are required, in the form of axioms
I and II:
(A I)	 (x)(y) (x ES&yES —> xRy v yRx)
This is the completeness' axiom: we require that all alternatives are com-
parable. Note also that this axiom implies that R be reflexive: if x y ,
the Axiom A I reduces to
(x) (x E S —> xRx)
(A II)	 (x)(y)(z) (x ES&yES&zES& xRy & yRz ---> xRz)
This is the transitivity axiom: it requires that if x is at least as good
as y and y is at least as good as z , then x is at least as good as z .
We may now define preference and indifference with respect to the
relation R :
(7 .2.2)	 xPy	 (xRy &	 (yRx))
(7 .2.3)	 xI y H (xRy & yRx)
Clearly then, it is immaterial which of these relations we employ as
our starting-point.
These axioms seem intuitively rather reasonable. Comparability is
a requisite to the formation of preference hierarchies. 2 But there are counter-
arguments. It is obvious that certain states are extremely difficult to com-
pare. As an extreme case consider state 1 in which all expenditures are
going to military purposes, and state 2 in which all are going to social ends:
on what basis are we to compare them?
In a later article (1967: 5), Arrow has argued that in all cases compar-
ability is possible, as there always is a zero alternative which is chosen if
other choices are not comparable. This does not seem to be very assuring,
because to choose inaction, or the state that exists because there are incom-
parable choices, cannot be generally considered highly acceptable.
1 This is Sen's terminology. Arrow prefers the concept of connectedness.
2 It is also important in consumer choice theory because it can be shown that it is a necessary
and sufficient condition for integrability, (Arrow 1959: 121).
COMMENTATIONES SCIENTIARUM SOCIALIUM 4
	 137
The transitivity axiom is usually considered even stronger. As Mura-
kami (1968: 9) notes, it is necessary for us to be able to choose the best
alternative from the set of existing alternatives. Yet this is not strictly
necessary. We only need transitivity of preference (quasi-transitivity) to
fulfill this requirement.' This has been pointed out by Sen (1970: 3, 15).
Interestingly enough the transitivity of indifference principle has already
been criticized harshly for its other unsatisfactory qualities. Especially
Schick has attempted to build a whole case against the impossibility
theorem on the basis of the weaknesses of intransitivity of indifference
(see Schick 1969: 131-133, 138).2
Luce and Raiffa (1957: 346) have given an example of the implausibility
of the transitivity of indifference: If we gradually add small amounts of
pepper to food, there will eventually come a moment when we are no longer
indifferent as to whether more pepper is added or not. This is however,
not altogether convincing. It could be proposed that we should compare
not the piecemeal additions, but the sums with each other. On the other
hand it is clearly true that in many cases divergencies can result from the
comparison of a total action with the pieces that constitute the entirety.
We may be more inclined to accept radical change if it is accomplished
in a piecemeal fashion, and in this sense there may be some intransitivities
of indifference.
The definition of intransitivity of indifference is uncomplicated: it
refers to an equivalence relation which defines, among a set of alternatives,
equivalence classes which are mutually exclusive. The preference ordering
of all alternatives is thus reduced to a preference ordering of equivalence
classes (Murakami 1968: 8-9).
Nor is completeness strictly necessary for social choice. If we disregard
it, but retain reflexivity and transitivity, we have a quasi-ordering. The
nature of these orderings and their effects upon the impossibility result
has been extensively studied by Sen (1970).
7.3. The Arrow Social Welfare Function
We now return to the social welfare function, already so extensively ana-
lyzed in chapter 6. This time we are interested not in its optimization
but in a more fundamental problem, namely that of its essential nature:
1 Note that A II implies transitivity of preference and indifference: see Arrow (1963: 14).
2 According to Schick, the conditions for social choice are not important because the impossi-
bility theorem breaks down already in the preference axioms. The Schick approach in a way
anticipates (although chronologically following) the results of Sen, where he shows that the
theorem actually collapses if the intransitivity of indifference is disregarded.
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in other words, is such a function practicable. Here I shall be using a slightly
different terminology from that used in the previous discussion. First,
I shall define a preference profile (a profile of preference orderings). If we
denote the ordering of the individual i as R„ then the preference profile
of the society (of n members) is (R„ R2 , . . . , R,) . The set of all possible
profiles in society is the Cartesian product
(7.3.1)	 R(")=RXRX...XR
where	 R {Ri , R2 ,	 Rm}
is the set of possible preference orderings of the alternatives, with m de-
pending on the number of alternatives (see Luce—Raiffa 1957: 332).
We now define the choice function C(S) as the set of all alternatives
x in S , such that for every y in S , xRy (Arrow 1963: 15-16). Thus,
(7.3.2)	 C(S) = {x : (x)(y) (x E S & y E S & xRy)}
Every element of C(S) is preferred to other elements of S and indifferent
to all other elements in C(S) . For every x E C(S) there is no z E C(S)
such that zPx .
The choice function is thus related to indifference curves and utility
functions, but in a more general fashion, with no need for explicit utility
functions and avoiding the familiar problems of indifference curves, such
as indivisibility problems. We can now define the social welfare function
(Arrow 1963: 23): >>By a social welfare function we mean a process or rule
which, for every preference profile (R i , R2 , ... R„) gives the corre-
sponding social ordering R
Formally,
(7.3.3.a)
	 (Ri R2 • • • , ,Rn) ---> R	 or
(7.3.3.b)	 = W (Ri. , R2 , • • • , Rn)
Some call this a choice function (Hansson 1968a) which would be more
appropriate, but as that name is reserved here for other purposes, I shall
refer to it as a welfare function. Other alternative labels are constitution
(used later by Arrow himself), arbitration scheme, conciliation policy,
amalgamation method, and voting procedure (Luce—Raiffa 1957: 332).
All of these would be better because we should save the name welfare
function for a function that would express, for instance, the welfare effects
of social choices or social action.
There has been considerable interest in the conceptual problems con-
cerning the relationship between the Arrow and Bergson social welfare
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functions. This is all the more important as it has been maintained that
the Arrow theorem is not relevant to the Bergson welfare function (Berg-
son 1966: 35).
Considering that Arrow himself has emphasized the 'constitutional'
nature of his welfare function, it would appear related to the Bergson
function in that it would specify the choice of a particular Bergson welfare
function. I.e., it would be a rule for choice (Arrow 1963: 23). This is a
rather plausible description which has been ascribed to by Sen (1970: 35).
This can be expressed through an illustration by Rothenberg (1961: 37-38).
The Bergson welfare function was defined as follows:
(7.3.4) W	 WRI1 (x, i , x12 ,
 • . . Xim X21 . . . X2m . . . 5 Xni • •
. . . , xn,n) U2 (xll ,	 ,	 . . . Un(xii , . . . x„m)]
where it is assumed that utilities are interdependent (the consumption of
some individuals affects the utility of others). xii expresses the amount
consumed by the ith individual of the good or service j . (In the previous
chapter this was denoted by xi .)








• • •	 •
Xn1 Xn2 . . . . Xnm
These states may be ordered in the social preference ordering R ,
which is a vector
R(U 1 , U2 ,	  U") .
R h
This is a function of the individual utility functions. Respectively the
ordering of the individual i
Rixi\







is a similar function.
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Combining these two equations (7.3.5)  (7.3.6) we get
(7.3.7)	 R	 f (R i 	 , R.)
which is precisely the Arrow welfare function. In other words, the right
sides of the equations (7.3.5) (7.3.6) give the corresponding Bergson wel-
fare functions.
7.4. The Conditions for Societal Decision-Making
7.4.1. The Formulation of the Conditions
In the following section I will analyze the conditions for social decision-
making that Arrow has considered reasonable. These conditions are, it
should be noted, given only as necessary conditions for a social welfare
function; they do not completely define such a function. This fact has
been utilized very efficiently by Sen to explore the possible alternatives
(Sen. 1970: 49).
These conditions are in themselves relatively simple and probably
not worth the space allotted them, but their importance is twofold:
Together they lead to Arrow's impossibility result (note that also through
relaxing the preference axioms we may affect this result), consequently
creating an important barrier to any constructions of social choice, and
They have some rather important implications for social policy which
we must investigate.
The presentation here is not strictly technical, as my present interest
lies primarily in the implications of the conditions for welfare planning
and social policy.1
1. The first condition is referred to here as the condition of collective
rationality. 2 We assume that the number of individuals n > 2 and the
number of alternatives is greater than or equal to three. We define an
admissible set of individual orderings as the set for which the social welfare
function defines a corresponding social ordering which fulfills axioms I and
II. Now we may formulate the first conditions as follows: all logically pos-
1 It has been said that the Arrow conditions result is nothing else than the formalization
of the consumer sovereignty principle, thus making their social policy implications rather
meagre (Rothenberg 1961: 46), but this claim can be qualified.
2 Arrow (1963: 24), Luce—Raiffa (1957: 334), Murakami (1968: 82-83). Sen (1970: 37)
calls this the condition of unrestricted domain, which only entails a part of it.
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sible individual orderings must be admissible; i.e., they must lead to a social
welfare function which satisfies axioms I and II (Arrow 1963: 96).1
The requirement of collective rationality then presupposes that the
social decision-making needs to fulfill the same conditions as individual
preferences, i.e., completeness and transitivity. I have discussed the nature
of these requirements in connection with the preference axioms, and shall
not take them up here except for the special qualities of social decision.
It is obvious that the same arguments are, to a large degree, equally as
applicable for the society as for the individuals.
The requirement of completeness especially, is essentially same for the
individual and for society. The nature of transitivity is however different.
The requirement of transitivity in social choice is, according to Arrow,
essential because it assures that the final decision is independent of the
means employed to reach it (Arrow 1963: 120).
Sen (1970: 48) has pointed out that this is not strictly true as transitivity
does not ensure the choice of the same best alternative, if the choice set
(defined by the choice function) contains more than one alternative. This
means that the most important quality of transitivity is sacrificed. Yet
it is precisely this quality that may be criticized: why should we demand
that the result be the same, independent of the method used to reach it.
In the political process, the way decision-making occurs is unquestionably
a member of the set of welfare-relevant factors, especially if we define
welfare as an activity (see chapter 4).2
The argumentation against collective rationality can also be based on
a critique of the mechanistic 'Platonic' model: it can be claimed that
social decision-making and social welfare contain strong extra-rational
elements which cannot be ignored. The decision-making process itself
contains creative, intuitive and non-mechanistic qualities which simply
cannot be analyzed in the framework of a rational decision-making model.
1 Originally this condition was only given for a triad of alternatives; later it was shown by
Blau that this condition would not be enough for demonstrating the contradiction (Blau
1957, Vickrey 1960: 512).
2 There has been some commentary, largely mistaken, about this aspect. Tullock (Buchanan —
Tullock 1962: 332) has expressed the opinion that as the decision-making process is a means,
and not an end, and is thus without any independent content, there is no reason to assume
its rationality. This argument does not seem to hold water: the question is whether the de-
cision-making mechanism produces rational results, not that it is rational itself (see also
similar arguments by Buchanan (1960: 82)).
Dahl—Lindblom (1963: 422-423) have proposed an odd argument: if we accept intran-
sitivity we need not consider social preferences. This also seems to be a misconception: the
Arrow result essentially is that social preference is impossible due to the given conditions;
in other words Dahl and Lindblom start from the Arrow result and proceed to criticize it
on this basis.
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This has been emphasized by Häyrynen (1970), and Dror (1968), among
others. On the other hand, it can be said that social policy research must
concentrate on the analysis of systematic knowledge and structured ration-
ality because intuitionistic and extrarational elements lose their meaning
when rationalized (Dror 1970: 103). And the pertinence of the Arrow
theorem is precisely in the exploration of how far one can get with the
aid of certain kinds of rational models.
But as I have pointed out previously, the problem of collective ration-
ality is not overly important as both completeness and transitivity are
actually expendable. Transitivity in particular, is not a necessary condition
for a series of decisions in which it is only natural that the ordering may
change (Schick 1969: 141).
Technically more important is the aspect of this condition which re-
quires that all logically possible orderings should be admissible. This con-
dition might also be criticized on the basis that some preference orderings
are not regarded as acceptable in the consideration of social preference.
And it has been shown that if we are willing to make such restrictions,
we can eliminate the Arrow theorem entirely (Sen 1970: 65-66).
2. The second of Arrow's conditions may be called the positive associ-
ation of individual and social choice (Arrow 1963: 25 26, Luce — Raiffa
1957: 335). Briefly formulated, it is as follows: we must require that the
social welfare function has the capacity to consider that if some alternative
rises in an individual ordering without a consequent decrease in position
in other individuals' orderings, its status must not depreciate in the overall
social ordering. Expressed in an inverted form, if the social welfare func-
tion includes xPy as a definite profile of individual preferences, this
preference remains intact although the profile itself might change:
so that other than comparisons of x do not change, and
for every individual, the comparison (in pairs) between x and any
other single alternative does not change or changes in favor of x (Luce —
Raiffa 1957: 335).
This condition may formally be expressed as follows:
Let R1 , . . . , Rn and R; , . . . , R: be two preference profiles, the cor-
responding social orderings of which are R and R' , (P and P' represent
the corresponding preference orderings). Assuming that for each individual
i the following is true,
0 x(7.4.1)
	 (x') (y') 	 x' R'i y ----> x' Ridx
(7.4.2)	 (y')	 fxRiy' ---> xR'iy'l
(7.4.3)	 (y')	 {xPiy' ---> xP'iy'}






Sen calls this condition the weak Pareto principle (1970: 37), indicating
its relationship with the Pareto principle. It is weak because its assump-
tions are stricter than those of the regular Pareto principle. Its weakness
is reflected by the fact that it requires only that the society does not react
negatively to a change in preferences. Under the requirements of the strong
Pareto condition one individual alone could affect the society's preferences
if others are indifferent. Yet strictly speaking, this condition is not the
Pareto condition and I shall return to the relationship between the Pareto
principle and the Arrow conditions. In this form the condition is probably
acceptable to most people.
3. The third of Arrow's conditions, that of the independence of irrel-
evant alternatives1, is probably the most controversial of all, especially in
earlier discussions (see Rothenberg 1961: 127). This is partly due to the
fact that its interpretation has been rather unclear. There are innumerable
and contradictory claims about the independence of irrelevant alternatives
condition and its meaning.2
The condition is formulated in the following way (Arrow 1963: 27,
Luce—Raiffa 1957: 338):
Let R1 , . . . , Rn and R; , . . . , R„ be two preference profiles and C(S)
and C'(S) be the corresponding choice functions. If for all individuals
i and for all x and y E S , xRiy if and only if xR:y then C(S) and
C'(S) are identical.
(7.4.5)	 (i) Rx ES& yES& xRiy	 xR:y) --->-
C(S)	 C'(S)]
This may be expressed in another way. If S i is any subset of the set
of alternatives S and we change the preference profile in such a way
that for every individual his comparisons of alternative pairs in S i remain
unchanged, the social orderings corresponding to the original and changed
preference profiles are identical for the alternatives in S i .
The most general interpretation for this condition is that an alternative
1 According to Rescher it is improper to speak of irrelevant alternatives as we are concerned
with the question of whether the alternatives eliminated are irrelevant (Rescher 1969: 103).
2 For instance, Arrow himself has been guilty of faulty reasoning in scolding Buchanan and
Tullock for their misinterpretation (Arrow 1963: 109). It is certainly true that logrolling,
which involves direct interpersonal comparisons, falls outside the scope of the Arrow theorem,
Arrow however claims that this is not so because all kinds of criteria for preference orderings
are allowable.
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that is not in a given set of alternatives must not affect the choices of the
individuals. Arrow has given an example that illustrates his idea of the
principle well: There are elections in which each voter places the candidates
in a preference order. Assume that after the elections, one of the candi-
dates dies. We must then require that the results of the elections for the
other candidates do not change, i.e., their ordering is unaffected (Arrow
1963: 26). This example has a strong intuitive appeal. If the decision
function would allow such changes, then by adding one 'irrelevant' alter-
native we might change the order of other alternatives in an important
way.'
It is not difficult to present examples of decision functions that might
nonetheless be considered reasonable, which are eliminated by the indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives condition (Luce-Raiffa 1957: 338, 346;
Rescher 1969: 103-108; Theil 1964: 334-335). 2 Also, as is obvious from
the example given by Arrow, the majority rule, in which the alternatives
are weighted according to the order given them, does not fulfill the inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives condition (Vickrey 1960: 516).
It is obvious that this condition is so controversial because its practical
implications are so grave. These implications can be analyzed by dividing
the irrelevance condition into two conditions (Murakami 1968: 105, Sen
1970: 89- 90, 105- 108):
For every pair of alternatives, social choice depends solely upon the
information concerning this pair (the condition of pairwise comparison).3
The information on which social choice is based for every subset of
alternatives, consists of only the individual preference orderings for
this subset.
The first condition concerns only individual choices. In the comparison
of two alternatives, all other alternatives must be kept irrelevant (Rothen-
berg 1961: 128, Buchanan, Tullock 1962: 332-333, Koskela 1970: 26-27,
Murakami 1968: 84). In fact, in the irrelevance condition, it is assumed
that the decision-making procedures of the individuals can be reduced
to pairwise comparisons, at least in theory. This is Arrow's view (Arrow
1963: 20, Murakami 1968: 107-108). It can be shown (Murakami 1968:
108) that comparisons between three and four alternatives, or more can
be reduced to pairwise comparisons as long as the preference axioms are
1 Valkonen (1971: 21) has mentioned an example of this kind of 'cheating' in a very important
context, namely in a comparison of alternative transportation schemes in the city of Hel-
sinki.
2 Rescher in particular has attempted to create decision rules that are 'reasonable', but
do not fulfill the Arrow conditions.
3 It has been even claimed that the whole theorem depends on pairwise choices (Buchanan —
Tullock 1962: 334).
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adhered to. Thus we are confronted with only two alternatives, either
a pairwise comparison or a comparison that entails the whole set of alter-
natives simultaneously. This means that complete information about all
alternatives, as well as a limited amount of alternatives is needed.
Arguments against pairwise comparisons are common in scaling theory
used in sociological and social psychological research. As is well known,
the respondents adopt reference points which form the basis of their or-
derings. If the reference point changes, the ordering also changes, i.e.,
the extraneous alternatives are not irrelevant (Rothenberg 1961: 129).
But it is more pertinent to regard the irrelevance condition as that
which denies the cardinality of the utilities underlying preferences. I have
already analyzed the implications of cardinality, but in this context an
analysis specifically on the basis of social decision-making is in order.
First it should be remembered that additive utility functions are elim-
inated as acceptable social decision functions (Arrow 1963: 32, Vickrey
1960: 516). 1 Secondly, as noted above, the strategic aspects of social decision-
making are ignored (Vickrey 1960: 518, Rothenberg 1961: 47). Arrow has
defended the irrelevance condition on these bases, because one can imagine
situations where, in order to acheive desired results, a person might adopt
a strategy of concealing his true preferences, if preference intensities are
considered important. But other, more 'acceptable' strategies are also
eliminated through this condition, which makes the theorem rather un-
realistic. An essential aspect of social decision-making and welfare is the
'game' between various social groups and even some tactical misrepresen-
tation of preferences should be accepted. Take, for example, the situation
of a person with very extreme intensities of preference. It would undoubt-
edly be very easy for others to predict his orderings.2
There are many examples that can be construed to prove the desir-
ability of taking preference intensities into consideration (see Goodman--
Markowitz 1952: 258-259, Luce—Raiffa 1957: 337). One additional argu-
ment against ordinality is that it leads to an implicit weighting of indi-
viduals, which cannot be considered acceptable (Quirk—Saposnik 1968:
115, Hildreth 1953: 89-90).
It is understandable that decision functions that do not fulfill the
1 Rothenberg (1961: 31) claims the contrary, but on the other hand admits that preference
intensities are unacceptable. What other interpersonal comparisons are possible?
2 For instance, let us have three alternatives x , y and z . The person A considers x as
the best alternative, y as the second best and z by far the worst. y and z are known as
equally possible alternatives while x is impracticable. A will probably place y first contrary
to his actual preferences (Rothenberg 1961: 128). This is the prevalent situation in direct
elections for presidency. A person more often votes against one candidate than in favor of
another, if his first choice is in the minority. See also Sen (1970: 91) for an additional example.
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independence of irrelevant alternatives condition have often been pres-
ented as solutions for the Arrow dilemma. (See the above citations, also
Goodman—Markowitz 1952, Hildreth 1953, Kemeny 1959, Coleman
1966b, Rescher 1969, Luce—Raiffa 1957, Rothenberg 1961). Many of
these attempts have led to difficulties.'
One of the attractive properties of the irrelevance condition is that it
protects the welfare function from 'non-functional' behavior; i.e., it
ensures that one preference profile will lead to one and only one social
ordering (Koskeal 1970: 30). In fact, one of Arrow's main defences of this
condition is that other solutions have led to such ambiguous results (Arrow
1963: 109-111).2
In general, it is the configurations of conditions that are mainly in-
teresting, not the isolated conditions in themselves. Yet it can be said that
the irrelevance condition is rather central and its main content restricts
the Arrow theorem to the same level as neoclassical welfare economics.
The remaining conditions are rather trivial and serve only to eliminate
certain extreme cases. These cases are however employed in the formal
proof of the theorem, so they are crucial to it.
The fourth condition states that the welfare function must not be
imposed. This means that the following case is forbidden: for any two alter-
natives x and y (such that x	 y) , the relation R is xRy for any
preference profile R1 , . . . , R„ (Arrow 1963: 28-29, Luce — Raiffa 1957:
338). Arrow calls this condition the sovereignty condition of citizens. It is
too strong a condition for the theorem (i.e., too weak), and a milder one,
namely, that the condition must hold for a triad of alternatives, would
fulfill essentially the same function.
It is obvious that this is an acceptable condition. It is extremely dif-
ficult to imagine a condition that would allow 'reasonable' impositions
(Vickrey 1960: 512). Yet there are cases where decision-makers may act
regardless of people's preferences with clear requisites for such an action.
This would be true, for example, in the case of narcotics or pornography.3
The fifth condition demands that the welfare function must not be
dictatorial. This means that there must not be an individual i , for whom
it is true that always, when he prefers x to y , the society prefers x to
1 Such as the attempt to define a limited amount of preference levels (Goodman—Markowitz
1952, Luce 1959). It can for instance be shown that small differences in the ability to discern
preferences lead to large differences in distribution (Arrow 1963: 117-118).
2 Lately, Hansson (1969a) (see also Koskela (1970: 31)) has pointed out that if we combine
the irrelevance condition with symmetry conditions, the results will be nonetheless queer.
3 Note that the logrolling principle, to be considered later, also violates this condition (Bu-
chanan —Tullock 1962: 333).
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y irrespective of other individuals' preference profiles R1 , . . . , Ri_i
-Ri d- , • • • nR (Arrow 1963: 30, Luce —Raiffa 1957: 338).
This is also a relatively innocent and generally acceptable condition
(but see the proof of the theorem, Appendix 2).
In essence, the fourth condition denies that the welfare function can
be constant over all preference profiles, and the fifth condition demands
that the function not be reduced to a certain independent variable (any
one individual's preferences). In actuality, this means that we also deny
the negative dictator: the case where the society prefers consistently x to
y when an individual prefers y to x . Taken on the whole this implies
that the function must be non-trivial, thus the Arrow result may be for-
mulated as a non-triviality result in the deduction of social preferences
from individual preferences (Murakami 1968: 104).
7.4.2. The Meaning of the Conditions
The conditions for the Arrow theorem only place restrictions on a social
welfare function. Nothing is said of the states to which the Arrow welfare
function may lead, that is, of the nature of welfare it implies.
One school of thought (of which Arrow is himself a member; see 1963:
106) seems to think that nothing else is required except this sort of 'con-
stitutional' determination, i.e.,. the creation of rules according to which
individuals may freely realize their own personal conception of welfare.1
Even if one were to accept this, it is certain that the conditions contain
implications for social policy which severely restrict their general appli-
cability.
First, they are saturated with the premise of methodological indi-
vidualism. The welfare of the society depends solely upon the welfares
of the individuals, disregarding various important social processes relevant
to welfare (see an analysis of this in Koskela 1971: 42).
Second, the conditions are rather traditional in the sense of economic
analysis: they contain the concept of consumer sovereignty (conditions 2
and 4) which has been criticized above; and the principle of ordinal utility,
also criticized above. It is another matter that both of these can be sur-
rendered in developing the theorem.
3. The conditions also lean on the Pareto-principle. 2 It is clear there-
1 Arrow (1963: 106): ». . . in my view a social decision process serves as a proper explication
for the intuitive idea of social welfare. The classical problems of formulating the social good,
are indeed of the metaphysical variety which modern positivism finds meaningless: but
the underlying issue is real.»
2 See Arrow (1963: 96-97), in a weaker form: if for all i xPiy, then for the society xPy;
this is implied by the conditions 2, 3 and 4 (see also Murakami 1968: 92).
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fore, that they contain much of the traditional economic assumptions
which have been severely attacked by scores of economists. In this sense
the original formulation of the Arrow theorem is not of great bearing.
Later I shall discuss more recent developments, some of which have already
been mentioned in passing.
About concrete applications of the Arrow theorem, it may be mentioned
that, for instance, the market mechanism (in the sense of perfect compe-
tition) fulfills the irrelevance condition but does not fulfill the condition
of collective rationality. This is expressed by the intersecting social indif-
ference curves which make intransitivities possible. The Samuelson social
indifference curves satisfy the condition of collective rationality but not
the irrelevance condition.
Compensation principles, on the other hand, do not satisfy the condition
of collective rationality, especially its aspects of unrestricted domain
(Rothenberg 1961: 70, Arrow 1963: 34-43). Sen (1970) has also discussed
these implications of the Arrow theorem.
7.5. Extensions and Restrictions on the Arrow Theorem
The impossibility theorem is a paradox: to solve a paradox you must
either show that some of its conditions are not acceptable or then formulate
the problem in another way that eliminates the paradox. On the other
hand, one may wish to generalize the paradox due to the possible relevance
of its implications or because one senses that it might be more widely
applicable than had been previously thought.
The literature concerning the impossibility theorem can be divided,
into fundamentally two stages. First came the stage when all of the con-
ditions, and specifically the third condition were exposed to close scrutiny.
This stage produced the literature on the restriction of preferences, i.e.,
restrictions on the part of the first condition which concerns an unrestric-
ted domain.
The second stage spawned discussions about the fundamental bases
of the theorem, namely the question of collective rationality,' but also
saw the addition of new conditions and the introduction of choice functions,
instead of welfare functions (as a technical distinction). Luce and Raiffa
(1957: 340) have formulated this so that the third condition is the only
Sen (1970) expresses this very clearly by separating the question of the nature of social
and individual preference wholly from the conditions of the theorem: previously I have fol-
lowed the Arrow manner of separating them only partly as axioms while retaining a part
of them (collective rationality) as an assumption.
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one that can be tampered with within the framework of the impossibility
theorem itself. As conditions four and five are rather trivial and always
acceptable in principle, in general, it is actually the three first conditions
that can be altered. In fact, the second condition is also rather innocuous,
so only the first and the third have proved to be central problematic points.
Here I adhere to the Sen separation, and consider the question of collective
rationality fundamental for the Arrow theorem in all its aspects, and the
condition of the unrestricted domain of the social welfare function and the
condition of the independence of irrelevant alternatives as conditions that
can be manipulated. As the most interesting aspect of the independence
of irrelevant alternatives condition is the subsequent question of strategy
and interpersonal comparison which have been discussed extensively in
this context, I will concentrate on the restrictions of the domain.
This has been the subject of many discussions. It has been shown that
under certain restrictions on the individual preference orderings, the
theorem collapses. And some have seen this as the main avenue for the
elimination of the impossibility theorem, as these restrictions are relatively
mild and acceptable.
More specifically, the restriction is as follows: if from the individual's
best alternative we can deduce his complete preference ordering, we can
construct a social welfare function which fulfills all the Arrow conditions.1
This is called the condition of single-peaked preferences.
An instance of single-peaked preferences is political choice in a multi-
party situation. Here we may assume that in most cases, we can deduce
the individual's whole ordering rather well from his first (preferred) choice.
Let us have alternatives x,y, z and w, the ordering of which is, for
individuals 1, 2, and 3, as follows:
w x y z
x y w z
3:	 y z x w
Thus the individual preferences can be represented as single-peaked
curves (Fig. 7.5.a).
Formally, this condition may be expressed in terms of the conditions
on the ordering of the alternatives in the preference profile: we must be
able to determine this ordering in such a way that all curves describing
individual preferences are single-peaked (or have a peak containing more
than one indifferent alternative). Obviously this condition is difficult to
confirm in most realistic situations when the number of alternatives and
individuals is large.
1 Arrow (1963: 75 — 80), Vickrey (1960: 513 — 514), Rothenberg (1961: 280 — 287), Black
(1958: 99 —102); see Kassouf (1970: 83 — 84) for an enlightening presentation.
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Fig. 7.5.a
We may then construct a welfare function that fulfills all of the other
conditions. For instance, such a welfare function is the weighted majority
rule (in which alternatives are weighted according to their orderings).
With single-peaked preferences the choice is the median of the individual
choices (Rothenberg 1961: 281, Luce—Raiffa 1957: 355). From this example
it can easily be seen that the results from the single-peaked preferences
condition are not necessarily particularly interesting. The proposal that
society should choose the median party through this method would prob-
ably be acceptable only to those supporting the median party.
Single-peaked preferences have an interesting relationship to the prob-
lem of scalability and the construction of attitude scales. This problem
has been studied especially by Coombs. 1 Specifically, the assumed relation.
ship demands that if single-peakedness exists, there is a common qualitative
dimension along which all preferences are ordered. The only quality re-
quired is the concept of betweenness, but no distances are necessary. Any
alternative lying between two other alternatives is assumed to be indif-
ferent with respect to them. This can be given the following rationalization:
Coombs (1970); see also Koskela (1971: 35-37). This relationship has been first pointed
out by Guilbaud (1968 (1952)), see Riker (1961: 907), Luce-Raiffa (1957: 354-355).
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Every individual i has an ideal position on this continuum and he
orders his preferences in such a way that they are related to the 'distances'
(in the sense of order arrangement) of the alternatives from the ideal.






Single-peaked preferences allow for tactical considerations when applied
in, for instance, the weighted majority decision rule. Anyone may try to
move the median towards his own choice by preferring the extreme alter-
native in his end of choice (Rothenberg 1961: 288). This would imply that
most individuals would desert the middle positions unless they had a strong
conviction that their position was truly at the median. This may actually
have happened in certain cases, but probably for other reasons than this.
The single most important restriction for single-peaked preferences is
obviously the assumption of an unidimensional underlying ordering. Most
social decision problems are clearly multidimensional and therefore will
not allow for single-peakedness in this sense (Rothenberg 1961: 295-298).
The idea of single-peaked preferences can be extended. Tullock (1967:
256) has advocated the application of single-peakedness in a multidimen-
sional base ordering. It is not very clear how such orderings could be
constructed, and especially whether they would still produce the wanted
results. According to Tullock the existence of multidimensional single-
peakedness wholly eliminates the significance of the Arrow theorem. This
view has not gained many adherents, (see e.g., Vickrey 1960: 516).
Arrow (1963: 81) has given single-peaked preferences the following
philosophical interpretation. They form the foundations of the so-called
idealist school of thought, exemplified by Kant and Rousseau. According
to Arrow this school separates individual wills from the general will, while
the latter is considered dominant. In single-peaked preferences, we can
also speak of a 'general will' that determines the structure of the individual
preferences. This is hardly the most plausible interpretation for the possible
existence of single-peaked preferences.
A much more natural interpretation would be expressed in the form
of the common interests of certain group of people. For example, for most
members of the society, democracy is in their common interest. Or, the
working class has common interests which create a basis for a special
preference structure. Yet, as has been noted above, the concept of single-
peaked preferences is rather restrictive and the rules that can be con-
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structed on the basis of these alone is relatively uninteresting. At best
they can be understood as a defence of the majority rule in many situations,
and also as an explanation of why the majority rule breaks down in so
many cases.
Proceeding from the case of single-peaked preferences, the next point
of consideration is those extensions of the impossibility theorem not
formulated in the theorem itself. These extensions will be considered only
shortly as they are rather technical and cannot be analyzed here properly
without the aid of demanding preparatory considerations.
Generally speaking, the above-mentioned extensions have largely
manifested themselves in the form of new conditions for a social welfare
function which have resulted in the widespread reconsideration of the
utility of the theorem, as it was originally constructed by Arrow.
One of the most important of these results related to the conditions
is that the impossibility theorem is true only for orderings, not for choice
sets. In other words, the Arrow theorem is about social welfare functions
and not about choice functions (this has been shown by Sen 1969, 1970).
This is because for choice functions, transitivity is unnecessary. To ensure
that an alternative will be chosen, already quasi-transitivity (i.e., tran-
sitivity of preference), and of course the much weaker acyclity l of prefer-
ence are enough. Although this is a very important conclusion, Sen empha-
sizes that it does not eliminate the importance of the Arrow theorem. Even
if we can noticeably strengthen other conditions, if we are concerned with
choice functions the Arrow theorem is still, according to Sen, the most
economical and fundamental.
The fact is, however, that the additional conditions are rather interesting
and through disregarding transitivity we arrive at much more realistic
situations, where only partial rationality in the classical sense prevails.
I shall not treat these new conditions extensively in this monograph.
It should be noted that especially quasi-transitivity is an interesting con-
dition in its own right. It may be described as a condition that also takes
into consideration the inability of individuals to discern small differences
between the values of social states (Inada 1970: 29). This is, in fact, much
more realistic than the requirement of full transitivity in preference
orderings.2
1 By acyclity is meant the following property (see Sen 1970: 15-16): R is acyclical over
S if and only if the following property holds.
For all x l , x 2 , ...xi in S :
(x1Px2 & x 2Px3 & . . .	 ---> x1Rxi
2 For a very extensive review of the content and relevance of the quasi-transitivity of indif-
ference condition, see Koskela (1971), who very succinctly and comprehensively reviews
the existing literature. Note also that quasi-transitivity implies cardinal utility.
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But there are also problems involved. If we are satisfied with a choice
function producing a set of best alternatives, we are in exactly the same
situation as the classical welfare economists; that is, we have a set of
alternatives from which we cannot choose, and another set of alternatives
that we also cannot compare (i.e., the alternatives outside the choice set).
Most people would say that such a problematic dichotomy is not much
of an improvement over the original situation, whereas the social welfare
function that produces an ordering would be much more appetizing.
In fact, personally I would prefer to disregard the condition of com-
pleteness, as it would be much more natural to have a partial ordering.
However, the surrendering of this condition does not prove very helpful
(see Hansson 1969: 536).
The two most interesting additional conditions for a social welfare
function are those of anonymity and neutrality.'
May (1952) was able to show that the simple majority rule was the
only rule with the following four properties:
decisiveness, i.e., there is a social choice for every profile.
positive responsiveness, i.e., a situation where, if x and y are indif-
ferent in social choice and if one more individual prefers x to y while
no others' preferences change, the society must strictly prefer x to
y (for a formal definition of these conditions, see Sen 1970: 72, Luce —
Raiffa 1957: 357, May 1952).
anonymity: if the preference orderings of individuals i and j	 are
interchanged, the social preference ordering is not affected.
neutrality: if the preference orderings concerning two alternatives y
and x are interchanged in every individual's preference ordering,
x and y exchange positions in the social ordering as well.
The positive responsiveness condition is a clear Pareto-type condition,
(together with neutrality, it satisfies the strict Pareto principle (Sen 1970:
73)), but the remaining two are the more interesting ones. In a sense,
both are intuitive preconditions for a certain type of equality. Sen (ibid.: 78)
shows, as could be expected, that they are not fulfilled by the market
mechanism under perfect competition: perfect competition and equality
are rather distant principles. Majority rule also fulfills the independence
of irrelevant alternatives conditions (Sen ibid.: 72). This is a direct con-
sequence of the condition of neutrality. This is obvious, but Hansson
(1969a: 51) has shown that with a rephrased version of the independence
of irrelevant alternatives condition, the following result is obtained: assum-
ing that a social welfare function fulfills the three conditions of anonymity,
1 First suggested by May (1952), and extensively studied by Murakami (1968), Hansson
(1969a), Dummett —Farquharson (1960), Sen—Pattanaik (1969), Sen (1966, 1970), and
Guilbaud (1968).
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neutrality and independence of irrelevant alternatives, if we have xPiy
for every i , we must have xIy , i.e., social indifference. This is clearly
unacceptable and obviously violates the positive responsiveness condition.
In other words, we are confronted with an interesting contradiction. The
conditions of neutrality and anonymity considered together (as neutrality
implies independence of irrelevant alternatives) are incompatible with
the condition of positive responsiveness and with even stronger conditions.
There is something wrong with either the May theorem or the Hansson
lemma (and the resultant theorem, ibid.: 54). It seems that the Hansson
definition of independence of irrelevant alternatives is different from the
Sen and May definitions. But the Hansson definition is interesting in its
own right, and therefore his conclusions merit consideration. If the anon-
ymity and neutrality conditions together are incompatible with an inter-
pretation of the independence of irrelevant alternatives, then one or the
other must collapse. In accordance with Hansson, I think that the inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives (as Hansson has defined it) is the
weaker. But in other versions they clearly are not incompatible, thus
Hansson's claim that his theorem is an argument against the Arrowian
condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives (ibid.) is based on
a misinterpretation.
For most social decision situations, the conditions of neutrality and
anonymity are unrealistic. It should be noted that the method of majority
decision is not a social welfare function in the Arrowian sense (i.e., it does
not fulfill the condition of collective rationality), nor is it a social decision
function (it does not fulfill the condition of acyclity). There most certainly
exist individuals and alternatives that are more important than others.
In particular, there are rules that weigh some individuals more heavily
than others, and some alternatives that are barred from consideration
(i.e., truly 'irrelevant' alternatives).
But as ideal conditions these are rather good. Their only fault is the
one which prevails for all other Arrowian conditions, they do not consider
the problem of social activity and power. But this is another ques-
tion.
Schwartz (1970) has presented an interesting new development that
also partly contradicts the claims of earlier writers. Schwartz claims that
we can relax the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition and
part of the collective rationality condition and the same result will none-
theless obtain. This is in clear contradiction of, for example, Sen's assertion
that Arrow's result is very economical; if we relax any of its restrictions,
the result collapses (1970: 49). It is difficult to assess the truth of Schwartz'
claim, as his formulation of the crucial conditions somewhat differs from
the Sen formulation. It is not my purpose to make them comparable in
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the context of this monograph. Yet it is safe to say that if the Sen results
are valid, then the Schwartz result loses its force, and vice versa.
The Schwartz results have a very high relevance to social policy as
compared to those of Sen. What Schwartz has attempted to show is that
the whole concept of maximizing choice in multidimensional decision
situations is an impossibility. This argument sounds very plausible, espe-
cially in the light of the reasoning presented in the following chapter
(about the level of living index). 1 But as it depends on a perhaps implaus-
ible proof,2 I shall not risk making far-reaching inferences from it. Yet it
opens new possibilities that are interesting especially with respect to social
welfare, and may well prove to be one of the most important implications
of the Arrow theorem.3
7.6. The Implications of the Arrow Theorem
I have now covered the essential problems of the Arrow theorem and dis-
cussed the importance of the various concurrent conditions. What remains
to be discussed is the highly important problem of the general relevance
of the Arrow theorem from the point of view of social welfare and social
policy.
As noted above, the fundamental idea of the theorem is that social
welfare is not definable other than through the social activity of individuals,
expressed as 'voting', or preferences, (see Arrow 1963: 106). This idea differs
substantially from the various attempts to define welfare 'externally',
that is, semi-independent of individual activities. The implications of the
Arrowian approach find expression most clearly in the so-called consti-
tutionalist school of thought, whose interest is almost exclusively in the
rules (i.e., a )>constitution») for social intercourse. In and through these
rules welfare, justice and equality are realized.
In the section where this approach is analyzed, I have noted that it is
clearly inadequate to consider only rules of social activity when analyzing
problems of welfare and justice. The same argument applies to the Arrow
1 It is astonishing how some of the recent students of the Arrow theorem have written their
contributions apparently unaware of the contradictory results present in earlier literature.
Already in 1960 and later, especially 1966-1969, there have been thany articles about quasi-
transitivity and its implications.
2 As one counter-example is enough to devalidate a proof, and it is very possible that the
Sen counter-example (Sen 1970: 52-53) for instance, will prove sufficient.
3 With respect to the impossibility theorem one must always be on guard against misinter-
pretations, wrong theorems and the like. Compare for instance, the discussions of Contini
(1966) and Majumdar (1969), where Majumdar refutes the claim of Contini that one of the
Arrow conditions is irrelevant for connected choice spaces.
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impossibility theorem and its later developments. We must also approach
the content of social welfare, and not only its form, to use a classic meta-
phor. More specifically, we might speak of external definitions of welfare,
in which welfare is defined in terms of the rules given for social decision-
making and collective choice; and internal definitions of welfare, where
welfare is defined through the nature of activities under any set of rules.
The combination of these two will clearly be nearer to that which is under-
stood as social welfare. Without the internal definitions of welfare we
cannot — and this is important — circumvent situations in which external
definitions break down; that is, situations where fundamentally necessary
conditions are not fulfilled. On the other hand, we cannot fully consider
the content of the rules unless we can analyze their results independently.
This is why definitions of social welfare related to the concept of level of
living are absolutely indispensable.
The importance of the Arrow approach is therefore, that it forms a
basis for a 'constitutionalist' discussion about the rules that should be
applied in social activities relevant to social welfare. These rules are ex-
tremely general in nature. They specify very little about the social struc-
ture, as well as about the actual conditions of the society, etc. Neither
are they, as noted above, substantially specific about the content of the
social welfare resulting from their application. It is therefore obvious
that they are not very fruitful, except as a framework for welfare, and
an extremely general framework at that. It is conceivable to consider a
certain point and note that it fulfills certain conditions, after which we can
specify its welfare relevance. In this respect, however, the fulfillment of
the conditions is irrelevant.
Another question which the Arrow theorem and its extensions clearly
ignore is the problem of the systemic, structural components of social
decision-making. One individual may express his preferences in many
different functions in society, depending on his power and nature of his
activities. This is clearly dependent on the very narrow definition of social
choice given by Arrow in the beginning of his book (1963: 1-2). This
definition has not been challenged in later developments, not even by Sen
(1970), who has a much broader view on the problem. There are, however,
some notable exceptions (for instance Coleman 1966), but most have started
from the Arrow characterization of social choice. Yet all the more inter-
esting qualities of choice, i.e., the process of choice, the nature of social
choice as a complicated social process containing both objective and sub-
jective elements, are wholly eliminated. The implications of this omission
are not very clear: what actually is lost? If our only interest is in the con-
ditions, we lose little if anything. But if we are interested in realistic situ-
ations, and in the question of social welfare as a process itself, the Arrow
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theorem is not of much pertinence. Thus Sen's dictum (1970: 1) that his
book is only interesting to those not believing in the existence of inde-
pendent collective welfare, is not strictly true: also those who wish to
analyze the processes of welfare formulations have little to gain from the
Arrow theorem and its extensions.'
In effect, what I have said about the nature of the Pareto-optimum
is valid in this connection as well: we must be aware of the means to reach
the best or better situations, and knowledge concerning the ordering of
situations is not sufficient.
The Arrow Impossibility result is also essentially an irreducibility result.
If it is valid, it means that social preferences cannot be reduced to indi-
vidual preferences, and vice versa. Proponents of extreme forms of method-
ological individualism have claimed exactly the opposite — that all societal
facts can be deduced from individual facts (see Mandelbaum 1970, Israel
1970, Lukes 1970, Watkins 1968 and Koskela 1971: 42). Therefore, the
impossibility theorem can be understood as an argument against method-
ological individualism in its extreme form. This was acknowledged by
Arrow already in 1950 (1950: 165), when he emphasized that preference
orderings of every individual are partly dominated by socio-ethical norms
which have social origins. In a later article, he has developed this theme
by explicitly criticizing the idea that social action can be reduced to units
of individual action. Instead, a general theory should start with the con-
cept of a social action, which is collective and interpersonal. Social choices
should then be based on this concept (Arrow 1967: 8-10). In this article
Arrow seems to think that one solution would be to relinquish the third
condition, but this is obviously not the case, as the underlying individua-
listic assumptions will not be eliminated by denying the third assumption.
(ibid.: 19). But the idea Arrow has in mind is some form of extended sym-
pathy concept, also analyzed by Rawls (1961).
Generally it does not make sense to speak of independent social entities,
but under some conditions this is not so. If we define independence simply
as a breach in the chain ultimately beginning from individual action, this
is perfectly plausible and may lead to interesting results.
This is the way in which Marx and Engels (1970: 103-105) speak of
the contradiction between general and individual interests. 2 In this pass-
1 Lindblom (1964: 226) has emphasized that on the contrary, the resolution of the Arrow
paradox would be meaningless, because then we would have the problem of creating a social
welfare function from individual welfare functions. Thus in a sense the Arrow paradox makes
life easier. But as I have noted, this #ease# may be illusory.
2 *How is it that personal interests always develop, against the will of individuals, into class
interests, into common interests which acquire independent existence in relation to the
individual persons, and in their independence assume the form of general interests? How
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age, Marx and Engels describe very succinctly the process of general
interest freeing itself from the common interests of the members of the
society. These problems are however, rather distant from the original
purpose of the Arrow theorem, but there certainly exists a relationship
between them.
7.7. Constitutionalist Solutions
The problem of social welfare, as we have noticed, is divided into two
central and primary problems: that of the definition and determination of
social welfare, and that of the nature of the social decision-making process
— i.e., the question of how is social welfare to be »implementeth. As noted
earlier, the Arrow theorem is, in essence, an attempt to show that social
decision-making is not possible under some general conditions. For those
who are essentially interested in the social decision-making process, this
has necessitated attempts to evade the Arrow problem by inventing pro-
cedures for social decision-making that circumvent the Arrow theorem.
One of such attempts is the ))constitutionalist# approach which has been
suggested independently and simultaneously by many authors. I shall
consider some of the aspects of the constitutionalist theories in order to
see whether they can indeed provide a solution to our problem.'
is it that as such they come into contradiction with actual individuals and in this contra-
diction, by which they are defined as general interests, they can be conceived by consciousness
as ideal and even as religious, holy interests? How is it that in this process of private interests
acquiring independent existence as class interests the personal behaviour of the individual
is bound to undergo substantiation, alienation, and at the same time exists as a power inde-
pendent of him and without him, created by intercourse, and becomes transformed into
social relations, into a series of powers which determine and subordinate the individual, and
which, therefore, appear in the imagination as 'holy' powers? .. .
»Theoretical communists . . . are distinguished precisely because they alone have dis-
covered that throughout history the 'general interest' is created by individuals who are defined
as 'private persons'. They know that this contradiction is only a seeming one because one
side of it, the so-called 'general' is constantly being produced by the other side, private
interest, and by no means opposes the latter as an independent force with an independent
history — so that this contradiction is in practice being always destroyed and reproduced»
(Marx —Engels 1970: 103-105).
1 For instance Kaplan (1964: 58) says that the solution to the Arrow problem is to be found
in the political process. This is the heart of the constitutionalist solution in its relation to the
Arrow theorem, but I would like to emphasize that this is true on an even more general level.
I will return to this in the last chapter.
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As we shall presently see, this approach is fundamentally a classical
solution, implying a return to the Good Old Days of laissez-faire.' The
principle idea of constitutionalism is relatively easy to discern: instead
of trying to devise a system which would guarantee social welfare in the
sense of a welfare function — i.e., reacting to changes of welfare concur-
rently and continuously — the constitutionalist attempts to develop a
system in which people would make agreements, a social contract, for a
certain period under which all would be on their own. This contract provides
the regulations for decisions of social policy during the given period. After
this period, and on the basis of the results subsequently obtained, new
agreements would be made (see for instance Runciman 1970: 219-220,
Buchanan 1966). The essential point of the idea is that the »contract» or
constitution approved is the only social decision made in the name of
public interest. All other activities are based on attempts to maximize
individual utility — for individual interest — within the bounds of the
rules agreed upon, of course.
The major current proponents of this idea are John Rawls, who has
suggested it as a solution for distributive justice (see Rawls 1961, 1968,
and Buchanan—Tullock 1962, Buchanan 1966). who have been inter-
ested in it from a more general point of view, as a method for political
decision-making. They have of course, many predecessors, for instance
Hobbes (see Rawls 1961: 90) and Wicksell (see Coleman 1966: 1115; Wick-
sell proposed it as a requisite for just taxation). Also, the whole »con-
tractarian» tradition should not be forgotten.
But indirectly, the idea of constitutionalism is closely related to the
idea of a perfect market. Just as in the perfect market, where the actors
must answer only to the rules of market, and each actor is supposed only
to further his own interests, people in the constitutionalist system are
acting by the rules, for their own interests, and each is assumed unable
to effect the final outcome by himself. 2 Thus, we could say that the idea
of constitutionalism roughly implies a return to the advocacy of laissez-
faire, only in a more refined and modern form. This may not do justice
to some of the ideas of Rawls, but certainly does with regard to the
principles of Buchanan and Tullock. In addition to Rawls, Buchanan
1 Thus the name of the Gordon Tullock article sA. reply to a traditionalists (1961) is certainly
a misnomer; it nicely reveals the unhistorical nature of the constitutionalist argument. In fact
the article against which Tullock argues in his paper (Downs 1961) is of a much newer tra-
dition than that which Tullock represents.
2 See Buchanan— Tullock (1962: 266, 303); Dahrendorf (1968: 219— 220), conceives of plan-
ning as an antagonistic counterpoint to the constitutionalist-type agreements in the form
of market rules (Coleman 1966: 1116).
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and Tullock, many other modern writers have presented these same
ideas .1
I will concentrate here mainly on the presentation of Buchanan and
Tullock, as it is most closely related to my analysis of the Arrow theorem
and problems of welfare economics, and also because this approach is very
comprehensive, and not restricted to some limited aspects of social decision-
making, such as justice.
It should be noted that the constitutionalist approach is not only
interesting because it implies a »solution» for the problem of social decision-
making, but also because it contains strategic elements. As I emphasized
above, the Arrow theorem eliminates strategic elements from the analysis
thus making it rather unrealistic. The main idea behind the Buchanan
and Tullock model is to incorporate strategic elements in the form of log-
rolling or »horse-trading». Thus the constitutionalist approach is also con-
nected with the theory of games, and especially with the problem of »fair
deal» games (see Luce —Raiffa 1957: 361, 363-368). These games fall
beyond the scope of this monograph, but for those interested in the prob-
lems of constitutionalism, they should not be forgotten.
Above I delineated shortly the essential qualities of a constitutionalist
model. In the following we will examine certain central questions more
thoroughly.
First of all, the main assumption of the constitutionalist approach,
as exemplified by Buchanan and Tullock, is that the state is not an inde-
pendent entity which could have aims or goals. The state is founded
on individual consent and the political process can be subdivided into
individual choices (Buchanan 1966: 25-27, Buchanan—Tullock 1962:
12-13).
Secondly, the rational individual, who is the central element in the
political process, is assumed to minimize his external costs, incurred by
the activity of others, and decision costs, i.e., costs due to collective decision
making. Both types of costs, which Buchanan and Tullock classify together
under the name of social interdependence costs, are mainly incurred by
the activities of the state. Thus the rational individual is assumed to mini-
mize collective action (see Buchanan—Tullock 1962: 46-47). In the
terminology of Marx, the rational individual of Buchanan and Tullock
is an isolated monad. He is not interested in collective activity as such,
1 See for instance Leibenstein (1965), Coleman (1966), (who presents some additional ideas,
however, not related to the idea of constitutionalism), Downs (1957) who in some points is
in disagreement with Buchanan and Tullock as well as Arrow (1963: 106), who has a very
interesting view on the matter; see also Rothenberg (1961), and Social Policy and the Dis-
tribution of Income in the Nation (1969).
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but only as a means to further his own, private interests. This applies
equally to political, economic and social activities.'
Based on the further specification of both the external and decision
cost functions, Buchanan and Tullock draw the conclusion that the only
acceptable collective decisions are those about which there is complete
unanimity. Only in situations where the decision-making costs would be
very high, could decisions made with less than complete agreement be
acceptable. According to Buchanan and Tullock, the unanimity rule for
decision-making is especially applicable where procedures are agreed upon
for certain situations and where the individual cannot be certain of the
outcome (Buchanan—Tullock 1962: 78). In this situation the individual
would be ready to make agreements which would be in the interests of
all (see also Buchanan 1966: 30-32). Only in very rare cases would the
individual make agreements which would further some group interests.2
Buchanan and Tullock think that these conditions are extremely un-
likely to be fulfilled simultaneously. Of course the whole idea of agreement-
making as Buchanan and Tullock define it is rather improbable, but it
seems that if we accept the basic idea, there is certainly a great possibility
that all these conditions can be fulfilled. As they themselves say (ibid.: 80),
it would require a society of great equality for these conditions to be appli-
cable (also Rawls 1961: 85). If the society contains a clear concentration
of power and resources, the decision-making system suggested by them
would break down. Interestingly, they seem to think that this is a con-
clusive argument for the acceptability of their theories, whereas any
objective observer of the capitalist democracies of today would say that
just this fact makes the approach completely unrealistic.
Actual decision-making under such a system would be comprised of
the so-called »log-rolling» mechanism. To reach unanimity, it would be
necessary to make agreements which are in the interests of everybody;
i.e., to barter with political issues. This system is of course a well-known
political practice, exemplified by the direct trading of votes, by the lobby
system, and so on. In fact, one of the aims of the Buchanan—Tullock
1 (Ibid.: 20). For Buchanan— Tullock it seems impossible that the same individual would
behave differently in different roles: a fact well-known to all sociologists.
2 According to Buchanan— Tullock only under the following conditions would this be possible:
The individual is able to predict -which issues are going to be decided.
The outcome is predictable for one or more issues if we use the most efficient rule A.
The outcome for one or more issues is not so good for an individual if we employ the rule A,
than if we would employ some other rule.
There is another rule B, under which outcomes would be more desirable for the individual.
The advantages of B are larger for the individual than the disadvantages from the un-
employment of rule A.
It is possible to have rule B agreed upon (Buchanan— Tullock 1962: 78— 79).
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book is to make lobbying and political pressuring respectable (1962: 23).
But for log-rolling to be really effective, it is necessary to have total agree-
ment, otherwise the result is an ineffective log-rolling system, as Buchanan
and Tullock attempt to show in an example (ibid.: 135-140) which has
become rather famous.
The ideas of Buchanan and Tullock have been warmly supported by
Coleman (1966), who thinks that the idea of log-rolling is extremely fruitful
for the analysis of social decision-making. Also Arrow (1963) has analyzed
extensively the idea of constitutionalism in relationship to his theorems.
According to him, it is plausible to think that one of the components of
an alternative of social choice is precisely the mechanism of choice itself.
Thus the social alternative would consist of components of different orders:
for instance, action components, law components, decision-making system
components and so on. If we can assume that there is a component of
order n , about which all can agree, we would in principle have solved
the paradox: this agreement would determine all choice of the lower order
(Arrow 1963: 90). Thus, in principle it is possible that the constitutionalist
approach would eliminate the Arrow problem. But, of course, it does
require quite far-reaching assumptions which are not normally fulfilled.'
It should be noted that the unanimity rule of the Buchanan—Tullock
thesis is simply the Pareto principle applied to political decision-making,
in that the consitutionalist is not interested in the welfare of the people,
but only in whether they are unanimous or not in a certain decision. But
actually it is in connection with the Buchanan and Tullock argument that
we can clearly see the absurdities to which the Pareto principle can lead us.
It is obvious that the constitutionalist argument can be subjected to
severe criticism on many levels. This has in reality been the case, and the
evidence has been, in my opinion, rather conclusive against the idea of
constitutionalism in the form presented by Buchanan and Tullock. This
does not exclude the possibility, however, that constitutionalist ideas
based on some other assumptions would not be acceptable.
One of the most obvious forms of criticism can be directed against
the extreme individualistic assumption presented by Buchanan and Tul-
lock. The assumption that individuals would rather avoid any collective
activities save those in which there is unanimous voluntary agreement
(see Buchanan—Tullock 1962: 90), leads to impossible situations. Not to
1 One indication of Arrow's interest in the constitutionalist solution is that he has replaced
the term social welfare function by the term constitution in the second edition of his text
(see Arrow 1963: 105). Thus he has very obviously attempted to emphasize that the con-
stitutionalist solution by no means resolves the Arrow paradox. But as the true constitution-
alist solution does include strategic aspects, it seems obvious that the Arrow theorem is not
directly relevant to it.
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mention the fact that, as Barry says, it is obvious that a society formed
of such rational egoists that Buchanan and Tullock have in mind would
not be a nice place to live in (Barry 1965: 243). Very few people would
consider an ideal society to be a place where people keep completely to
themselves unless there is something (such as external threat) which re-
quires collective action. But it should be pointed out that Marx demon-
strated precisely this state of affairs to be the bourgeois ideal, as expressed
in the declaration of human rights of the French Revolution (Marx 1965).
In such a society it would be meaningless to speak of social welfare, and of
course, anything related to welfare would only be the business of isolated
individuals.
The second criticism can be directed against the unanimity rule and the
assumption of complete voluntarism. Buchanan and Tullock emphasize
that majority rule, which is now being hailed as the Klemocratic# decision-
making rule, should be replaced by unanimous rule.'
In an ideal society this should certainly be the case, but in our very
defective societies, unanimous rule could only bring more hardship. This
can be illustrated by an example, also analyzed by Buchanan and Tullock
themselves (ibid.: 91) — namely the problem of pollution. According to
them if we do not witness voluntary action against the pollutant, the
costs incurred by pollution are not real. Thus no governmental, non-
voluntary action should be undertaken against pollution. This implies,
as has been repeatedly pointed out, that anybody wishing to pollute air,
rivers and so on, could freely do so, and afterwards it would be determined
whether the costs are real or not. This is regrettably true in the present
situation, but few would consider this situation ideal (see Barry 1965:
256— 259).
Of course even more absurd situations can occur. The owner of the
polluting factory could simply prevent antipollution measures by vetoing
all action directed to such ends. It would be in his interests to control the
rules which would ignore such situations or make effective safeguards for
his business (see Sen 1970: 25).
But this leads us already to the third, and perhaps most important
criticism against the constitutionalist approach. It can be pointed out that
the constitutionalist situation requires men without attributes to make
agreements: if we have the rich and the poor, capitalists and the workers,
the educated and the ignorant, and so on, agreements will necessarily
1 Buchanan — Tullock (1962: 96): »We have witnessed an inversion, whereby, for reasons
to be examined later, majority rule has been elevated to the status which unanimity rule
should occupy. At best, majority rule should be viewed as one among many practical ex-
pedients made necessary by the costs of securing widespread agreement on political issues
when individual and group interests diverge.»
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favor some group and be biased against others. The factory owner of our
previous example would envision situations where his activities would
perhaps arouse opposition, and ensure that no rules enabling the opposition
to dominate would be accepted. This is of course, the situation in the real
world, and this is the basic reason why the constitutionalist device breaks
down (see Wolff 1966: 188, Runciman 1970: 220). This argument has been
countered by the assertion that it is equally plausible to conceive that
people are not aware of the effects of their attributes (see for instance
Runciman 1970: 221, Buchanan 1966: 30-32), and that it is much easier
to reach agreement on rules, than on the outcomes of situations. The latter
argument is doubtlessly true, but even agreement on rules is exceedingly
difficult to attain.
If an individual has an attribute useful to him only in very specific
situations (such as a very rare language skill), it is difficult for him to
know the effects of this attribute. He would be, in effect, involved in a
lottery situation, which is the ideal state according to the Buchanan and
Tullock principle. But if an individual has a very large amount of money
or in general some negotiable resources, he possesses a very universal
attribute which can make him expect to gain in most situations, except
in those where his resources are not valuable. Thus, such an individual
can have a very definite idea of which kinds of rules he should accept and
which kinds of rules he should not. He should oppose rules which would
imply control of resources by society and the utilization of resources for
the general good. And his opposition would either entail the acceptance
of rules not effectively curtailing the use of resources as an attribute, or
would result in a paralysis of decision-making, which is not very probable.
This is also true in reverse, as Sen points out. People with less power
are ready to make settlements which are not in their interests, but which
they know to be the best they can get.' Coleman (1966b: 1117) has developed
a model which has included the power of the individual as a factor. In his
model, thus, we have a realistic situation where a person with intense
preferences but no power is irrelevant to the final outcome.
In extreme cases the Buchanan and Tullock model can thus lead to
a minority dictatorship, where one powerful individual, or small group,
by blocking all rules which would work against them, can use their power
unrestrictedly during the intermittent periods of contract. This is a case
which is not considered feasible by Buchanan and Tullock. For them, it is
more relevant to secure that everybody can prevent external costs incurred
1 Sen (1970: 26): >>A laborer in a monopsonistic labor market may accept certain terms of
agreement feeling that he cannot hope to get anything better but this does not mean that
it is unanimously preferred to an alternative set of terms.))
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to them by collective action (Buchanan—Tullock 1962: 25). This is, of
course, an important problem but it is perhaps even more important to
hinder private individuals from incurring external costs to others by
interferring with necessary action.'
In any case, the problem of minority power which is very possible under
the Buchanan and Tullock approach, is not correctly understood if we con-
sider solely the rule-making per se (as does Barry 1965: 315). It is only the
implementation of the possibility to eliminate rules which would restrict
one's power which makes the minority rule really dangerous. This is
precisely why it has been opposed by people interested in the democra-
tization of society (see for instance Riepula 1969).
It is possible of course, to criticize many other aspects of the consti-
tutionalist approach (see for instance Runciman 1966: 252-253, Rothen-
berg 1964, and Bower 1968: 137), but the above points can be considered
the most conclusive. Thus we might say that the constitutionalist approach
as presented by Rawls and Buchanan—Tullock is reactionary and includes
many features which make it unrealistic for present-day societies. But as
mentioned above, in an ideal society where all men are equal, well-informed
and altruistic, the ideal method of decision-making would undoubtedly
resemble some form of the constitutionalist model. This merely demon-
strates the relationship of the ideal to the possible very well: if one would
attempt to introduce such a decision-making system into a present day
society, the results could well be disastrous.
8. An Operational Approach to Social Welfare:
Level of Living, Social Indicators and Level of Welfare
8.1. General Remarks
In the two previous chapters I have analyzed the problems of welfare
economics and the Arrow theorem. The starting point in this analysis has
been the individual and his welfare, a concept which has not yet been oper-
ationally defined. The problem has actually been how to make social wel-
1 It is interesting that the contradiction between these principles has not been recognized
very widely. The same groups may both be requiring more effective forms of control against
collective activities and simultaneously require possibilities for more effective collective
action. Of course, this is an apparent contradiction, resolved by the fact that different
types of decisions are envisioned. But in principle it would be very difficult to specify which
types of decisions should be covered by unanimous rule and in which types of decisions
coercion could be exerted.
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fare judgments if the content of welfare is intuitively known (but not
specified) at the individual level.
The level of living and social indicators approaches are almost dia-
metrically opposite the approach delineated above. The question is: what
is welfare (social welfare), and how can it be measured; and more import-
antly, how could this measurement be implemented in social policy? This
latter question has only recently been formulated, yet, the decision-making
aspects are almost wholly ignored while the content of welfare is in the
foreground. This has important 'ontological' implications: we are no longer
interested in the problem of how to derive social welfare from some indi-
vidual judgments, but instead go directly to the question of the possible
content of social welfare in the form of social conditions necessary for
individual welfare.'
This indicates that unless we consider welfare economics (in a broad
sense) and level of living as opposite approaches, we can see them as com-
plementary, centering in different, but equally relevant problems of social
welfare. As I emphasized previously, it is not reasonable to analyze only
the 'formalistic' side of welfare, that is, the different rules and methods of
making judgments about social welfare. And it is as equally insufficient an
approach to consider only the 'content' of welfare, as it is to conceive
solely of fundamental principles with no intermediate alternatives. Ulti-
mately the theory of social welfare will need to contain both elements and
more: the connection of social welfare with social reality, that is, with
the structure and functioning of the society.
In the following I shall first review the development of the level of
living concept and social indicators and then proceed to analyze the various
gaps left unresolved by the existing approaches. Mainly I shall be empha-
sizing the above-mentioned issue of the connection of the level of living
and social indicators with social reality, with social policy and social action.
I shall not be concerned with the technical details of the development
of adequate indicators, but will remain on a more abstract level of dis-
cussion which centers on the problem of the dimensions of the level of
living and social indicators, 2 nor shall I dwell on the history of the level
of living analysis, except very briefly to illustrate some main tendencies.3
Traditionally a distinction has been made between the standard, norm,
1 The attitude of welfare economists toward this approach has been rather well presented
by William Vickrey (1960: 531): ». . . any welfare function for which the argument consists
solely of objective data consisting of prices, incomes, institutions and the like, thus abstracting
from the declared preferences of the individuals, is ultimately dictatorial in this sense (Big
Brother sense)»; see also Little (1957: 1).
2 See, for instance, Drewnowski (1968a, 1970) or Johansson (1970).
3 See Pipping (1953), Salavuo (1968) and Johansson (1970) for a fuller historical account.
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and level of living." In the United Nations report of 1954 this distinction
was adopted and 'officialized' (Report on International Definition and
Measurement 1954: 2— 3). Shortly, the distinction was as follows:
the level of living is the measure of the actual living conditions of men
(or of a people);
the standard of living indicates the aspirations or expectations of people,
i.e., a sort of ideal level of living; and
3. the norm of living indicates some predetermined level of living which
is considered 'adequate' according to some criteria. The norms could
refer to a minimum, or comfort, or very good, and so on.
A modification of this is the Pipping distinction between the 'normal'
or 'general' levels of living (or standard of living in Pipping's terminology,
i.e., a kind of combination of standard and level), and the ideal standard
of living.2
It is obvious that in particular the distinction between the 'standard'
and 'level' of living does not withstand concrete analysis. Already the
choice of components and indicators is related to some standards or 'ideals'
about living conditions, i.e., to a conception about the good life (cf. my
analysis on needs in chapter 5).3
I do not thus deem it necessary to make the separation between level
and standard, but will use them interchangeably, with level of living as
my fundamental concept. 4 The current trend has been away from the use
of standard of living toward the use of level of living, and in any case,
the level of living is certainly more accurate and conveys a clearer idea of
the meaning of the concept.
On the other hand, it may be reasonable to speak of a 'norm' of living,
in the sense of an adequate or minimum level of living. These entail no
absolute measures, as they are very much dependent on social judgments
and social realities.5
In any case, this kind of norm of living is clearly dependent on the
definition of level of living which is therefore, for the time being, the cen-
tral problem.
One of the variants of this tripartition of concepts is the distinction
For the probable origins see Bossard (1934: 152), who used the terms plane, standard and
norm; International Labour Organization (ILO) report (1938); Pipping (1953: 116, 1936:
87-89) refers to a related distinction.
2 Pipping (1953: 118-119); this has been adopted by Salovaara (1968: 18).
3 Note also that this is true especially for the weights of a level of living index which, there-
fore, cannot be 'objective' in this sense.
4 This is in accordance with the Finnish usage, where 'standard' has necessitated some very
arbitrary terminological juggling; see Waris (1965), Salavuo (1968).
5 See Allardt (1972) who emphasizes this; Rescher (1966: 99).
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between the objective and subjective levels of living (or welfare). 1 The
most interesting explication is that given by Noponen and Sipila who divide
well-being into 'real' or objective welfare on the one hand, and the well-
being experienced by the individual himself, which is termed subjective
welfare (Noponen 1971: 15, Sipilh 1970). As I noted in chapter 4 above,
this distinction is related to the distinction between happiness and welfare,
which is not a particularly fruitful distinction, conceptually speaking.
With respect to the problems of the level of living this is also true. It will
certainly be necessary to include both subjective and 'objective' elements
in any definition of the level of living that is to be practicable. It is very
mechanistic to think that there could be a 'real' or 'actual' level of living
abstracted from society or from the individual's experience.
Another distinction that is of interest here is that between the flow of
welfare and the stock of welfare.2
This distinction has, however, mainly technical relevance and thus
does not interest us here. It is obvious that almost anything affecting wel-
fare should be a flow. For instance a stock of food has no welfare effects
(except in security components) unless it is consumed, i.e., transformed
into a flow. Thus stock concepts are not very relevant. However, it is
generally easier to measure stocks than flows and this leads us to some
very difficult problems in the operational measurement aspects.
8.2. The Concept of the Level of Living
It is probably safe to say that compared with other resources expended in
social scientific pursuits, the research on the level of living has, at the
level of published material (and also lately at the level of official resources)
been more intensive in Finland than in any other country in the world.
In fact, there have been so many theses, articles, monographs and abstracts
about the level of living published in Finland lately, that one could almost
speak of over-production. 3 In addition, we can refer to the pioneering
work by the Finnish economist Pipping (1934, 1953) with respect to the
1 See for instance Salovaara (1968), Noponen (1971), Sipila (1970); for older exponents see
Hoyt (1938), Salovaara (1968: 24-25), Kyrk (1953):
2 In Drewnowski's (1968b: 3— 5) terminology the former is the level of living and the latter
is the level of welfare, but from a practical point of view, and in accordance with popular
usage, it would be better to consider the stock of welfare as the level of living, i.e., the more
stable part, and the flow of welfare would be the level of well-being or welfare which is more
transitional.
3 See Salavuo (1968, 1969), Vepsa, (1966), Noponen (1971), Roos (1968), Salovaara (1968),
Waris (1965), Allardt (1970, 1971).
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level of living. This is not to say that the concept has not been studied
outside Finland, but one could almost speak of a Finnish 'school' of level
of living studies. (Although, one should add, this school is very hetero-
geneous.)
This is, of course, no reason for avoiding more analysis of this problem.
It is obvious that the area has not been explored completely (by any
means), not in Finland, nor anywhere else. On the other hand, the issue
of the level of living and its connections with social welfare on the one hand
and social policy on the other, is so central for much of social science that
there is little fear of too much research. In addition, the existing attempts
have many faults: in part, they are not based on a well-developed theory
of society or even of social welfare.'
The majority of approaches to the problem of level of living have been
rather empirical; they are either efforts at suggesting empirical indicators
for the measurement of level of living or actual attempts to illustrate,
with the help of empirical material, the problems of measurement in the
level of living. Actually this has led to 'misuse' of the concept of level of
living in the same sense as there has been misuse of the concept of welfare
in the economics of welfare: i.e., conceptualizations that are very far from
the original idea of the concept (see e.g., the empirical analysis of Noponen
1971, or Salavuo 1969).
8.2.1. Fundamental Distinctions
Historically the concept of the level, or standard of living is relatively old.
Already the classical economists and also the economists of the German
liberal school used the concept of standard of life in a context roughly
equivalent of that used today: i.e., referring to the 'necessities' and relevant
aspects of an acceptable life (see Hertz 1961: 86, Myint 1948: 135, Pipping
1953). The standard of life was especially used in connection with the prob-
lem of the determination of wages. We can even speak of a specific #stan-
dard-of-life» theory of wages. But it was only in the twentieth century
that a specific analysis of the concept of level of living was developed.
Most of the fundamental problems of the level of living had been presented
already in the 1920's and 30's. Especially the following were prevalent:
1. The distinction between a normative and non-normative standard of
living was already presented in Bossard (1934), in the ILO report (1938)
1 Waris (1965: 142) has noted that the trend has been from abstract theory formation toward
more operational attempts, and from conceptual analysis to measurement techniques. The
cycle has quite recently been completed by a trend to the opposite direction; in fact, we
could speak of a peaceful coexistence of both trends.
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that was to lay the foundation for the famous UN report (1954), in
Pipping (1934), and in Hoyt (1938).
Most of the currently extant components of the level of living were
also known. For instance Kirkpatrick (1929) presented a definition of
the level of living including health, education, recreation, social relations,
etc.1
Many aspects of the problem were analyzed which only recently have
regained attention. These are the connection of the standard of living
with the social policy and social action, and with social structure.
In this the pioneers have been Bossard (1927), Pipping (1935) and the
ILO report (1938).
One of the most complete histories of the concept of level of living and
standard of living is undoubtedly that presented by Pipping (1953). 2 But
the Pipping analysis is not only historically relevant, but is also a theor-
etically significant contribution to which I shall return.
The next stage in the development of the concept of level of living
began when the United Nations created a committee to define the level
of living and to operationalize it with a view to international comparisons.
This committee published its report in 1954. It contains much of the older
tradition: especially the distinction between normative and non-normative
levels, but also suggests some reforms. The reforms centered around the
expansion of the use of components, of which the committee presented
a very comprehensive list. The work of the commission was continued in
the so-called interim report (1961), where the amount of components was
restricted and the indicators specified.
The later developments of the concept of level of living have been largely
related to the UN report. Especially the United Nations Research Institute
for Social Development (UNRISD) has contributed much to the develop-
ment along these lines. Its former research officer Jan Drewnowski has
had an instrumental role in this process (see Drewnowski 1966, 1968, 1970).
It seems apparent that the recent interest in social indicators is essen-
tially only a continuation of the level of living analysis on a lower theoreti-
cal level. The social indicators researchers have been astonishingly unaware
of this, and have consequently missed many important developments.
In effect we could speak of social indicators as a step backwards in the
general line of development soon to be described. Later, however, both
See Salovaara (1968). Neurath (1970 (1944): 36-37) has also suggested the measurement
of the living conditions>> in several components such as shelter, food, entertainment, friend-
ship, etc.
2 See also Salavuo (1968).
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approaches have drawn nearer one another which should prove fruitful
for both.1
In the development of the concept of the level of living we can separate
three distinct phases which, however, are not completely distinct in time,
but are actually recurrent in the sense that they may be developed simul-
taneously:
The foundation of the level of living concept solely on the level of con-
sumption, level of incomes, and the Gross National Product (GNP).
This, in effect, implies that the concept is being based on wants, as
distinct from needs. In other words, whatever a person or a nation has
is part of the standard of living. This is still relatively common, espe-
cially in popular usage, but definitely on the decline.2
The subdivision of the level of living into separate and independent
components, the classification of which is based on the classification
of human needs, but in a rather restricted sense. This line of develop-
ment has been relatively dominant.
3. The third stage is the anchoring of this concept in existing social reality:
the regarding of both needs and resources in the concept of the level
of living and the analysis of the relationships of the various components
on the basis of a conception of social action and structure. Historically,
this is the most diffuse stage: it has been present at various times.
These main trends of the level of living theories are by no means vure>>,
they are typologies, not >weal* in the sense that every approach would be
open to perfect classification into some of the categories (although it must
be said that the distinction between GNP and other approaches is theore-
tically rather watertight).
It is obvious then, that the concept of the level of living has figured
rather importantly in the development of welfare theory. Such a concept
has many practical and intuitive advantages. To this day there do not
There are of course many other approaches that are related to the concept of level of living.
One of the most interesting is the so-called time-balance surveys. These have especially
been developed in the socialist countries and they consist of a computation of a time budget
for the various activities of the individual in the society. The components of a time budget
coincide partly with the components of the level of living, which is of course natural, as most
components of the level of living are actually time-consuming activities or very closely
related to them, see Patroushev (1970), Friedrich (1970). Also the politological tradition
of developing various 'polity' indicators has had much influence for the development of
social indicators. To some extent, however, this politological tradition derives from the
same source, namely that of level of living developments.
2 It cannot be denied, of course, that consumption and the GNP certainly are important
factors in the level of living, but there are also obvious differences between them to which
I shall return.
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exist any better measurements of the extent of well-being in human soci-
eties. It is clear that this concept must be developed further, and shall
be developed, but one must bear in mind its fundamental importance.
8.•.2. The Development of the Level of Living Concept
If we analyze the three-stage division presented above, it is immediately
obvious that the first stage offers us little of interest, although it is still very
influential (see for instance Myint 1948: 84 et seq. for the historical origins
of this usage). In its most unrefined form, it is based on the equation of the
national income (or the national product) and social welfare. Here we can
speak almost interchangeably of production, income and consumption.
The differences between these in relationship to the level of living are
relatively slight. They are distributed internationally and regionally in
the same way. Income and aggregate consumption measured in money
is almost the same thing: only individual differences in the rate of savings
and taxation affect this. Neither expresses anything about the nature of
consumption, its quality being the main factor in the level of living. The
same goes for production which contains items that are even less immedi-
ately relevant for the level of living (production of machines, etc.). The
criticisms against this approach are so well-known that they need not be
reiterated. 1 Recently, criticism has especially been directed against the
detrimental effects of production which are ignored completely in the
national income and national product calculations. This social cost and
external effects analysis is very closely related to the problems of the
level of living, but I shall not take that matter up here.2
It can actually be said that the level of living comes into being as an
independent concept only when we reject wants as its foundation. In this
approach the concept of level of living refers to a property that is much
more restricted, but on the other hand much more broadly based than the
'true' level of living.
Thus, even consumption must be discarded as a measure of level of
living, although it more accurately reflects the living conditions of people,
especially in a capitalist country where individual consumption is most
characteristic of one's living conditions. But the same argument that
leads to its negation, applies to any other comparable measure: increased
consumption in itself is no guarantee for an increased level of living.3
1 See Johansson (1970: 17-18), Drewnowski (1968b: 14, 23-25, 28), and Tsuru (1971)
for the most lucid presentations relative to this monograph's approach.
2 See Kapp (1950), Mishan (1967), Taylor (1970), Olson (1970a: 24), Drewnowski (1966:
5-7), Pipping (1953: 147-148), and Waris (1968: 83).
3 However, especially the early definitions of levels of living were based upon consumption;
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Although the researchers who employed such concepts as national
income, national product and consumption were aware of the discrepancies
between level of living and these measures, the advantages of the use of
such extremely aggregated, rather easily understandable measures that
were certainly somehow related to the level of living weighed heavily.
Especially comprehensive aggregation is important in this connection
(see Toward a Social Report 1969: 98). As the aggregation of the compon-
ents of level of living has proved difficult (some have in fact, considered
it impossible), the temptation to lean on unsatisfactory solutions has
been great.
The second important argument for the use of the monetary measures
connected with the national product is very persuasive: only such measures
are so closely connected with the manifest central activities of society.
It is obvious that in the UN definition of level of living in particular, this
connection was almost severed. What we must emphasize in this context,
however, is not arbitrary equation but the analysis of causal relationships.
8.2.3. The Simple Need-Based Level of Living Concept
It seems obvious that a proper concept of level of living should be ultimately
based on needs; it must reflect the process of need-satisfaction in a society
as an adequate and interesting concept. This goes back, on the one hand
to the relevance of needs in welfare, and on the other hand, to the relevance
of needs for the working of society. Only when the concept of level of living
reflects the interests of the members of society, can it be truly functional.
The question is, in what way should needs and the level of living be
related. It is essentially to this question that I will seek an answer through
analyzing the various alternatives.
The first existing alternative is what I will refer to as the simple need-
based concept of the level of living (SNC).1
This can be said to be the central and currently dominant phase of
development, with its foremost promoter being various organs of the
see Pipping (1953: 114 —115). Beginning with the concept of GNP, Tsuru (1971: 19-21)
has suggested a new measure which would more faithfully reflect the welfare content of
economic activity. This would be based on the distinction between capital and income made
by Fisher (note that Drewnowski makes the same distinction). What one would essentially
try to do is to construct a concept of social wealth sufficiently wide to reflect all the effects
of economic growth. This is a very interesting suggestion which is related to the Drewnowski
approach in more ways than one.
1 In a way, it could also be called the need-biased level of living concept. This reflects the
opinion that this alternative circumvents the essential point about welfare and level of
living: its relation to social activity.
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United Nations, especially UNRISD. In general terms the SNC is a con-
cept based upon the following theory of needs: men have rather unchanging,
general, similar needs (this especially with regard to basic needs) according
to which the components of the level of living may be formed.
Here 'higher' needs have proved somewhat problematic, but lately
this has been resolved in basically the same way as other needs. Therefore,
one might claim that the simple need-based concept, in its essential points,
has its roots in a need theory, the rudiments of which I have described in
section 3 of chapter 5.1
The essential qualities of such a relationship (re: footnote 1, this
page) imply that for every need component there corresponds a component
of the standard of living, that the intradimensional (need, level of living)
intercomponential relationships are essentially arbitrary (although dif-
ferent components are perhaps allotted different weights), and that all
needs have in principle the same status in the analysis.
The original proposal for this sort of SNC was defined by the UN com-
mittee in its report of 1954. As mentioned before, there were many related
approaches earlier.2
The main emphasis in the committee's work was on the word anter-
nationab; they endeavored to find a definition conducive to the best
possible comparability between nations. This of course, implied an empha-
sis very different from that which would have begun from the conditions
of any specific national group, or even smaller unit.3
Comparability does not necessarily require complete equality of the
basic needs, but only that the needs should vary between nations in a
known fashion (see the Report on International Definition and Measure-
ment 1954: 6).
It must be noted that the committee did not make a very explicit
connection between needs and the level of living. As Johansson (1970:
20, 24) notes, the starting point of the committee was very empirical,
with primary stress on operationality: the level of living was simply that
which was to be measured. Its theoretical framework was rather obscure.
It was only later that their original structure manifested itself in the
form of a SNC; i.e., a certain concept of level of living was later >>embellished>>
1 There is, of course, no explicit, theoretically complete account of the connection between
a theory of needs and a theory of level of living, which is unfortunate, but here I shall try
to explicate some of the heretofore tacitly understood relationships.
2 Here should especially be mentioned the definition of Getz Wold (1949: 68) where he defines
standard of living as the composite of different consumption norms concerning living, food,
clothing, leisure, time, etc. It may have affected the work of the commission considerably.
3 It is obvious that precisely this emphasis on comparability led the committee to formulate
a rather *sterile» definition, i.e., a definition which would be as general and simple as possible.
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with a theory of needs. Nonetheless, this does not alter the fact that it
was eminently well-suited for such a theory.
The committee justified the division of the level of living into com-
ponents and indicators on the basis that the level of living should con-
stitute clearly restricted aspects of the whole life situation, and these
aspects of the life situation are especially relevant when we present goals.
Here is also a clear allusion to the nature of the level of living, which re-
quires division into components, an allusion distinctly related to needs
(Report on International Definition . . . 1954: 8).1
The ILO committee (1938) had devised the following criteria for choice
of components in compiling their list of indicators:
the importance of the component with regard to the well-being of the
individual, according to generally accepted norms;
to what degree the deficiency in a certain component borne of »felt»
needs creates problems;
to what extent it is possible to remove the deficiency through human
action;
the capacity of the component to adapt to statistical measurement
(Report on International Definition . . . 1954: 24).2
According to these criteria, the following components were chosen:
(Report on International Definition . . . 1954: 26):3
Health, including demographic conditions
Food and nutrition
Education, including literacy and skills
Conditions of work
Employment situation
Aggregate consumption and saving
Transportation





The list of components shows clearly that the committee had envisioned
a broad but undifferentiated concept of level of living, including transport,
savings and social security, although these components are not directly
related to human needs.
Consumption in particular is a problematic element: the most important
But the division into components was also based on the fact that the UN was organiza-
tionally similarly constructed (see idib.: 23).
2 The final criterion, however, was not highly influential, as can be seen from the components.
3 See also the ILO list: Worker's Standard of Living (1938: 28).
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consumption groups are already included elsewhere in the list; this goes
for saving as well, although in prospective. Transportation is a matter
which apparently has effects upon the level of living only in an indirect
sense.'
Maybe the most problematic component was that of social security.
In the ILO proposal, there was a component of »general security», but the
UN committee strove for more specificity. But social security is contingent
upon all other components of the level of living if it is to be complete, as
Nieminen (1955) defines it. The goal of social security is to ensure a moderate
level of living for all citizens. In other words, social security is a means to
reach a certain level of living for the population. What this component
therefore measured is in what way a certain country undertakes to fulfill
its citizens' needs. As mentioned previously this is a very important ques-
tion, as the strategy of collective or individual needs is one of the most
central considerations in social policy.
If social security is to be used as a component, it would be natural to
require the inclusion of the component of, for example, regional policy
also into the analysis. Of course social security has indirect effects on the
level of living of the people, in that it affects security, but this implies
that there should be a general component of security to embrace all the
sorts of warranties which the state provides its citizens.
These problems were partially resolved in the Interim Report of 1961
(Report on International Definition and Measurement 1961). Here com-
ponents 6 and 7 were removed and components 4 and 5 combined. A social
security component however was nonetheless retained in the list. The
committee had previously created another group of components which
were referred to as the resources of the level of living (Report on Inter-
national Definition and Measurement 1954: 52). But this was not pursued
to a sufficient degree: the resource components were not analyzed further,
and their relationships to the proper components of the level of living
was left unexamined. This effected some odd consequences: the concept
of level of living did not include any resource components at all; economic
conditions were not seen as components of the level of living. This has
been severely criticized by Johansson, who also notes that ownership
conditions were not even mentioned. A concept which considers clothing
to be more important than income or wealth is not a proper level of living
concept, claimed Johansson.2
1 It is of note that the Committee's solution was obviously mixture of many different propo-
sals. Pipping (1953), for example included a savings component as a very central factor
in his analysis.
2 By ownership conditions Johansson apparently means the concentration of ownership,
etc. See Johansson (1970: 35).
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The Interim Report committee's definition of level of living included











Here we can observe an explicit connection with needs: most of those
components not directly related to needs were eliminated. This solution
has formed the basis for most later attempts to define the level of living,
especially that of UNRISD as well as for those, for instance, in Finland,
and it is certainly a rather purely need-based level-of-living solution.
But it was in the work of UNRISD that the level of living was explicitly
defined as the level of satisfaction of needs, effected by the goods and
services consumed in a certain time period (Drewnowski-Scott 1966: 1,
Drewnowski 1968a: 2). In Finland this was adopted by most of the level of
living studies (Waris 1965: 145, 1969: 84; Koskiaho 1969: 10; Vepsh 1972).
As a result of this, for the first time, the components were explicitly





















What is interesting is that the higher needs are left completely to the
whims of the consumer, while on the other hand, the basic needs compo-
12
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nents include some elements which could be easily considered as higher
in the classic sense.'
However this representation of the higher needs was not permanent;
already two years later, Drewnowski presented another formulation. But
his reasons for the revision were connected with the construction of the
level of living index: it would be more difficult to devise the index were
we not to eliminate the double standard created in this way (Drewnowski
1968b: 10-11).













physical environment (see Drewnowski 1968b: 37, 1970: 63).
During this period of development, the basic components which have
remained the same were nutrition, housing, health and education. These
components are those which are best susceptible to measurement, but
there are also good theoretical reasons for their inclusion: they are by far
the most central of components.
The other components have not been so stable: their designations and
natures have changed. Leisure, for instance, has been on the lists, but to
my knowledge there have not been any suggestions as to its measurement.
The new component, environment, includes a catalog which could
probably be continued indefinitely, but still seems rather important.
It reflects the direct individual and collective consumption of the citizens
and revives the component of consumption in another form. The component
In other words, this represents a digression from the needs approach: in fact, the surplus-
income conception can be said to be related with preferences instead of needs. Allardt (1971a:
306) has suggested that every component of the level of living should be related both to needs
and preferences, which would imply that the surplus income approach would cover all the
components. As I have previously stated, the nature of the level of living concept is such
that it should not be connected with preferences. On the contrary, the level of living should
be retained as a basic element of social welfare, connected with the primary fundamental
factors of social welfare.
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of social security has appeared as security, a change which is nonetheless
problematic.
One important component has been left out: the component of employ-
ment and conditions of work. As people work a very large part of their
time, including the majority of their conscious hours, it is very important
to reflect this fact in a definition of the level of living. It is obvious that
this component is very difficult to measure and compare internationally,
but on a local level and internationally it should be possible to some extent.'
All this juggling with components does not change the fact that they
are based on a very scant theoretical foundation. They have been the
consequences of practical and direct approaches with little connection to
macroscopic theoretical analysis. Of course they must rely upon some
implicit theoretical paradigm, which is also suggested here, but in any
case, it seems that in co-ordination with the increasingly specific work
on indicators, there should be an analysis of what theoretical foundations
a theory of level of living could have, i.e., not solely a concept but a theory.
Only through this theoretical development — it is the view of this author
— is it possible to increase the concrete, practical relevance of the level
of living approach.
It should be emphasized that many practical problems have received
extensive attention in a way which shall be of lasting use. This includes
the work on the flow-stock distinction, the construction of critical points,
the problems of ordinality, and in general the construction of indicators
on the basis of these components. I shall not take up these problems here,
except shortly when discussing social indicators, but their practical signifi-
cance should be recognized (see especially Drewnowski 1968b, 1970).
But of course, the relative weight of these advancements depends greatly
upon the theoretical decisions and solutions which have not yet been
reached.
One problem at the indicator level has been their applicability to the
comparison of nations. If one would wish — as is appropriate — to measure
the indicators of the level of living on an individual basis, many of the
indicators would have to be revised. This must be remembered in practical
measurement: there are no reliable level of living indicators on an indi-
vidual (nor family) basis.
8.3. The Level of Living Index
As was previously mentioned, the work of Drewnowski has been largely
oriented toward the development of a unitary index of the level of living
1 For instance such indicators as work time, nature of employment, number of industrial
accidents, the prevalence of work-related sickness, etc., come to mind (see also Hasan (1972)).
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which would serve as a measure as comparable as the per capita GNP
is presently. In the following I shall examine some aspects of the contro-
versy around this problem, as it has some relevance to the more general
problem of the relationships of the components of the level of living.
In short, the construction of an index of the level of living consists of
finding weights, first for indicators, then for components. Actually the
procedure occurs in three stages. First we must designate proper weights
to the distribution of the indicator; only then can we weight the indicators.
Drewnowski (1968b: 14-21), who has been the most persistent index
developer, has proposed a weighting system within the indicators, which
consists of defining the so-called critical points. These are based on the
conceptions of experts about how necessary a certain measure of the
indicator in question is for a man. The most important critical point is
the survival point which essentially defines the ultimate importance of
the indicator (see Drewnowski 1968b: 17). When we know the actual
value of the indicator, and relate it to the critical points, we already have
valuable information about its weight.'
But we need more than this; some other measures of the importance
of individual indicators and of the respective components are required.
Drewnowski has suggested the following solutions:
The weights would be based on expressed social goals, for instance,
international or national programs and declarations (Frisch has recently
attempted to develop a system on this basis; see Frisch 1970).
Weights would be based on implicit social goals. In this method one
would utilize the actions of the decision-makers to deduce their goals.
A »conventional>) method would be to build the index in consultation
with experts, in which the systems of weights would be as simple and
clear as possible. Here we can use equal weights or gliding weights,
where the weight of the indicator is inversely related to its value (rela-
tive to the critical points; Drewnowski 1968b: 19-21).
The fourth possibility, the construction of a weighting method based
on individual preferences, is not considered possible by Drewnowski,
who refers to the Arrow theorem (Drewnowski 1968b: 22). There are
those, however, who consider this very much a possibility (see for
instance Theil 1969). The weighting problem does not restrict itself
to the weighting of the indicators and components of the level of living.
David Alberts, in a recent book (Alberts 1970: 50— 51), has presented
an extremely simplicistic and optimistic solution (based on >>operation
See also Ahmavaara (1969), who emphasizes that basic needs have critical points under
which the entirety of well-being is reduced to zero; this implies that the weight of such an
indicator would be infinite.
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research0 to the problem of weighting. He sees it essentially as a rational
decision-making problem, with the following components:
available course of action,
the probability that an individual might select each of the courses of
action,
the possible outcomes,
the utility of the outcome to the individual,
e. the efficiency of a course of action resulting in an outcome; in other
words, a traditional decision-theory situation. On the basis of this
information it should be entirely possible, through a few simple oper-
ations, to determine the weights with the help of regression analysis!
Nowhere does Alberts seem to stop to consider why his approach —
so time-honoured and well-worn (although he does not mention this
at all) — has never been utilized in practice.'
The same problem exists in the welfare function itself, and all practical
attempts to develop decision-making criteria for social policy must resolve
weighting problems.
But these are technical difficulties, and although they may, perhaps,
contain the solution to the problem, I am presently more interested in the
theoretical aspects of the question (even should someone develop an emi-
nently pragmatic method of weighting, this would not dispose of the dis-
cussion of the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of the method:
the practical method of weighting would not eliminate the problems which
cast doubt upon the whole approach of weighting).
For, despite the attempts of Alberts, Drewnowski, and others, the
construction of a level of living index has been viewed rather skeptically,
and most writers have considered it either impossible or not recommend-
able .2
It should be remembered that also the UN Committee in its 1954 report
took a stand against the unitary measure (Report on International Defi-
nition and Measurement 1954: 52) which it considered impossible. But
as I have said previously, it is not so much a question of impossibility or
possibility as a question of whether or not a unitary index is desirable.3
The arguments for the development of the unitary index are rather
simple. The main reason is that of comparability. A rise or decrease in wel-
fare must be presented as one figure, otherwise comparisons in time and
1 See his own application (ibid.: 70), for an exercise in triviality.
2 Allardt (1971a), Neurath (1970), Radomysler (1969), Johansson (1970), Toward a Social
Report (1969).
3 It is interesting to note, that the UNRISD itself has apparently given up the development
of a level of living index and now concentrates on devising better and more accurate multi-
dimensional measures; see Social Development Review, No. 3 (1971).
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space (and also with respect to the effects of different projects in the
same time and place) would be impossible. And as the GNP per capita
measure is so over-worked, it is obvious that a better measure is needed
(Drewnowski 1968b : 14).
The second reason presented by Drewnowski is simply that it is possible
to construct such a measure. It is merely a question of putting the weighting
of social goals on a firmer basis (ibid.). The reasons given by Drewnowski
are very straightforward. As to the possibility of the measure (which in
my opinion is not the central question), Allardt has pointed out that in
the first place, we have no theory concerning the relationships of the
components, which makes the construction of an index arbitrary. And
once we develop an unitary measure, it is extremely difficult to say what
it is — exactly — that we are measuring (Allardt 1971a: 302). Olson has
pointed out the essential incomparability of components which makes the
whole attempt impossible (Toward a Social Report 1969: 99).
Drewnowski's first argument, that of the necessity of being able to
make comparisons, is more relevant. It is obvious that comparability is
a desirable property. But must comparison necessarily be unidimensional?
For instance, the arbitrariness of the unidimensional measure of the GNP
is well known. What is the significance of the fact that the common standard
of most of the items of the GNP are exchange values? Why should it be
necessary to exchange the arbitrary basis for the GNP to another, probably
even more arbitrary foundation? We are presently equipped with many
methods to compare multi-dimensional measures with one another, thus
there is no reason why the fact that not all dimensions give the same
ordering should disturb us. On the contrary, we would achieve a much
more interesting picture of the whole. To recognize that the GNP is an
absurd measurement does not mean that it should be replaced by one
equally preposterous. Otto Neurath (1970: 32-33) phrased this eloquently
already some thirty years ago: Some of the sociologists are prepared to
handle silhouettes (Neurath's term for multi-dimensional measures) but
not a few try to avoid this type of procedure, based on a multi-dimensional
comparison. They attempt to reach by some calculations, a single number
indicating a degree of 'something' and often they cannot even tell us to
what this 'something' should be correlated .
Also other authors have come out rather strongly against the single
measure of well-being, for various reasons (see Radomysler 1969: 91-92,
Myrdal 1971: 193-195).
According to Johansson the actual concept of the level of living would
be lost from sight by the construction of a unitary index (Johansson 1970:
38). This is certainly true. The advantage of a multi-dimensional measure
is that it is much more descriptive and informative. For most of its pur-
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poses, it is more practical than a unitary measure. For instance when
measuring inequality, it is much more useful to apply a multi-dimensional
concept than a unidimensional one, as the latter could not yield information
of much relevance.
As I noted in chapter 4, the concept of welfare is essentially a multi-
dimensional quantity. There is no reason why it should be reduced to one
single dimension, as its essential qualities would thereby be lost.
There is another, more technical argument. This is based on the method
of constructing the level of living index according to the Drewnowski
approach. Determining relationships between the components of the level
of living is not only a problem of weighting, i.e., one of adding independent
components.1
It is not only that the weights given to different components must be
determined on the basis of the social importance of these components,
but also that one must determine the interactions between the components,
i.e., their dependencies. According to Tinbergen these two problems should
be separated (1970: 14), but this is not possible: the weights of the com-
ponents clearly depend on the interrelationships between them, and there-
fore the weight of one component is dependent upon the level of another.
Assume that a hungry person cannot follow instructions and cannot learn
as well as others. Then the weight of education would clearly depend on
the level of nourishment, the weight of education ultimately being zero
if all children of school age are starving. But if education directly affects
the level of nutrition, this argument will have to be modified.
Interactions can also be noted in the qualitative changes of the level
of living. As Salavuo notes, we can speak of stages of the level of living
where completely different items are consumed and different components
or parts of the components become important.2 This implies that inter-
actions between the components and outside factors change the whole
structure of the level of living.
8.4. The Problem of thimensions#
In the consideration of dimensions, we confront the basic componential
distinctions of welfare mentioned earlier. Whereas the components of
health, employment, and so on, clearly signify different aspects of man's
1 As is assumed, for example, in Cost-benefit analysis of social projects (1966: 20).
2 See Salavuo (1969: 107-108); this phenomenon is also referred to by Johansson (1970: 33),
when he notes that in the case of Sweden, nutrition is no longer as pertinent a factor as are
patterns of diet. An extremely interesting analysis of this problem can be found in Waltuch
(1972).
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social activities and characteristics related to needs, the component of
security must obviously signify the quality of these activities: a general
characteristic of these activities. We distinguished many such >dimensions*
of welfare, such as justice, equality, freedom, and security. Thus the ques-
tion before us is how to account for the dimensions of welfare in concrete
analysis.
In the first place, it is apparent that these dimensions traverse all the
components of welfare. For example, a person may well be healthy all
his life, but if there exist no medical facilities capable of caring for him
at a reasonable cost, his situation with respect to health is very insecure;
the same is true of other components. Thus security, as well as the other
dimensions, is relevant to each component of welfare.
This is precisely the reason that the concept of the level of living is also
relevant to such problems as inequality. With the aid of the level of living
concept, we can construct a considerably more comprehensive and multi-
faceted picture of inequality or of insecurity.
This can be exemplified by the analysis of inequality, or in other words,
the distributional aspects of the level of living.
It is well known that the majority of measures now in use (such as the
GNP and even the level of living index) do not accurately reflect the distri-
bution of the level of living. In other words, however unevenly the GNP
for instance may be distributed, this is not at all reflected in the GNP.
This implies a very serious requisite for analysis: not only the multi-dimen-
sionality of the concept itself, but also its uneven distribution, must be
taken into consideration. This is a very common problem (see Makelä
1971: 2, 18-19, who emphasizes this in connection with another problem
complex).
In the development of the level of living concept this question has been
raised a number of times. Already the UN committee of 1954 considered
this problem and emphasized that for all components, information con-
cerning distribution should also be acquired (Report on International
Definition and Measurement 1954: 14). Drewnowski (1968a: 2) has suggested
some practical solutions for this dilemma on the basis of his SNC for-
mulation. Drewnowski's basic assumption is that all men must be
equal. The only legitimate reasons for unequality must be reflected in
differences in needs, never in differences in their satisfaction of needs
(Drewnowski 1968b: 9; cf. also Noponen 1971: 42). This suggests that
we may assume that for all components complete equality is the best alter-
native. There are several possible alternatives to account for this (Drew-
nowski ( 1968a).
1. We could define a specific component of distribution for the level of
living (as has been attempted for security). According to Drewnowski
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this is not particularly satisfactory, as it would also be, in essence,
a transversal component.
We could eliminate the upper-most, or several upper fractiles from the
distribution of a component. This makes the mean value more valid,
as it is sensitive to deviating values, and high deviations are not desir-
able (a high value relative to other values implies great inequalities).
The best method, according to Drewnowski, is to correct each indicator
by multiplying it by its Gini-coefficient, or some other coefficient based
on the Lorentz curve. In this way, the more unequal the distribution
of the indicator, the more strongly the distribution coefficient would
lower the value of the indicator.
Alberts has suggested a »fairness function* in which the function would
be dependent upon the distribution below the mean, but independent
above it. The function itself is not specified, and takes the form of a simple
integral:
A	 f g(Ak(0)))Ak(w)(10)
K number of individuals
A = value of distribution
g(Ak(co)) = fairness function
(Alberts 1970: 53).
This function is actually a specific solution of type 1, though not signifi-
cantly relevant, as Alberts has not made any specifications.
Another simple but efficient way to account for distributional effects,
especially in cases where the whole of the distribution is not known, is
to concentrate upon the lowest fractiles alone (for instance, to the lowest
quartile) relative to the general level of living measurements. Comparison
of this cross-section to the average level of living would be of utmost
interest. Utilizing this method we could gain valuable information about
the so-called »risk-groups» of society, which the effects of social policies
either hit hardest or not at all.' Many policies which have small or unimport-
ant effects upon the middle groups can be disastrous to these risk groups,
as they actually live at, or near, the minimum income level. It should be
1 A policy concerning the moderate raising of consumer prices has important repercussions
within this group, which are not reflected in the average level of living; on the other hand
introduction of sickness benefits of the type prevalent in Finland are not of much assistance.
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rather easy take these groups into consideration.' This analysis could
be extended to other dimensions as well. But again, I am more interested
in questions of principle; i.e., what would be the general solution to this
problem of accounting for dimensions.
Dimensions were said to describe the nature of the welfare arrangement
expressed by components. As previously noted, we do not arrive at a very
satisfactory solution if we over-isolate the different dimensions. In general,
as I have noted above, the quality of welfare can be best examined in this
context. The quality of welfare is that which is most closely related to
the structural aspects of the level of living analysis. It is understandable
that these have been avoided in international comparison, although it is
obvious that the quality of welfare is much less conducive to measurement
than the >>quantity# — the components — of welfare.
Thus it is impossible to account for quality aspects through arrange-
ments similar to those used with respect to components. That is, we can
not just add another set of components (although, as I have indicated
neither is this very advisable for original components). A solution must
be sought along other lines.
8.5. Indicators of the Level of Living: Social Indicators
As I have repeatedly noted, to reach an adequate level of disaggregation
in the measurement of social welfare, it is insufficient to remain at the
level of components. We need to determine actual units of measurement —
indicators — for social phenomena. For this purpose, the UN committee
of 1954 made suggestions for indicators to be used in the measurement of
the level of living (Report on International Definition and Measurement
1954). One might therefore speak of a simple type of »relevance-tree)) in
this context as illustrated below (Fig. 8.5.a).
Much of the development of the level of living concept has actually
consisted of the development of indicators for this purpose. These indicators
have one primary purpose: to express comprehensively and unbiasedly the
theoretical and practical concept of the level of living. From the one indi-
cator of the GNP per capita, we have, through the development of the
concept of level of living, reached a proliferation of various indicators.2
1 In the spring of 1971 there was great commotion in Finland concerning claims that the >>chan.-
ge in price index is only 1.6 per cents implying that talk about a price »tread.mill», or explo-
sion, were not founded upon fact. However, it would have been interesting to construct a
cost of living index for the poorest group alone, and observe its internal changes.
2 For suggestions for such indicators, see Report on International Measurement and Defi-
nition . . . (1954, 1961), and Drewnowski (1968a,b; 1970; 1971: 90 91).
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Fig. 8.5.a
Closely related to these developments has been the subject of social
indicators, which has aroused a very widespread interest. As the problem
of the development of indicators of the level of living (as a theoretical and
practical problem) is akin to that of social indicators, I have chosen to treat
them together.
There are, of course, some differences between the indicators of the
level of living and social indicators. While the former represent a theor-
etically well-anchored development, where indicators have a clear aim —
to represent the level of living — social indicators are much more ambigu-
ous and their aims or connections are the subject of heated dispute. But
fundamentally, as we shall see, social indicators and the indicators of the
level of living are very closely connected.
8.5.1. The Development of Social Indicators
The development of social indicators is a textbook example of isolated,
simultaneous development occuring along similar lines in separate fields.
The concept of »social indicators probably originated from the suggestion
of Bertram M. Gross, among others, to complement the main economic
indicators used in the decision-making process of public policy in the
United States (Springer 1970). The term was most likely coined in the
beginning of the 'sixties. The suggestion gained official recognition and
there soon appeared an innumerable stream of papers, official as well as
not, concerning social indicators (for the official, see Toward a Social
Report, Full Opportunity Act 1970).
A similar approach was presented in France (see Baudot 1969, also
French Experience . . .1969) in connection with Le Plan, probably some-
what earlier. In any case, there has been widespread public interest towards
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the social indicators approach. There even exist somewhat coordinated
attempts among the countries belonging to the Economic Commission for
Europe (ECE), at the instigation of this organization, to develop social-
indicator systems (see Methodology of Long-Term Studies 1970), which
has also led to the creation of research groups in Finland.
The development of social indicators has taken place in almost complete
isolation from the level-of-living research. The most important predecessor
to social indicators is seen to be Recent Social Trends, edited by William
F. Ogburn (1933).
It is understandable that the bibliographies on social indicators pub-
lished in the United States reveal the same type of ignorance (Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 1970, Full Oppor-
tunity Act 1970). As to the situation in France, Baudot (1969: 47) refers
to Quetelet, Durkheim, Sorokin and Simiand as developers of measures
comparable to social indicators.
Thus, it should be clear that Allardt is wrong in associating the interest
towards social indicators with the scepticism about unitary measures,
as the developers of the social indicators were obviously not aware of
existing attempts to develop unitary measures (excepting of course the
GNP; Allardt 1971a: 303). Rather, the true reason for the development
of social indicators was simply a wish to develop indicators of a similar
nature and importance to those of economic life (see Olson 1970c: 123,
Gross 1966: 257), and thus, at best, to effect a widening of the scope of
national statistics.'
8.5.2. Social Indicators and Social Welfare
Upon examining definitions of social indicators, we observe that although
various definitions differ, they all refer mainly to the functioning of society
and to well-being. Olson's well-known definition (1970a: 27, Toward a
Social Report 1969: 97), for instance, says that ))a social indicator . . . may
be defined to be a statistic of direct normative interest, which facilitates
concise, comprehensive and balanced judgments about the condition of
1 Gross (1966: 158), for example, refers to the UN report of 1954 passingly and obviously
without being aware of the connection. The ignorance about developments in level of living
research is in exemplary evidence in Mancur Olson's comments (1969: 138, 1970b: 113) about
his Toward a Social Report (1969): »This was the first systematic attempt to assess the well-
being of a society»! (See also Galnoor (1971)). This very simple report is, however, in structure
almost identical to the well-known reports of the World Social Situation, the first of which
was published in 1955, and which are explicitly based on the Report on International Defi-
nition and Measurement . . . (1954).
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major aspects of a society. It is in all cases a direct measure of welfare . .
This means that the Olson definition has great resemblance to the SNC
definition of level of living: i.e., in its emphasis that it is a direct measure
of welfare. No wider aspects are considered. This has been seen as an undue
restriction even with respect to the SNC of welfare (see Springer 1970: 11),
especially as it eliminates all other indicators except direct goal indicators.
Some writers have opposed this because they feel that >>normative# infor-
mation is not appropriate, and that all kinds of #key time series should
be open to consideration as social indicators (Moss 1969: 7, Moser 1969:
12-13). This type of attitude results in a totally atheoretical approach
toward social indicators which, unfortunately is reflected in current reality,
as just this has happened and is happening in the development of social
indicators.'- In the definition of social indicators, one of the main problems
to arise has concerned whether indicators should refer exclusively to goals
or whether they should reflect the whole spectrum of relevant variables
of social activity (see for instance Baudot 1969: 52, Methodology of Long-
Term Studies in the Social Area 1970: 6). Most of the developers of social
indicators seem to concur with the latter conception, which is in accordance
with level of living theory.
But even more ambitious possibilities are reflected in the distinction
between social indicators which measure the state of the system and those
which measure the nature of systems (Biderman 1966a: 71, Baudot 1969:
48). By the former is meant indicators which express existing conditions,
and by the latter, indicators which form a conceptual model which expresses
the basic structure and dimensions of the society. In other words, it is
a question of whether social indicators are understood as isolated state
variables or whether they are seen as building bricks of a theory, in other
words as related measures. This latter possibility has aroused considerable
interest.2
This, once again, implies the necessity to develop a theory of society,
the variables of which would be social indicators. One element of this
theory is undoubtably level of living theory, but alone it is not sufficient.
However, I shall restrict my examination of this problem to the component
level as it would be far too complicated a process to consider all pertinent
indicators (see next section). Thus, in this context, I am only interested
in indicators because of their relationship to the component approach.
1 This is an important problem. The existing systems of statistics, including the new SNA,
are quite restricted and it is obviously necessary to develop systems which either complement
of replace the existing systems; see for instance Hjerppe —Niitamo (1971), Niitamo (1971),
Moss (1969), Gross (1966: 258), Partanen (1971).
2 Hjerppe — Niitamo (1971), Etzioni — Lehman (1967: 7), Kamrany — Christakis (1970:
211), Baudot (1969: 52), Biderman (1966a: 69— 70), Deutsch (1966: 9), Allardt (1972).
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I shall not dwell on the requirements and properties of indicators at
this time. It is obvious that these questions belong to the sphere of general
sociological methodology: i.e., what kinds of variables do we collect and
what kinds of requirements do we assign to these variables. There are
many different types of indicators possible from absolute to relative indica-
tors, 1
 as well as macro- and micro-indicators, that is, indicators about
personal properties or about collective properties (Report on International
Definition and Measurement of Level of Living 1954: 11). All of these
indicators are possible alternatives when measuring social welfare.
To choose among indicators, the following criteria have been suggested.'
The indicator should be exclusive: it should not be replaceable by any
other indicator.
The indicator should be valid.
The indicator should be sensitive.
Changes in the indicator should be conducive to clear interpretation.
I.e., a change of indicator should always measure the same thing.
The indicator should be exact and not contain error.
These are all acceptable technical requirements. Niitamo and Hjerppe-
Niitamo (1971: Annex 2) give some additional quasi-technical requirements,
some of which are to some extent questionable:
Instrumentality (this is also mentioned in Kamrany—Christakis 1970:
209). This means that the indicator should be open to manipulation
by public authorities. This is in my opinion an erroneous assumption.
There are numerous circumstances in our society which are not avail-
able to control by public authorities, but which nonetheless constitute
an important part of the social reality to be rescribed. This is especially
applicable for many institutions which deeply affect men's lives. In
a deeper, theoretical sense, this requirement is obviously possible only
in the case where all relevant aspects of the functioning of society are
subject to change by some conscious activity. This is as yet impossible.3
1 See Kamrany— Christakis (1970), who also speak of autonomous indicators, by which they
mean regional indicators.
2 See e.g., Baudot (1969: 49— 50), Niitamo (1971: 15-16), Hjerppe—Niitamo (1971: Annex 2),
Biderman (1966a: 80).
3 Etzioni (1971: 11-12) has also emphasized the necessity that the variables used be »malle-
able» and »moveable». For instance a variable such as sex, which is not easily affected, should
not interest the policy scientist. To this a reviewer of Etzioni's paper remarked: »So, if women
are up in arms about discrimination by sex, we mustn't tell policy-makers about it because
sex can't be changed?» Etzioni concedes that certain invariable situations are occasionally
of interest to policy-makers, but does not take into consideration the central point mentioned
above: non-malleable variables are, for policy purposes, equally interesting, and sometimes
even more interesting than malleable variables. This is exactly why weather forecasting is
so important for everybody. When Etzioni remarks that »The waste of considerable energy
COMMENTATIONES SCIENTIARUM SOCIALIUM 4
	 191
7. Quantifiability is another »technical» requirement which is relatively
suspect. We should also be aware of other than quantifiable variables,
which requires that we describe them in some other terms. I shall return
to the problem of quantifying in the concluding chapter.'
8.5.3. The Relationship Between Social and Level of Living Indicators
Drewnowski (1971: 85-86) has suggested that the connection between
level of living and social indicators is as follows. There are four types of
indicators:
flow of welfare indicators,
state of welfare indicators,
welfare-effect indicators (i.e., »ratios of the movement of welfare flow
indicators to the movements of economic resources which were or can
be used in order to generate that welfare>>), and
productivity-effect indicators (these are inverse to the welfare-effect
indicators: they express how a given flow of welfare affects a certain
type of economic activity).
The flow of welfare indicators thus form the basic category and all
other indicators are derived from them. This makes it necessary, according
to Drewnowski, that level of living indicators should be elaborated first.
More appropriate than to speak of categories three and four as indi-
cators would be to speak of them as relationships, and note that the Drew-
nowski's scheme actually describes the relationships between welfare and
social and economic activity. This is precisely the problem of a theory of
the level of living, or that of the social welfare function.
A sensible social indicator theory would start from a theory of social
welfare (or a conception of social welfare) but be nonetheless anchored in
a descriptive model of society (see figure 8.5.b).
Hence, it should be obvious that developments in the field of social
indicators are partly linked to the level of living approach and partly to
more general theories of society, depending on the interests of the devel-
oper. This has also occurred on the practical level.
Thus we could define social indicators as the operationalized variables
of some given theory of society (specifically of the theory of the structure
on challenging windmills rather than fuelling change is one of the key characteristics of
liberal elites and radical movements», his attitude can be called simplistic reformatory, or
opportunistic. It has nothing to do with social criticism in the sense Etzioni himself speaks
of it.
1 About the purely technical questions of constructing indicators see Baudot (1969), Drew-
nowski (1968b, 1970), Johansson (1970) and Moser (1969). This aspect will not be taken
up at this time.
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a theory about social welfare
the indicators of welfare
social indicators
a model of social activity
Fig. 8.5.b
and functioning of the society). In this way, social indicators must be
considered to be a wider concept than the indicators of the level of living,
which are the operationalized variables of some given concept (or theory)
of social welfare. But their connection would be clear: level of living and
welfare indicators are included as the central social indicators, and the
subsequent relationships of the social indicators (or theory of society)
would in actual fact be explicated in the social welfare function based on
this theory.
It is worth noting that the development of social indicators, although
begun from a completely or nearly atheoretical basis (lacking, at least,
an explicit theory), has resulted in component-type classifications. Thus
in Toward a Social Report (1969: xivxx), for instance, the following ))com-
ponents)) are mentioned: health and illness, social mobility, physical en-
vironments, income and poverty, public order and safety, learning, science
and art, as well as participation and alienation. These components obvi-
ously express the classifications of social problems in the United States
and little else. This is however, a classification of social needs, but in a
very superficial manner. An even more inadequate classification is that
of the French Commissariat du Plan:
demographic, health and family component
education
employment and social mobility
standard of living and level of consumption (ECE: French Experience
1969: 4). In other words, the result is components which are largely
useless, as they are constructed without clear criteria in mind.
There exists no innate development towards theory in social indicators
research (nor in level of living research). It is obvious however, that a
-›
J
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theory is necessary for two major reasons. First, without a theoretical
foundation it is impossible to discriminate between indicators which are
important and those which are not.' Indicators in particular, must be
connected with the central concepts of a theory.
Secondly, without a theory (of welfare and social activity) the relation-
ships between indicators are completely arbitrary. This is especially appli-
cable for the relationships of ends and means, if we look at the matter
from the decision-maker's point of view (Baudot 1969: 52-53, Gross
1966: 162, Niitamo 1971: 3, Allardt 1972).
Thus it should be very clear that a theory of welfare and its connections
to society is urgent. But this is not merely a question of »theory», in an
abstract sense. What the present situation demands is a context in which
all the innumerable variables we observe could be somehow combined.
For the conscious direction of society this is an absolute necessity, although
in itself insufficient. Even the best of theories is little more than a card-
board dragon, if it lacks conditions which allow for its use in implementing
the goals of welfare research and social indicators: the welfare of the mem-
bers of society.
8.6. The Level of Welfare: New Developments
The SNC which was analyzed above is not beyond criticism. In a well-
developed form, it is rather restricted and does not envelop an amply
broad area. Even its foremost developer, Drewnowski, has admitted that
the SNC is not highly acceptable.2
If we consider needs as isolated entities, irrespective of how they are
formed and how they are related to one another, the resulting definitions
and theories are rather meager. To be able to analyze welfare from the
point of view of social policy, it is not enough to limit oneself to the simple
categories of needs which should be considered.
It is obvious that the SNC approach has gained ground due to its
conceptual simplicity and propensity for international comparison (to
compare systems of the level of living is well-nigh impossible). It seems
that when operational requirements win, theory loses; i.e., the relationship
between theory and practice has been improperly balanced.
1 See Biderman (1966a: 84); I might point out, on the other hand, that we are always equipped
with an implicit theory which enables us to choose, and that these choices depend on some
conception of reality.
2 *The social variables that are to be measured refer to the satisfaction of the needs of popu-
lation. It must be admitted that such a concept of welfare is rather narrow. It leaves out
many aspects of the social situation. Some are not liable to numerical expression in the pres-
ent state of our knowledge» (Drewnowski 1970: 77).
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Already in the classic works (with respect to level of living theory)
of Hugo Pipping, there are arguments for a concept of the level of living,
in which the systemic »sociological* aspects would also be considered (Pip-
ping 1935: 138, 1953: 74; see also Salavuo 1968: 9-10).
Recently, criticisms against the Drewnowski approach have produced
some »constructive» new suggestions for the definition of the level of living.
One of these new alternatives, or complements, has been developed by
Drewnowski himself (Drewnowski 1970).
Another has been suggested by the UN secretariat in the report »Social
policy and the distribution of income in the nation* (1969: 2-3), in which
four groups of indicators are suggested:
the »natural» indicators of level of living conditions related to the com-
ponents of health, education, housing, etc.;
the monetary indicators of total and disposable income and wealth;
the total goods and services supplied by public authorities, non-profit
private organizations and other groups; and
the total goods of services received and utilized.
This proposal, although it does not make specifications concerning
indicator relations, considerably broadens the scope of the level of living.
In particular, the consideration of collective goods as a specific group is
an important point which has also been emphasized by, for instance,
Gorz (1971: 96-97), who notes that the development of society leads to
certain patterns of consumption and to the elimination of what previously
was a collective good. For this reason, collective goods should be regarded
specifically.
Titmuss (1969) and Johansson (1970: 24) have suggested that the SNC
pictures man as a consumer, as a passive receiver. Opposed to this, Tit-
muss and Johansson present a definition of man as an actor and user
of resources. Such a stand is, in other words, a plea for components which
reflect the resources of man: his activities. In fact, Johansson has aban-
doned needs as a basis for the level of living, and endeavors to found his
research totally on resources.' His definition of the level of living is as
follows:
»Level of living is the possibility of the individual to use those resources
(money, ownership, knowledge, psychical and physical energy, social
relationships, security) with which he can control and consciously direct
his life condition* (Johansson 1970: 25). Here we see that the »resource»
concept of Johansson is rather encompassing: in normal language one
1 In their paper on the dimensions of welfare, Allardt and Uusitalo (1972) have considered
the resource approach to be the more restricted approach to welfare, whereas the SNC ap-
proach has been considered of a broader capacity. This is true if we restrict ourselves to
resources alone, as Johansson suggests.
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would not generally refer to security as a resource. Apparently then, what
Johansson is up to is to define a concept of the level of living which is,
in truth, a mixture of needs and resources.




Conditions for growing up and family relations
Education
Employment and conditions of work
Economic resources
Political resources
9. Leisure and recreation (ibid. : 32-37).
Of these components, health is for Johansson the most important and
one which he obviously identifies with well-being in a restricted sense.
The central additions are clearly components 4, 7, and 8. It is obvious
that the component of family relations and the conditions of growing up
is not conducive to simple operationalization. Johansson apparently con-
ceives of some sort of scale of >>familial compatibility>> in addition to the
historical aspect of an individual's level of living, but these are extremely
difficult to chart.
The component of economic resources is by far the most pertinent
addition. At this time, I will discuss the problem of resources in general,
as Johansson's proposal has been accepted whole-heartedly by some writ-
ers as an entirely »new» approach to the measurement of well-being (see
Hjerppe—Niitamo 1971).1
I have already in passing mentioned the problem of resources, or the
means to satisfy needs. In practice it is immensely difficult to separate
needs and resources and the measurement of a need — in the abstract,
not in terms of existing means of satisfaction: the objects of need — is
certainly difficult if not impossible. In this sense then, we are actually
speaking of resources. For clarification, we should inquire, what is a re-
source? It might be defined as anything which can be used, directly or
indirectly to obtain anything. 2 This is a very general definition. We might
recall however the definition of needs presented in chapter five, where
they were said to be the motive for human action, the goal of which was
welfare. Therefore the object of a need (a concept on the same level as
resource) is anything which can be used to affect one's welfare positively.
It can be seen that resource is not always an object of need, but an object
1 The present author has suggested rudiments of such a concept in his monograph Welfare
as an Objective of Social Policy (1968).
2 For a slightly different definition, see Allardt and Uusitalo (1972: 3).
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of need, on the other hand, is always a resource. But if we define a »pure»
resource as a resource which cannot be used directly to fulfill a need (e.g.,
money), and a ))pure» need object as something which is directly connected
with a need (say a loaf of bread to be eaten immediately) we may construct
the following continuum:
pure resources	 needs-resources 	 pure needs
From this we see that to emphasize needs or to emphasize resources leads
actually to the selection of only slightly different items.
It is therefore difficult to accept the introduction of the resources con-
cept as a substitute for needs as a »revolutionary» measure in welfare
analysis (see Johansson 1970, Titmuss 1958, Hjerppe—Niitamo 1971).
According to Johansson, the following problems arise with the concept
of needs satisfaction:
the determination of the needs to be satisfied:
the means by which they are to be satisfied:
3. when can needs be considered to be satisfied.
It is possible to surmount these obstacles, according to Johansson,
two ways:
by starting from the conceptions of the individual, or by
constructing a list of the fundamental human needs on the basis of some
theory of social science or moral philosophy (Johansson 1970: 26).
According to Johansson, both approaches lead to difficulties: the first,
because men are not reliable, and the second because differentiation and
comparison are difficult. It is easiest to criticize Johansson's position on
the basis of the fact that his alternatives are in no way separable. Both.
individual conceptions and »scientific theories» depend upon social pro-
cesses, upon certain paradigms. As it is not possible to separate an atheor-
etical and a theoretical approach, the only question is of who interprets
the theories, and the practice behind them.
Even were we to accept this distinction we are still confronted with
the dilemma, due to the existence of the needs-resources continuum, that
the same problems should apply to resources as well as needs: i.e., the
questions of which resources are »needed», how to satisfy the resources,
and how to determine when they are satisfied. This does not, however,
dispose of the problem noted by Johansson: if any individual has a large
amount of resources he may employ them to fulfill many different needs.
Therefore to specify needs in this case would be futile (Johansson 1970: 27,
see also Hjerppe—Niitamo 1971).
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In other words, Johansson assumes a practically limitless complex —
a proliferation — of needs. On the other hand we would refer to the axiom
that needs are socially determined: in any specific society or social for-
mation there is a relatively restricted amount of legitimate ways to satisfy
needs. As a possession of a large amount of some resource enables one to
exchange it for other, it is obvious that we are still faced with the same
problem. Fundamentally, the resources approach and the needs approach
cannot therefore be separated.'
One final advantage of needs over resources (should we have to choose
between them, which, in my opinion, is not at all necessary) is that in
resources we are again faced with the dilemma of needs versus wants,
i.e., of the nature of the use of resources. Not all ways of using resources
are beneficial from the point of view of human welfare.
Another difficult point is the problem of collective and individual
goods: i.e., whether or not needs are satisfied individually. Whenever
society progresses in the direction of collective needs satisfaction, the
distinction between resources and needs becomes hazy. But if we are
interested in pure resources which cannot be >>eaten», such as money, it is
obvious that the resource approach results in the choice of providing people
with money instead of free food, housing, education, health services, etc.
This is probably something which neither Johansson nor Hjerppe and
Niitamo would wish — a classical Friedman-type solution.2
The fundamental advantage of introducing resources is precisely the
reason why Titmuss proposed their use in his analysis: they provide a con-
nection between well-being, social activity and material production.
Resources are directly created through social activity, while needs, in non-
Marxist analysis, are something innate. But when this conception is dis-
posed of, the contradiction, or distinction, between needs and resources
disappears.
8.7. The Marxist Approach to the Level of Living3
In the present monograph, I have not previously referred to any Marxist
definitions of the level of living concept. There is however, a clear Marxist
See also Hjerppe and Niitamo's list of the resources they propose to use, namely economic,
information (education), environmental safety and power goods (Hjerppe —Niitamo 1971: 5);
this cannot be distinguished to any great degree from any sensible list of needs, but we have
the advantage of having an idea of the relationships between the various needs.
2 But which is, for instance, suggested by Lars SOderstrOm in his book Là ginkomstproblemet
(1972a).
3 This section is of relatively early origin. After it was written, a sundry of new books and artic-
les have become available about the socialist concept of the level of living. These corroborate
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tradition, and very recently there has been an upsurge of interest in this
concept. Already Marx, in the first volume of Capital, devoted a great
deal of space to a detailed analysis of the living conditions of workers
(Marx 1967a) especially housing and conditions of work. Even earlier
Engels had written a classic work on the condition of the English working
class, which covered systematically most of the components of the level
of living referred to earlier.1
The specific analysis of the concept of level of living and its devel-
opment has not been very common among Marxist writers. Yet, there
have been some ventures in this area, such as the Budapest conference
on the standard of living (see Mod 1962) which contains some thought-
provoking ideas about the nature of the standard of living. Also, as is
well known, the famous fundamental economic law of socialism, according
to which the main objective of socialism is the fulfillment of the needs of
the members of society, has been described in Soviet five-year plans as
the raising of the peoples's living standard. Essentially this has been con-
sidered a very straightforward and practical matter, related on the one
hand, to real incomes, i.e., private consumption, and on the other hand
to societal consumption funds, i.e., collective consumption (Zlomanov-
Mihejeva 1971: 16-17; but see Fedorenko 1972).
In a sense we are dealing with a definition of the level of living similar
to that of Johansson (1970): economic resources form one component as
do societal consumption funds (which, as is well known, are allocations for
sickness benefits, housing, and so on). In the explicit definition of the level
of living (lebensstandard) of the WOrterbuch der marxistisch-leninisti-
schen Soziologie (1969: 266) this view is confirmed: The level of living is the
*gesamtheit der Lebensbedingungen der BevOlkerung einer gegebenen
Gesellschaft oder Gruppen von Menschen. Zum Lebensstandard gehOren.
Niveau, Umfang und Art der Befriedigung der materiellen und ideellen
Bediirfnisse sowie die politischen Lebensbedingungen. Dabei sind folgende
Gruppen von Faktoren (in my terminology, components) bestimmend:
Realeinkommen, Sicherheit des Arbeitsplatzes, Arbeitsbedingungen (wie
in many ways what is said here, but on the other hand it would now be possible to present
a much more detailed and complete picture of the Marxist approach to the level of living.
This would, however, affect much of what follows as well. Thus I have decided to bypass it
for the time being, and will give it extensive treatment in connection with a comprehensive
analysis of the planning of the level of living and welfare under socialism which is to be
included in a larger study of social planning on which I am presently working. The most
important of the more recent literature includes: Aganbegjan—Waltuch (1972), Fedorenko
(1972), Soviet Economic Reform (1972), Manz (1972), and Waltuch (1972). See also Roos
(1972b).
I- Engels (1972); the first edition was published in 1845, when Engels was twenty-four, see
also Manz 1972: 12-13.
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länge des Arbeitstages, Unfallschutz), soziale Unterstiitzung bei Krankheit
und im Alter (System der Sozial- und Krankenversicherung), Bildungs-
system, materielle und ideelle Unterstutzung bei der Erziehung der Kinder.
Per Lebenstandard, sein Niveau und seine Entwicklungsrichtung sind
massgeblich durch den Entwicklungstand der Produktivkräfte und den
Charakter der Produktionsverhältnisse bestimmt.>>
In other words, the earlier-mentioned components of Johansson and
Drewnowski have reappeared in a slightly different form. However, it is
emphasized that through changes in components and in emphasis, it is
possible to alter the concept of the level of living to become appropriate,
as they say, *seine besondere Eignung fur die Apologetik des imperialisti-
schen Systems durch biirgerliche Ideologen*.
What is *new*, is their emphasis of the necessity that the level of living
depends upon the state of development of the productive forces and the
nature of the production relations. This is of course consistent with the
Marxist view. But the indispensability of relating the level of living to
social reality should be apparent to everybody.
It seems appropriate to note that while the content of the level of living
in socialist and capitalist countries certainly differs, the form of the more
developed definitions in capitalist countries is approximately equivalent
to the principle definitions in socialist countries.
8.8. The »Systemic)) Approach to Welfare Measurement
I have mentioned above several approaches which contain improvements
upon the original SNC approach; they complement its characteristics in
an important way. However, they still fail to necessitate the analysis of
the relationships between the components of the level of living — in other
words, the systemic aspect of the level of living (except the Marxist con-
ception; see Manz 1972). It is clear that the components of any of the above-
mentioned concepts of the level of living are not independent. They form
a closely related complex of factors which largely determine man's well-
being. A change in one component necessarily affects other components
in a significant way. It is therefore urgent to try to chart these relation-
ships. This is, however, only a first stage: to complete the approach we
must seek to determine the most important factors affecting the level of
living.' In the following passages I will examine both approaches as well
1 Drewnowski (1968b) has suggested precisely this when he proposes that first we should
analyze the feedback effect of the level of living to the society, social production; and secondly,
that we should analyze and develop the welfare generation function, i.e., a function of the
generation of welfare through social processes. This is exactly what construction of relation-
ships between the components and their social factors implies.
200	 J. P. Roos, Welfare Theory and Social Policy
as the few attempts to construct such concepts of the level of living. But
this extends so far from the original SNC definition of the level of living,
that it is perhaps appropriate to call it by a new name. In the spirit of the
Drewnowski improvement, we might refer to it as a level of welfare concept
(LWC) by which is meant a concept which encompasses, as completely as
possible, all aspects which belong to human social welfare, as well as all
the relationships between these aspects. It is this LWC that I will then
attempt to relate to social reality.
A recent definition by Drewnowski (1970) which points toward my line
of development, perhaps provides a cogent example as well as an intro-
duction to this concept. In this suggestion, which is intended to comple-
ment his previous SNC approach, Drewnowski distinguishes between a level
of living (flow of welfare), and the level of welfare, which is the stock of
welfare. The relationships between these two concepts are analogous to
those between the integral and its derivative (ibid.: 77-78). The following
three basic aspects are considered parts of the level of welfare by Drew-
nowski:
somatic status (the condition of the bodies of the members of the popo-
lation)
cultural status (the state of the development of the mental capacities
of the members of the population)
3. social status (the integration and participation of individuals).
In the words of Drewnowski: The three level of welfare components'
refer to the state of human body, human mind and the comfort resulting
from attitudes towards other people and the society. They are supposed
to cover between them all the main aspects of the state of human welfare.
which can be observed at any given moment* (ibid.: 94).
In a sense then, Drewnowski proposes a healthy spirit in a healthy body
in a healthy society principle, seen however very mechanically. This mech-
anistic view is also evident in Drewnowski's previous approaches. What
this approach has to offer however, is the introduction of the social struc-
ture as an explicit aspect of the level of living. This is missing from all
other approaches, except from that of Pipping. But Drewnowski's way
of accounting for the social structure is extremely simplicistic, which is
to say unrealistic. The structure of society cannot form a special component
or group of components, but must provide the entire framework for the
analysis. It should be expressed in the relationships between the compo-
nents, and in the relationships between the properties of the society and
the components of level of living, in a systems view of these components.
1 If component is to be used as a technical term, it is inappropriate to refer to the parts of
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To begin with, the above approaches have shown that there are, in
fact, three types of components (I am disregarding dimensions for the
time being):
Pure resource components such as income, wealth, political and econ-
omic power and employment. These are not necessities as such, but
only as a means to some ends.'
Components which are both resources and at the same time fulfill
some needs: this goes for most of the components mentioned above,
such as education, participation, etc.
3. Pure need components, which are resources only marginally, as a
reflection of the fact that some degree of fulfillment is necessary for
the adequate functioning of man. Such components are the conditions
of work, leisure, housing, nutrition, and health. All of these compo-
nents are primarily needs components. It is obvious that living accom-
modations form a resource in the sense that without it, work is impos-
sible. After this dichotomous case, a place to live is centrally to fulfill
man's need for shelter and security, and little else.
We may therefore speak of the LWC as a multi-level concept, in which
all components are not of the same level. In other words, we are concerned
with a rather complicated relationship. The general relationship between
resources, needs-resources, and needs components can be illustrated by
the following (Fig. 8.8.a):
Changes in needs components feed back to resources, but not directly.
This occurs through a regulator element which may, at this level, be called
the asocial systems.
To put it another way, the functioning of the social processes depends
on how the fulfillment of needs affects the resources available to the mem-
I Although some may claim that power is desired for its own sake, which may be true, for
the majority, the need for power, per se, represents nothing of value.
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bers of the society. This implies that to analyze the relationships between
resources and needs, we need a theory of society — a theory of social
processes (in the Marxist definition, this is specified as an analysis of the
productive forces and the production relations).
In essence we have now travelled a full circle, or rather, a spiral. From
the welfare function, which was rejected in its welfare economic formula-
tion, we have reformulated the SNC and emerged with what is essentially
a welfare function, but now on a much higher level, as an attempt to truly
specify the form and content of welfare. This is not, of course, the place
to begin to make any conclusive proposals (it would require much empirical
material), but I can indicate some of the most interesting implications
and their possible resolutions.
The LWC-type social welfare function should combine the advantages
of the previous attempts at defining a welfare function with the advantages
of the level of living approach, which offers us the essential components
of the well-being of man. As the economic welfare function was left com-
pletely unspecified, now it is time to attempt the most central specifi-
cations.
From the point of view of social policy, the construction of a social
welfare function of this type is certainly not an irrelevant matter. As I
have previously noted, the social welfare function must not replace politics
by any means: it should be a reliable tool of social policy as politics — as
democratic decision-making. And it can only express a part of well-being
in any case: the subjective activities of man — his creative, conscious activi-
ties — are only very indirectly reflected in the social welfare function, and
justly so. There is no reason to replace man's political and social activities
with their measurement, except only as an external indicator, or even
better, with scientific analysis as an aid to the consciousness of man.
The interdependence of the components of the LWC is rather generally
acknowledged. Also the social processes that affect the level of living are
often mentioned. But there have been few attempts at developing theories
which would comprehend such matters.
Here I shall examine some relationships between components of the
level of welfare. With this in mind, I shall employ the following list of
components:
Economic resources and economic power
»Political>> resources, or the ability to participate in political decision-











Nutrition and eating habits
11. Health
I have attempted to construct a hierarchy ranging from the most pure
resource component to a pure need component (the purest of which is
survival). It is obvious that in order to have a truly realistic model of the
relationships these components should be extensively subdivided, but for
the present purposes of preliminary analysis, these will do.
In formulating this list I have utilized previous component classifi-
cations, especially those of Drewnowski and Johansson. Some comments
concerning the other components are in order. The component of economic
resources and power is not easy to define. It seems justified, however,
to separate economic power from political resources, as there is an obvious
causal connection. Generally we might say that the economic power of
most individuals approaches zero as does that of some social groups. Most
people have some economic resources which are significant to their own
welfare. The resources which are no longer directly relevant to their wel-
fare could be termed economic power. The component of participation is
closely connected with economic resources but not totally, as education,
for instance, is also a relevant factor. By employment is meant, as in the
original level of living definition, primarily the question of whether a
person is unemployed or not, but it also includes situations of partial employ-
ment, being a housewife, and so on. By family conditions is meant such
factors as the number of children in the family, the nature of the familial
unit (is it stable or not), and the conditions affecting the maturation process
within the family. By conditions of work, I mean elements such as the
nature of the work, the length of the working day, the conditions at the
place of employment, and so on. The rest of the components have been
commented up on earlier.
In table 8.8.1, I have presented the general relationships between the
components.
I have not excluded two-way relationships, although I am not, for the
present, explicitly considering dynamic aspects. The central component
is that of economic resources, a fluctuation in which has repercussions for
almost all of the components, with feedback from some of them. There
are also many indirect relationships which can best be seen in the figure
8.8.b.
It should be noted that health, which in principle signifies the survival
component, ultimately affects all the remaining components: if a person
dies, it is irrelevant to speak of welfare. The same applies to nutrition.
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Fig. 8.8.b
In the table, I have described the relationships in the case of smaller
changes.
The relationships indicated in the table and in the figure are, of course,
perfectly arbitrary. We only assume their existence. But they form a basis
for a more developed theoretical approach to the problem. From these
we can try to develop either simple econometric models for welfare analysis,
or then more complicated dynamic models.
To summarize, welfare is a three-level concept.' At the first level we
have relatively pure resource components such as economic resources and
participation. They cannot, however, be described as exogenous variables,
but as variables which are only indirectly related to the central aspects
of welfare. In my opinion, they do, however, belong to welfare in a broad,
but meaningful sense.
At the second level are such intermediate components as family con-
ditions, work, and employment, which are connected both directly with
the central aspects of welfare, and with resource aspects. At the third
level we have health and those components most immediately associated
with it, namely nutrition, housing and leisure. Thus we might say that
the nucleus of welfare is health (in a very broad sense), but that health
alone does not determine welfare.
As I have emphasized earlier, it is only the totality of human actions
that can constitute welfare; to restrict welfare to some single aspects of
human activity, is to lose grasp of its essential nature.
1 This is connected with Uusitalo's idea (Allardt—Uusitalo (1972)) that the components of
the level of living are at different distances from welfare. But he is operating with a very
restricted conception of welfare. This is, of course, only a matter of opinion: one can ask,
however, what exactly is welfare when leisure, health, etc., are not?
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Technically speaking, this scheme is not practicable for any pragmatic
purposes. Only after the decomposition of the components, the specifi-
cation of the relationships through time, and the determination of the
nature of the relationships could we build an exact model of welfare. This
is not, however, undertaken here. 1 One can think of the scheme in a more
elementary systems analysis sense, as the specification of relationships
between a set of black boxes, or subsystems, each having more than one
variable and their own internal relationships.
It should be noted that with the exception of one relationship (that
between economic resources and environmental quality), all the relation-
ships are considered positive. This is, however, only superficially so. If we
impose the necessary constraints on the resource components and their
relationships, this will result in a model in which a positive change in one
component may well result in a negative feedback in the same and also
other components. The nature of these restrictions depends upon whether
we work at the micro- or macro-level, or at both.
An alternative to the welfare function approach, in the above sense,
is the methodology of input-output analysis. Especially with respect to
practical applicability, this approach seems to be highly fruitful. However,
the practical results would probably not differ greatly. In the input-output
methods, information is obtained concerning the relationships between
different sorts of welfare inputs and outputs, on the basis of which we are
able to determine what sorts of inputs should be employed to get the
desired outputs. In the welfare function approach we would primarily
seek information about the structure of welfare in a deeper sense. Most
of the results, however, would be the same.
Niitamo (1971b) 1 has also cautioned researchers against too Wavish>>
an acceptance of the normal input-output approaches of national account-
ing systems. His suggestion is that we should not try to express all the
components of the input-output table in equivalent values, but allow them
to be expressed in their own #currency. Only then can we avoid the ex-
tremely arbitrary solutions of a wider national accounting system.
The use of input-output models presents the same advantages as the
use of econometric welfare function analyses: there exist ready-made,
applicable methods of analysis which seem conducive to application with-
out greatly sacrificing the principles of welfare themselves.
It has also the same disadvantages, although the use of lagged variables
is possible, and the analysis of lags is relevant, as its coefficients are static.
See my forthcoming paper on »The level of welfare function,>.
2 See also Lange (1970), who has briefly presented some of the implications of the input-
output approach to the study of total welfare.
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We must thus assume (or develop) a fixed model of the relationships of
welfare, thus eliminating the dynamic element with respect to coefficients.
Yet it seems that, because the existing accounting systems predomi-
nantly apply methods of input-output analysis, that this method will
similarly be used when developing the necessary accounting systems for
welfare. This will undoubtedly in many ways produce interesting results.
I shall however, for the time being, proceed directly to some broader
perspectives of the »systemic» analysis of welfare.
9. Welfare Policy : Problems of Welfare, Politics and Science
9.1. The Problem of Social Control
The entire analysis of this chapter can be termed, as I have done, a study
in welfare policy>>. By welfare policy I am referring to the problem of
how, in what way, and by whom is social welfare to be defined and realized
in society. Thus welfare policy constitutes an essential part of social policies
in general; essential in the sense that without it, no social policies would
prevail.
The nucleus of welfare policy is the analysis of the relationship of wel-
fare to actual social policy. This is closely related to the problem of how
social welfare shall be determined: in essence, they are actually the same
question. In the former we emphasize vractical* aspects, while in the latter
the >>theoretical>> aspects are stressed. But as we shall see, they cannot be
separated: social welfare is essentially a practical problem, thus a political
problem.
In the preceding chapters I have examined the following main types
of approaches to social welfare:
First, the attempt to determine changes of social welfare objectively,
but in a restricted sense, as changes about which there is unanimity.
Yet the approach itself was deductive, rather than inductive, and was
not based upon actual knowledge of unanimity, but only on simplified
assumptions about the behavior of men.
Second, an attempt to derive a system of rules under which men could
consistently determine what is advantageous to social welfare. This
approach assumed nothing more than knowledge about the preference
orderings of individuals, and in a sense was inverse to all the tech-
nocratic attempts: it proved the impossibility of reaching agreement
about social welfare under certain specific conditions.
Third, to find empirically the variables which could approximate
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social welfare most accurately, and thus be able to determine changes
and the nature of social welfare in societies.
The factor common to these approaches has been their universal assump-
tion of the following premises:
The goal of public policy-makers is the welfare of the people, for whom,
and instead of whom they make their decisions.
The information and advice provided the policy-makers, is given in
the interests of the people.
3. The people are external to all of this, acting as an object rather than as
a subject, the welfare of which is to be measured externally.
In sum, all these measures have overly abstracted the problem of how
to develop models which would account for the interaction between #scien-
tific# analysis of welfare and social welfare, as a process of social activity;
in other words, as praxis.
The consideration of praxis is laced with problems, among the most
central of which is the question of in what way needs are to be fulfilled.
As Andre Gorz (and many others) has shown, capitalist society causes
whole groups of needs to disappear only to be resurrected as needs only
capable of fulfillment through private activity. Thus fresh air, which is,
in most cases, still a collective good available to all, is rapidly becoming
a marketable good, a good which must be bought privately.' There are no
channels through which people could demand collective needs fulfillment
for certain needs; their only alternative is to submit to market mechanisms
and purchase what they want. Thus measures of welfare which ignore this
distinction — considering individually bought welfare components as
equally as satisfactory as collective welfare components — ignore a very
pertinent aspect of the political praxis.
But to be able to discuss more deeply these problems we must first go
into the question of social control. We need to formulate the obvious
questions: What is actually meant by social control? How is it related to
welfare?
In the second chapter, we observed that the essential quality of policy
was its conscious nature — a quality which is also central in control. But
control is, of course, significantly more comprehensive than policy. Policy
might be interpreted as a process through which we attempt to adapt
ourselves to some uncontrollable force: one can thus conceive of emergency
policies. However, to be able to control a situation is something else entirely.
1 In a package deal along with holiday resorts, outings, and so on; see Gorz (1971: 96 — 98):
»The individual has a certain degree of opportunity to some day, perhaps, have a washing
machine, his own car, and the necessary pay increase, but he has no chances at all to procure
public transportation, public parks within ten minutes of his home, or even an acceptable
apartment at market prices».
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»Adequate» control is the natural aim of policy. Our aim is to find such
policies which make control possible. In every society, control is an inherent
factor (Afanasyev 1971: 32), but both the forms and the nature of control
may differ greatly.
It should be firmly emphasized that complete, conscious social control
is not, by any means, possible (nor, perhaps, even desirable) in any of the
existing societies of today. To believe otherwise presumes acceptance of
the fallacy of power, which is particularly evident in the writings of the
more zealous protagonists of planning and policy sciences in the capitalist
countries. Their fundamental idea seems to be that control, although
presently impossible, can be achieved through the razing of some minor
barriers, which might occur through changes in attitudes or values.'
Neither are socialist societies completely »controllable». As some Marxist
theorists have indicated, there are many areas of a socialist society not
yet subjected to conscious control (see Glezerman 1969: 13-17).
We can, in some sense, even speak of spontaneous control, such as in
perfect market, where the results of human activities are ultimately deter-
mined by blind forces beyond the control of the actors themselves. There
are also many who find this kind of control appealing — the »invisible
hand» being to them more efficient and just than any of human design
(see for instance Hayek 1935, Dahrendorf 1968). But if we wish to analyze
the problem of control as a subject-object problem — that is, as a prob-
lem of who can control and what — we are in the realm of conscious social
control. And it is with this phenomenon that I am primarily concerned in
this paper (see also Afanasyev 1971: 35-36).
The main argument of those who advocate spontaneous control is
based on the premise that, in general, control is the anathema of freedom.
Control negates freedom, and vice versa. This is, however, a stale contro-
versy. If we define freedom in the positive sense (see above, chapter 4)
it should be apparent that freedom is essentially identical with control,
or with a certain type of control, namely that of conscious social control
by the members of society themselves. A situation in which the human
objects of control are also subjects of control is one of positive freedom.
Clearly much of this control is actually the control of other than human
objects, and some feel that all control should ultimately be that of objects
other than human.
Usually control is understood as bureaucratic control: the control of
one body over another; control from the top down (see Mills 1959: 116,
See for instance Dror (1968: 287) and Kahn (1969: 28, 51); Toffler (1971) has a more pessi-
mistic general view, but in the end he succumbs to the same optimism, seeing good omens
in the behavior of some private funds and foundations, etc. See also Roos (1972a) for further
discussion.
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Toffler 1971: 427). But there are other possibilities as to the forms and
nature of control. We can speak of control from the bottom up, i.e., control
of the controllers by the controlled. But even this implies a detachment of
the subjects from the objects of control. The ultimate ideal of control
would be the control of the people by themselves. Men should be able to
control themselves, control their society by themselves — a total negation
of bureaucatic control, in fact, of the classical conception of control (Mills
1959, Ahmavaara 1970: 162).
In Marx' and Engels' descriptions of the communist society (Marx—
Engels 1970; see also Bukharin 1969, Bukharin—Preobrazhensky 1969)
we can distinguish rather clearly an idea of spontaneous control; i.e.,
a situation in which solely the control of non-human objects is required,
while the control of men is not. This is, of course, a form of spontaneity
different that of the market control. However, it seems obvious that
collective activity requires some forms of control, and that this control
can never be restricted solely to the control of non-human objects, nor to
men as non-human objects, which is clearly the ultimate manifestation of
bureaucratic control.
Existing societies certainly fall rather short of the ideal of collective
self-control by all members of the society. Various combinations of bureau-
cratic control, self-control by the people, control by various Towerfa)
individuals, and so on, are the dominating social structural themes. Some
writers have even suggested that a mixture of control forms constitutes
the best possible situation. 1 It may very well be true that bureaucratic
control is perfectly acceptable and possibly necessary in some areas, but
one thing is clear: there is much to be done to cultivate the self-control of
society by all of its members, including broadening its scope, and imple-
menting this form of control in all situations where it is the best possible
form. And it is clear that especially in situations involving the determination
of welfare, collective self-control of society is in all ways the superior form.?
It should be stressed that conscious social control of any type is not
a simple matter. It depends primarily on the level of development of the
society, and on the control resources at its disposal (Afanasyev 1971: 36,
Mannheim 1940). There are societies where almost any form of conscious
social control is practically impossible, and, on the other hand, societies
in reference to which we can speak of great control capabilities. Etzioni
1 Sen (1970: 200); this does not, of course, require that precisely the amalgamation existing
in the capitalist societies of today would be the ideal.
2 Very subtle distinctions can be made in this respect (see for example, Runciman—Sen
(1970: 225 — 226)). For instance Mannheim (1940), often stresses the necessity of control
over men in terms of control over attitudes, and so on. Thus, in the final analysis he endorses.
a nearly bureaucratic view of control problems, as we shall see.
COMMENTATIONES SCIENTIARUM SOCIALIUM 4
	
211
(1969: 7 — 9) has distinguished the following control characteristics (or
guidance characteristics, which is perhaps a less obtrusive term): the
cybernetic capacities of the society, the power of the society, and the ability
of the society to generate consensus. This enables him to classify types
of societies into four categories according to their control capacities: namely,
the passive society, the active society, the overmanaged society and the
drifting society (ibid.: 24-28). The active society, which is Etzioni's
conception of ideal form of society, has large cybernetic, as well as con-
sensus capacities. Thus consensus would be closely connected with control
in an ideal control situation. It is obvious that consensus is indeed one
requisite, but its realization depends on the means of control available.
The optimal forms of control are certainly not possible in a society torn
by wide divergencies of interests, and class antagonisms.'
What Etzioni termed as society's consensus capabilities, I am inclined
to rechristen the welfare capabilities of society, in order to analyze the
relationship of welfare and control. It is evident that the ultimate objective
of control must certainly be found in welfare. Thus, in order for control
to be possible, a common conception of welfare in the society must be
determined, and a control form which is compatible with welfare.
One of the most profound questions with respect to control is that of
social welfare. Not all of the problems I have presented above concerning
different forms of control are connected with welfare. Conscious social
control by the people requires a conception of social welfare decidedly
different from that which advocates bureaucratic control. And to achieve
true welfare, only some forms of control can be acceptable.
In the final analysis, we are left with this nuclear problem: how can
the divergent interests of men in any society be reconciled; how can we
'find' social welfare? This is not, of course, the only question to be resolved
for control to become possible, but it is by far the most important. Yet,
it cannot be separated from the solutions of the other problems. Should
we, for instance, decide that bureaucratic control is the ideal means of
control, we must ask: how will the bureaucrats solve the problem of re-
1 In this connection, I should mention the subject of planning. Problems of policy, control
and planning are closely intertwined. Yet as planning is, in a sense, the most vracticak
of this threesome, I have decided to ignore it for the present. Yet, much that I have said
about control and policy applies to planning as well.
The development of planning is essentially the development of the control, or guidance
capabilities of societies. Through an analysis of the development of planning, we can also
see, in the best possible way, the impact of the development of society upon control, and
also upon its analysis. But this will not be endeavored here. See for instance, Gross (1971)
for a brief but expedient presentation; for developments in western planning see Braybrooke —
Lindblom (1963), Friedmann (1967), Kahn (1969), Mannheim (1940), Ozbekhan (1969),
Roos (1972b), Tinbergen (1956), Toffler (1971), Ward (1965), and many others.
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conciling all interests in the society? If, on the other hand, we are concerned
with some forms of conscious control not involving bureaucratic control
(such as self-management), we must ask another set of questions; how
are the people supposed to reach decisions which are in their own best
interests? In what ways can this happen?
These questions can be answered in many different ways. For both
bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic control, there have been many solutions
suggested; for example, the constitutionalist solution and the welfare
function are perhaps polar points on a continuum of such proposals. The
Arrow result, for instance, can be seen primarily as a result denying the
possibility of pure bureaucratic control, i.e., control through a machinery
which automatically fulfills the wishes of the people (but this depends
of course, on whether we accept the conditions of the theorem).
One is also confronted with the very general question: shall we attempt
to control the social and technological processes affecting men's destinies?
Secondary and related to this is the problem: are we concerned with only
that in which men are interested, or are we concerned with that which
is in men's own interests (Mills 1959: 194). In the first case the society will
be the executor of habitual trivialities (as is the capitalist society of today)
and in the latter case, the risk is great that policy-makers and social control
would become instruments of coercion and manipulation.'
These questions are related to the problem of social information, and
determine much of the line of inquiry including questions such as: what
forms of information shall we use, how do we collect information, who
will receive the information, and to what type of analysis will the infor-
mation be subjected?
9.2. Science, Politics, and Policy2
To analyze the relationship between social welfare and societal control,
we must consider the relationship between science and politics, and of
scientific control to political control. Both control and welfare are political
questions: they cannot be solved by 'science' (in the traditional sense)
1 Another phenomenon which is not unknown in the capitalist system: in fact we might
say that capitalist society is an unfortunate combination of both.
2 There is one intricate question to which I have not, as yet, given an answer. This is the
question of the distinction between politic8 and policy. Earlier I >define& policy as the cons-
cious control of social processes, and here I have referred to politics as conscious self-control
by the people. Thus, in accordance with this terminology, politics is a form of policy. Alter-
native forms of policy could be, for instance, bureaucratic control, or more generally, techno-
cratic control. Of course, both these forms of control can exist simultaneously. My proposal
would certainly attach to politics denotations quite removed from the common usage; it is,
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alone. But the role of science in this respect has been given many different
interpretations.
Habermas (1971: 57) has presented this problem in the following succinct
way. He divides societal processes into essentially two parts: technology
and democracy. The former constitutes *scientifically rationalized control
of objectified process*, and the latter, *institutionally secured forms of
general and public communication that deal with the practical question of
how men can and want to live under the objective conditions of their
ever-expanding power of control*. In these terms the problem has been
formulated by Habermas as follows: *How can the power of technical
control be brought within the range of the consensus of acting and trans-
acting citizens?*
Thus, for Habermas technology is roughly the same as a scientized
mode of social management, whereas one could very obviously term his
*democracy* as politics, although it excludes some political forms. It may,
however, be permissible to prescribe some initial requirements to dis-
tinguish between >>true* politics, and mere manipulation, or totalitarianism,
etc. Thus we might rephrase the Habermas inquiry as one of how to procure
scientific technology under political control. But this is not quite in accord
with the more traditional conception of the problem, which I shall examine
first.
One of the classical issues of policy-oriented science is that of the sub-
stitutability of politics and science. Lindblom (1968: 5-6), for instance,
asks *can policy-making be analytic and scientific, or does *politics» always
dominate? How far can analysis go in policy-making?>> More often this
question has been framed very implicitly, for the dangers of scientocracy
have been evident to many. But it seems, nonetheless, to be a rather
widely-held opinion among policy scientists and theorists that such a
question is justified, and that almost everything can be adapted from the
realm of politics to that of science in the traditional sense.'
in fact, a reference to a very idealized sense of politics. Everyday, pragmatic politics in
particular, are often somewhat less than an instrument of conscious (although it may cer-
tainly be one of self-) control. Thus my interpretation of policy, as I have noted, is of a gen-
eral strain, and is applicable when analyzing the general problems of welfare policies.
1 Mannheim, in his Ideology and Utopia (1936: 112) speaks about the impossibility of a science
of politics, on the basis that even a hypothetical composite of all the possible sciences that
might constitute the elements of a science of politics would still be lacking something. Later,
however, he proved to be an eminent defender of the scientization of politics (see Mann-
heim 1940: 360— 363), arguing that all political questions will be, in due time, eliminated
from planning, as the result of its democratization. Mannheim's position seems to be that
of a very optimistic technocrat -- an understandable position in a historical situation where
the term »politics» had a rather tarnished reputation (see also Lindblom (1968), Lasswell
(1951), Schoettle (1968: 154), Simon (1966: 18 —19), and Dror (1970: 103), among others).
214	 J. P. Roos, Welfare Theory and Social Policy
According to Habermas (op.cit.: 62— 63), there are essentially two
traditions of social thought. The first of these originates with Hobbes,
Hume and Weber, and defines a strict separation between the experts
and the politicians, entrusting the politicians with the task of determining
ends, and the experts with that of finding the means. Such a distinction
implies a very simple division of labor between politics and science, and
assumes that scientists will refrain from becoming involved in politics.
This tradition essentially denies the concept of policy science (as I have
noted with respect to Weber; see chapter 2). Habermas designates Saint-
Simon and Bacon as the founding fathers of the second tradition (that
which he calls the *technocratic»), which assumed that science could also
be delegated with the role of determining ends, thus effecting the complete
scientization of politics. In this way the above-mentioned policy theorists
can essentially be said to continue this tradition (see also Gusta ysson 1972).
Within this second tradition, there are essentially two main approaches
which should not be confused. The first is that which we could actually
call *Platonian*, referring to Plato's famous conception about the relation-
ship of science to politics (see Plato 1971: 464, 1972). According to this
line of thought, which is implicitly accepted by most policy scientists in
the Drorian vein, politics is always the poorer alternative when compared
to science, and should be replaced by the rule of science and scientist as
soon as possible. The second line of thought is more fully explained below.
It essentially maintains that science and politics should be fused together,
in dialectical unity.
On the other hand, much that I have discussed in the previous chapters,
especially in those concerning welfare economics, has been covered by the
former tradition, that endorsing the strict separation of science from
politics, and of scientists from politicians (see Bergson 1966 for a con-
firmation of this). We have seen the fruitlessness of this tradition very
clearly, through the impotency of its solutions. But I have also discussed
some theories of the other tradition. Now, I shall examine the fundamental
question of the principles underlying the complete scientization of politics
and other possible solutions, and will turn later to the application of these
solutions to problems of welfare.
Habermas proposes a so-called >>pragmatistic model* as his own solution
to the science-politics controversy (see figure 9.2.a; Habermas 1971: 66—
67), in which the separation between the scientist and the politician is
replaced by critical interaction. That is, although we assume that there
will be specialized social scientists and specialized politicians, their relation-
ship is that of critical interaction, in which the scientist reveals to the
politician the faults in his actions, and the politicians similarly criticize
science for its weak response to practical needs. Thus experts are not













sovereign over politicians, nor do politicians dominate over scientists.
This model has been adopted by many thinkers, and I shall scrutinize one
of its versions in relation with the analysis of welfare »policy».1
In my opinion the question itself has been misleadingly framed. One
cannot make a clean separation between science and politics. Some of the
above-mentioned authors did not explicitly distinguish between science
and politics. It is my contention, however, that they examined politics
through the eyes of science; i.e., submitted politics to analysis only on the
conditions of science, without considering the political aspects — self-
control by the people — at all. When Dror (1971a: 37-39), for instance,
considers the barriers to policy science, 2 he is essentially analyzing the prob-
lem with a very clearcut distinction between »politics» and »science*, and
especially between »politicians» and *scientists». Thus a politician is a man
who makes decisions for others, and the aim of policy science is to help
him to make those decisions, starting from the choice of goals and pro-
ceeding to less encompassing decisions. This view is definitely in error.
1 Habermas (1971: 67): »Critical» interaction not only strips the ideologically supported
exercise of power of an unreliable basis of legitimation, but makes it accessible as a whole
to scientifically informed discussion, thereby substantially changing it. Despite the techno-
cratic view, experts have not become sovereign over politicians subjected to the demands
of the facts and left with a purely fictitious power of decision. Nor, despite the implications
of the decisionistic model, does the politician retain a preserve outside of the necessarily
rationalized areas of practice in which practical problems are decided upon as ever by acts
of the will. Rather, reciprocal communication seems possible and necessary, through which
scientific experts advise the decision-makers and politicians consult scientists in accordance
with practical needs.» See also Therborn (1971), Gusta ysson (1971).
2 Meaning the »lack of belief in the ability of science to be of help in the policymaking process»,
which is regarded quasi-mystically as an art monopolized by the »experienced politician and
decision-makers, in which he discerns the threat of scientocracy.
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Dror does not acknowledge the central problem mentioned above, namely
that of how people can manage to control themselves and the development
of their societies in an increasingly complicated world. For Dror it is a
question of how policy makers can control people in a world of increasing
complexity.
Here I have been operating within the context of an extremely gener-
alized concept of politics, speaking of it as a form of control, as the self-
control of people over the society. In Marxist usage, there are clearly two
different conceptions of politics: first, politics as a general process, largely
in the sense that I have used it; and secondly, politics as the expression
of class interests, i.e., as class struggle on the level of the superstructural
sector which I have referred to as public policy-making.'
Politics as a form of class struggle is of course, in existing societies,
an extremely relevant definition, but here I shall concentrate on a more
abstract consideration. The Marxist view holds that politics is equivalent
to science; it is the embodiment of the Marxist conception of science (social
science), as a combination of practical activity and theoretical analysis.
Every political action should be scientific; and every scientific action
should be, and is, political.
Thus, in principle we shall not need any distinction between *scientists»
and »politicians» — nor is it correct to speak of a politician-scientist or
scientist-politician — but simply of a citizen exerting his civil rights and
duties.
Thus the Marxist solution implies that politics (in the sense of self-
control) will increase simultaneously with the development of the role of
science (see Klaus 1971: 30). Only through science is true self-control by the
people possible. That is, through science alone can true politics be realized.
The implications of this view to the analysis of welfare politics and policy
are of primary importance.2
Thus the relationship between politics and science could be formulated
as the following question: How can we scientify politics in such a way that
it is simultaneously the politization of science? The emphasis is, of course,
on the scientific nature of politics, but the practical aspects of science must
not be ignored.
Thus a truly democratic model would deny the need for specialized
*scientists* and *policy-makers*, but would substitute for them a collec-
1 Spirkin cites Lenin's definition of politics: »Politics is participation in the affairs of the
state, direction of the state, the definition of the forms, functions and activities of the state*.
This is thus a very general definition (see also Gramsci (1967: 201, 281); for the general aspect,
see Klaus (1971: 30), Cornforth (1962), and Spirkin (no year: 172-173).
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tivity of people gathering and analyzing information by scientific methods
and making rational collective decisions on the basis of this analysis, thus
being, in reality, a people for itself and not merely a people in itself (para-
phrasing Marx 1963: 172-173, Bukharin 1969: 292 et seq.).
Of course, this model (see fig. 9.2.b) is highly unrealistic. As Gramsci
(1967: 208) remarks, one of the prevalent elements of modern politics is
the existence of the leader and the led, the ruled and the rulers. He contends
that this is not an unavoidable necessity, and emphasizes that we must
strive to realize the reverse situation, but that in any case, we must start
from the reality of this distinction.
My task, it would seem, would be to analyze under what conditions
the problems of social welfare would become problems conducive to solution
by the people, and not for them by the policy-makers and the scientists.
This is not only a question of which forms of decision-making systems are
the best, but also one of the scientific analysis of social welfare.
9.3. Social Information and Control
One of the most important components of control is information. It has
been claimed that information is the main source of power in society.'
Even if one were not to admit this, it is undeniably true that if people
are to control themselves — or if someone intends to control something —
they must have information. Biderman presents a hierarchy of information
sources for the purpose of control in society, in which the highest level
information is simply a well-developed social indicator system, whose
1 Of course there are many alternatives, see Boguslaw (1965: 113-114).
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information has been collected for this specific purpose. More realistic
would be, of course, that all possible levels are in simultaneous use.' Essen-
tially speaking, the level of living and social indicator approaches assumes
that they are the main forms of information for social control in the form
of planning and policy-making. Information about the condition of man
— the welfare of man — is something which is necessary for comprehensive
social control (see Afanasyev 1971: 182, Drewnowski 1971: 83).
The central position allotted to knowledge about the condition of man
can be inferred from the conceptions of what can be done with it. Such
conceptions range from the modest goal of determining social problems,
to the much more ambitious aim of revealing the true nature of the state
and activity of society, and of defining the methods of control, and what
data should be collected.2
But again, it is not sufficient to simply assert that measurements of
the level of welfare are requirements for control: we must determine also
for what kinds of control level of welfare analysis (as a part of which we
may here understand social indicators as well) is applicable.
According to Bauman (1971: 22), most information gathering models rely
on the following assumption:
every system is interested in its own survival;
survival implies retaining its present structure unchanged;
constancy of the structure, which should be defended for the sake of
survival, foreordains a limited sum of constant »consummative)) goals;
constancy of the final goals provides the needed frame of reference for
determining the most beneficial shape of system-environment equi-
librium;
— all that is needed to achieve this equilibrium is an increase in the infor-
mation supply, and thus control over the environment by the system.
These assumptions seem to implicitly govern much of social indicator
1 Biderman (1966a: 135-136). The hierarchy is as follows:
impressionistic observations which are based on common-sense concepts;
impressionistic observations based on theoretical concepts;
the application of theoretical concepts in such systematic information-gathering pro-
cedures as an impressionistic survey;
unique, rigorous quantitative survey;
repeated, well-done survey;
statistical time-series collected administratively;
g. regular time-series collected specifically for the purpose.
2 See Springer (1970: 5-6), Partanen (1971: 58), Baudot (1969: 64), Toward a Social Report
(1969: xii) and Wilcox (1968: 58-59). In other words, that all the necessities of control axe
fulfilled by a social indicators system is explicitly acknowledged (see Baudot (1969: 41-43),
Bauer (1966: 8-11, 19)).
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analysis: what one is primarily interested in is not the welfare of the people
and their possibility to affect their destinies, but the stabilizing control
function of the decision-makers. Because for these purposes knowledge of
the condition of men is important, a need is discerned for such indicators.'
In figure 9.3.a, I have represented this model. The idea of such a model
is that the decision-makers, through the information they gather concerning
the conditions of the people, are
better equipped to guide the society, thus improving the people's welfare.
This is clearly a typical bureaucratic control model. Combined with the
actual conditions of society, the distribution of resources and power and
class divisions, we are confronted with an information system which best
serves those best able to influence society.2
The nature of the social indicator systems and their relationship to
the bureaucratic-control ideology is unwittingly exposed in the specifi-
cations social indicator theorists have given for the functioning and charac-
teristics of a system of social indicators. Bauer, for instance, prescribes
that social-indicator systems must fulfill the following requirements:
See Toward a Social Report (1969) for a good example, as Springer (1970: 12) has pointed
out.
2 See for instance Biderman (1966a: 131), who predicts that the utilization of social indicators
will result in the retention of power and influence in the hands of those who have previously
had the most. For an actual suggestion in this direction, see Smith (1971: 7-14), in which
he develops indicators to assess the political atmosphere of business, with the intention of
promoting international business. These indicators happen to be startlingly similar to those
suggested by many a well-intending indicator theorist.
Smith (1971): »For the business planner, the problem is one of finding indices with which
to compare polities in which the firm operates or proposes to enter . . . Quite as important
to the business planner, the systematic consideration of these parameters leads to a more
rigorous assessment of the political and social climate in which multi-national firms must
operate.))
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They would constitute regular time-series data for comparisons in
time and place.
They would include special mechanisms for the collection of information
about new developments not yet reflected in the regular time-series data.
3. They would be equipped with the means to convey the data quickly
and in an appropriate form to the organ whose responsibility the prob-
lem is (see Bauer 1966: 21). This has been given a finishing touch through
suggestions of a »watchog mechdanism», which would quickly reveal the
shortcomings of the system (see Biderman 1966b). This is obviously
intended to maximize the use of social indicators for the decision-
makers.'
A very good example of this attitude is to be found in the problem of
transparency mentioned by Baudot (1969: 63). This problem concerns the
opinion that decision-makers must keep certain information secret in
order to be able to act freely. Therefore, we must take care that social
indicators do not designate too easily or rapidly the directions of change
in society, nor the basic processes of change. This is a rather interesting
piece of analysis which revealingly denotes the bureaucratic control basis
of social indicators. In any democratic system, it is the basic requirement
of the social indicators that they clearly and sensitively indicate the
changes in society, i.e., work as a feedback system for the people, and
not merely as a tool for their manipulation by the decision-makers (see
also Roos 1972b). It is also rather naive (not to say irresponsible) to assume
that the career politician, or professional decision-maker — particularly
in competitive western capitalist society — would be endowed with such
an inherent sense of moral righteousness as to remain steadfastly dedicated
to promoting the welfare of the people while being more immediately
dependent upon interests directly conflicting with the goal of social welfare.2
The central problems relating toy social indicators are seen to be the
1 Requirements on a slightly more general level have been presented by many researchers,
including I-1j erppe — Niitamo (1971: 5 — 8), Baudot (1969: 62) , Etzioni — Lehman (1967: 2) ,
and Kamrany— Christakis (1970: 208— 209).
2 An interesting proof of how incredibly divorced from reality a decision-maker can be is
provided by Richard Nixon's television speech in Moscow on May 28, 1972. Simultaneously,
while this man is the Commander-in-Chief of a war machine that is responsible for the inten-
sive bombing of the whole Vietnam and the annihilation of hospitals, schools, bridges and
dams, allowing the use of inhuman 'anti-personnel' weaponry, and condones the My Lai
massacre and similar genocidal acts, he apparently expects people to be convinced of his
sincerity when he expresses a hope that there would come an end to such suffering as was
experienced by the legendary little Tanya during the Siege of Leningrad. Coming from the
mouth of a statesman to whom can more than likely be attributed more pain and anguish
than to any of his contemporaries, this speech borders on the realm of the absurd. One
cannot rationally expect that such a person could make a realistic assessment of any aspect of
social and political reality.
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following: It is not presently possible to quantify everything relevant to
welfare and possibly never will be, and the part currently quantifiable may
be very biased and impossible to compare. It is essentially a problem of
developing adequate, formalistic models of society. Thus one can immedi-
ately conclude that it is closely related to the bureaucratic control idea.
Quantification is essential so that the decision-makers could make optimal
decisions for the people themselves; for their self-guidance it is often not
so necessary.'
But some so cial indicator theorists do to some degree acknowledge the
danger of constructing social indicator systems solely in the service of
decision-makers.
Hjerppe—Niitamo (1971) call it a value danger, meaning by this the
fact that in social indicator systems, one starts from the values relating
to the existing system; i.e., the values of the men in power (also Baudot
1969 has a similar idea). Yet generally, this is not the case. This is also
related to the problem of flexibility in the social indicators systems. They
should react to changes in society, not only in the sense that they inform
decision-makers about sore spots, but in a broader sense, as in that of being
able to function against the decision-makers. This, however, is only impli-
citly recognized by Hjerppe and Niitamo.
It is clear that it should be possible to construct social indicator systems
which are relevant to (and which are connected to the idea of self-control
by) the members of the society. I shall subsequently make some suggestions
to this effect, but for the moment may it suffice to point out that practically
all social indicators theorists have implicitly or explicitly been interested
in social indicator systems which serve solely bureaucratic control, in my
use of the term. At best there have been attempts to build guarantees into
the systems ensuring that it could be used otherwise, but little or no analy-
sis has been endeavored concerning what basic underlying changes in the
social indicator system should be effected in order to achieve goals beyond
mere service to decision-makers.
Social indicators — as well as social control as an entirety — can be much
more efficiently used as a tool in the employ of the people themselves. It is not
their heuristics, nor simply more flexible solutions, rather it is the conscious
reformulation of the whole role of social information which will change the
nature of social indicators.
This is the question to which I shall now turn. There are some requisite
preliminary considerations: we are speaking of social information systems
in general, not solely of indicators of the level of living. This is justified
I See also Etzioni —Lehman (1967) who distinguish between partial quantification, indirect
quantification and formalistic-aggregative quantification. All these are related however
to the same problem, namely that of how to quantify as much and as well as possible.
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both by the analysis of the level of living and its nature, and also by the
analysis of the concept of welfare, which was seen to encompass the entirety
of the net of social activities. But at this point I will be emphasizing the
problems seen from the point of view of welfare analysis; i.e., problems
referring to the welfare-relevant conditions of men.
Above I have described the technocratic-bureaucratic model for using
social information (and science in general). Depending upon how we con-
ceive of the relationships between scientists, giving and analyzing social
information, and decision-makers, we are faced, on the one hand, with the
technocratic model or, on the other, with the strict separation of science
and politics. Most of the social indicator researchers have implicitly en-
dorsed the technocratic-type model, in which the analysis and dissemination
of social information is decisive for the control functions of the decision-
maker. As antithetical to this model might be regarded the »real» simple
democracy solution. In this model, social information gathering is com-
pletely eliminated and we have a system of direct democracy in which
the people themselves, through their political activity, express their needs
and the decision-makers exist for the simple and express purpose of ful-
filling their wishes (see fig. 9.2.b above). It is obvious that this model
presents the ideal political system for society. The democratic system
should work just in such a way that via its institutions people could express
all their needs and grievances, and all social information systems con-
centrating on the citizenry would be superfluous. The existing systems of
social information seem, in some sense, to be based upon this assumption.
Thus, in fact, we might consider the attempts at social indicator devel-
opment as an indirect admission of the failure of the democratic system
to respond sensitively to people's needs.'
Etzioni (1968: 626) has said that: »ultimately, there is no way for a
societal structure to discover the members' needs and adapt to them
without the participation of the members in shaping and reshaping the
structure.» In this I agree with Etzioni. But I am doubtful as to whether
the best solution is of the type envisaged by the 'social indicatorists'.
There are, however, some who think it realistic to attempt to »return»
to the real democracy model (see for instance, Toffler 1971: 428-432,
and Karapuu 1970).
In addition, it is of note, although obvious, that the model of soviet
democracy developed in the Soviet Union is clearly constructed with the
idea of real, responsive democracy in mind. Thus it was assumed that the
soviets at every level would actively supervise and express the need of
the proletariat and control the upper organs. (See Bukharin--Preobraz-
1 For an explicit recognition of this see Partanen (1971).
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hensky 1969). Thus the state planning function would be expressly that
of planning over things» and not over men. This is the probable explana-
tion of the very technical and economical character of the Soviet planning
system, in which questions of social welfare have obviously been relegated
to a less central position,1 as they are assumed to be attended to by the
people themselves, once the material requirements exist (this is of course
not strictly true, but it seems to be the general idea).
The real democracy model is, however, obviously inadequate. The
relationship between social control and welfare is infinitely more compli-
cated than a simple cause and effect process in which people express what
they need and which the system then supplies. There is no guarantee that
the best interests of the people would be secured, nor is there any assurance
that the development of the society would be in the correct direction. The
social consciousness does not develop spontaneously, it needs organi-
zation — »guidance». This is the area in which the social information sys-
tems, and science in general, have their main function — in the extension
of the consciousness of the people, in the successive development of social
consciousness (Bukharin 1969: 163).
One solution to the technocratic dilemma is the application of the
pragmatistic model suggested by Habermas (see above p. 214).
This model dictates that the gatherers and analysts of social information
not only supply the information desired by decision-makers, but also infor-
mation which is not necessarily required. But in this model, once again,
the object of the information is still ostracized from the decision process:
the welfare of the people is determined for them on a higher level, in dis-
cussions by scientists and policy-makers, who are both supposedly inter-
ested in the welfare of the object of control. This is, nonetheless, a step
forward from the technocratic model, in which information is given un-
critically in the interests of the decision-makers, and in their own language,
so to speak (see Etzioni 1971).
But a truly significant degree of progress would be represented by a
situation in which the gatherers and analysts of social information (i.e.,
usually social scientists) would also be involved in critical interaction with
the object of control, thus allowing it to be simultaneously the subject
of control, in other words, a subject using social information to control
the decision-makers (see Berndtson 1970: 27, Habermas 1971). This is
1 Another, parallel explanation has been provided by Academician Fedorenko (1972), which
refers to the fact that the building of adequate productive forces, i.e., the economic basis
of socialism which is the first task of socialism, is in itself relatively straightforward, and
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the 'hermeneutic' or 'emancipatory' solution, (see figure 9.3.b). The critical
interaction between policy-makers and scientists should be replaced largely
by critical interaction between scientists and the people, against the schemes
of high-level policy-makers, both private and public.
But even the emancipatory model is subject to further development,
into a model which we might call the augmented real-democracy model. In
this model the fundamental assumption is that political practice should,
in the final analysis, be that which decides the questions of welfare. But
this political practice should be scientific, in the sense distinguished above
when discussing the unity of science and politics. Thus we would have
a political system in which the people are aided by the scientific analysis
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The principal idea is that so well expressed by Bukharin (1969: 163):
»As the natural human organs, in the direct process of material production
in society, are 'extended', and by this extension, 'contrary to the Bible',
are enabled to embrace and manipulate a much greater material, so the
'extended' consciousness of human society is science, increasing its mental
compass and enabling it to grasp and consequently to better control, a greater
mass of phenomena.>>
What would be the consequences of the introduction of the augmented
democracy model for the relationships of social welfare and social policy?
It is obvious that systems of social indicators and information concerning
social welfare are needed, but these must be construed in conjunction
with social activity — through social praxis. Thus, instead of developing
large, centralized systems of information, we should perhaps attempt
to begin by developing small-scale, specialized information systems which
directly serve the people in their political activities.
In addition it should by now be apparent that information systems in
themselves are not a solution to our problem. One must assume a social
system quite different from the present, in order to imagine that the above
suggestion could be realized or be really fruitful.
The central questions of human welfare are not solved by models, by
bureaucrats, technocrats and scientists, they are solved by men themselves
— perhaps with the aid of social science — not through social indicators
or welfare measurements, but through changes in the social consciousness,
in the conscious activities of men to improve their lot.
Appendix 1. The Maximization of the Welfare Function
It is possible to undertake the maximization of the welfare function util-
izing two principal tools. The first is the classical method using calculus1,
and the second is via the methods of linear algebra and its derivatives,
programming, activity analysis, etc. 2 Here I shall employ the calculus
method, as the formalism in itself is not central to the main theme. It is
true that the Debreu-type analysis is much more efficient and avoids some
of the more unrealistic assumptions of the classical method, but the gains
accrued in this respect are not so marked as to necessitate such a method
in this context (see also Arrow—Scitovsky 1969: 5).
There are a few technical restrictions in the use of the calculus method,
1 Presented very elaborately by Lange (1969 (1952)), and instructively by Nath (1969),
which is used in the following.
2 The 'classical' presentation here is Debreu (1959), but see also Quirk— Saposnik (1968),
Lancaster (1968), and Baumol (1965: 4-11).
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such as the problems of the corner equilibria and the global maximum
(which can be found only by trial and error). There is no direct solution.
We can only define the conditions that the optimal points should fulfill;
the points themselves cannot be determined in general (Lancaster 1968:
20). Specifically, these problems are best solved by nonlinear programming
and related methods (Arrow— Scitovsky 1969: 5, Baumol 1965: 4-11).
Normally the classical solution is presented in three stages. First,
we consider the conditions required in production, then in exchange for
goods and lastly the general conditions for the whole economy.1
The so -- called production optimum is as follows (Nath 1969: 14):
the production function be
(A.1.1)	 Xi = Xi( Vi	 j= 1 ,	 m
We maximize it with respect to a good i with the other production
goods being constant: i.e., we have a situation that is exactly of the Pare-
tian type: it is not possible to increase any one good's production without
decreasing that of another good; this is the same principle applied in other
optima, as well.
(A.1.2)	 X h = X h (?) h ) = X h.°	 h= 1 ,...,i— 1,i+ 1 ,...,n
From the above equations we have
(A.1.3)	 Xi = xi	 . . .	 consumers, n goods
= 1 , . . . , n
(A.1.4)	 V. =	 . . .	 s	 producers, m kinds of labor,
= 1 . . .
i.e., Xi is the total consumption of the ith good and	 Vi is the total
amount of the jth kind of labor.
Also we require that
(A.1.5)
	 vii	 . . .	 yin = V.?
We maximize
(A.1.6.)	 0 = X i (vii ) +	 h(X
 h(V
 h)	 XI)t)	 111j((v j + • • •
	
v.in) -
i  h,	 j-=1,...,m
where 2,, and ,ui are Lagrange coefficients. We have a constrained opti-
mum problem where maximization is realized keeping X h° and Vi° constant.
1 These in effect include the first two groups of conditions, but it is more elucidating to
separate them.
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We differentiate G (take the partial derivatives with respect to the
production inputs) and set the partial derivatives equal to zero, and then
solve the system of equations with respect to 2, and pi , and get
ax i lavii 	axhiavi,	 i ,h = 1, .	 n	 i	 h
OXildvki	aXhlavkh	 j ,k = 1 , .	 m	 j	 k
This is the production optimum.
The next stage is the exchange optimum (Nath 1969: 16-18) in which
the consumer's utility functions are maximized (in a Paretian sense).
Let the utility function of the gth individual be
(A.1.8)	 ug = ug(xy , v1)	 i	 1 , . . . , n
j= 1 , . . . , m
which is maximized while keeping other utility functions constant at an
arbitrary level, repeating this for all individuals.
(A.1.9)	 Ur = Ur (x:: , vri )	 r= 1 , . . . , g-1,g+ 1 , . . . , s
— ur°
and
(A.1.10)	 . . .	 =
(A.1.11)	 +...+	 	 =
Next is formed the function
(A.1.12)	 H = Ug(xf ,	 + 2,(Ur(xr, , vrj )	 Ur')
. . .	 xsi ) — X?) + ni ((vj	 . . .	 v.si ) —
g,r=1,..., s; gr
which is maximized in a manner identical to the G of (A.1.6) to get




In the above equations, (A.1.7), (A.1.13) and (A.1.14) have been given
the conditions for optimal production and consumption. Next it must
be assured that this is true simultaneously. In this we shall utilize the
transformation) curve, which is the path of those points where the pro-
,





i ,h = 1 ,	 n; i	 h
j , k = 1 ,	 j	 k
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(A.1.15)	 11(xl,	 , xi,;	 v 1 ,	 ,	 v.) = 0
The total optimum (or top-level optimum, among other labels, Nath
1969: 18-20) is reached when the individual utility functions are maxi-
mized under the given efficient transformation curve. Because the optimum
under question is a Pareto optimum, it is again sufficient to maximize
one utility function at a time while keeping others constant. In addition
the two familiar conditions are given
(A.1.16)	 xi	 . . .	 = X°
(A.1.17)
Next is developed the formulation
L = Ug(xf ,	 + 2,.(Ur(xri , vrj) — Ur()
.	 x i) 	 X?) + vj((vj	 . . .	 v;)
+,(T(oel, • . ,	 x.; v, , . . . , v.))
g,r=1,...,s;g0r
to get the conditions for total optimum:
(A.1.19)
	 augiaxf	 auriax:	 aTlaxi
aUglaxf,	 aUrlax;",	 OTIaxh






	 j1 , . . . , m
All of the above conditions may be presented as one equation system
without separating the three groups of conditions but as a separation it
is clearly more illustrative (cf Lange 1969).
Appendix 2. The Proof of the Arrow Impossibility Theorem
In the following I will present a proof of the original Arrow theorem (cor-
rected) utilizing the Arrow (1963) proof, the Luce—Raiffa (1957) version
and the Quirk—Saposnik (1968) proof.1
1 Some other proofs are also available, such as the Vickrey version (1960), and Fishburn's
proof based on the finity of the members of society (1970c). I shall not follow this line of
reasoning, although it may interest some. Recently, Sen (1970) has presented a very simple
and efficient proof.
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The proof is based on the concept of a decisive set with respect to a
pair of alternatives (x , y) . By a decisive set, V , is meant a subset of the
members of society such that for all i E V , when xPiy , then for the
society: xPy .
The proof is in four stages.
First we see that the members of society form a decisive set with respect
to all pairs of alternatives (this is the weak Pareto-optimality).
Because there exists a decisive set for all pairs of alternatives, then
there is a smallest decisive set with respect to all pairs of alternatives,
i.e., a set with at least as many members as in any other decisive set .
If the decisive set only contains one individual, this individual is a
dictator, i.e., decisive for all pairs of alternatives, in violation of con-
dition five.
Lastly we find that any decisive set with two or more members con-
tains a smaller decisive set, which concludes the proof, as there is no
social ordering which simultaneously satisfies conditions one through
five.
The ensuing proof, then, is rather simple in principle. The only alter-
native that would prevent the decisive set from containing only one indi-
vidual is to impose social ordering, which is in violation of the fourth
condition.
First we must prove that
(x)(y) {[(j) xPiy]---> xPy}
From condition 4, it follows that not all preference profiles lead to yRx ,
so for some profiles, xPy . Assume that xPy . The preference profile
is changed in such a way that for all individuals j , xPy . From con-
dition two, it follows that this cannot change the social ordering xPy ,
so the society is a decisive set for all pairs of alternatives.
Because there exists a decisive set, there exists a smallest decisive set.
3. If the smallest decisive set contains only one individual k , then we
can show that this individual is decisive for all pairs of alternatives,
i.e., a dictator.
Assume that S = {x , y , z} , and that every other individual in the
society except k has identical preferences. Assume that k is decisive for
alternatives x and y i.e., xPky -->- xPy . The next step is to show that
k is decisive also with respect to alternative z . Let us assume that xPkyPkz
and determine the possible resultant orderings.
k	 others	 proof that xPyPz
xyz	 xyz	 by unanimity
xyz	 yzx	 xPy by assumption (k decisive)
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yPz by unanimity
xPz by transitivity
xyz	 xzy	 xPy by assumption
xPz by unanimity.
yPz? Assume that the ordering of k were changed to yxz . From
condition three this does not change the ordering between y and z . But
then yPx & xPz yPz (k decisive). Because yPz when k's ordering
is yxz , then from condition three it follows that yPz when k's ordering
is xyz
xyz
	 zyx	 xPy by assumption
xPz by condition three and case two: if others' preferences are yzx --->-
xPz . When zyx , this cannot change the order; i.e., xPz .
yPz follows from condition three and case three in the same manner.
The next case is when the others' preferences are zxy . Then xPy
by assumption. xPz by condition three and case two, yPz by condition
three and case two.
When the others' preference ordering is yxz , then xPy by assumption,
xPz and yPz by unanimity.
We have now covered all alternatives. And the result is that k is decisive
over all alternatives if he is decisive over one pair of alternatives; in other
words, he is a dictator. This result can easily be extended over n alter-
natives and for R . We can also show that the result follows even if others'
preferences are not identical.- For one example, assume that for k , xyz
and for other members of the society all other possibilities prevail: xyz ,
yzx , xzy, zyx , zxy and yxz . Then by assumption xPy . Assume that
zPy (against k's preferences). We raise z in relation to y (condition two).
By condition three the social ordering depends only on the orderings of z
and y . If we change the others' orderings to zyx , then zPy must obtain.
This is in contradiction with case four above. Therefore k is decisive even
if preferences differ.
Because the smallest decisive set cannot contain one member (which
would be against condition five), we must assume that it contains two or
more individuals. Let V 1 be any member of this set and V, contain
the rest of the members, i.e.,
V 1 U V 2 = V
Assume that the ordering of V 1 is xyz and V, , yzx . Because V is
decisive, the unanimous preferences of V 1 and V 2 are always equivalent
to the preference of the society. Assume that other members of the society
have an unanimous ordering of zxy . The social ordering is yPz because
V 1 and V 2 are unanimous. If xPz , V 1 would be decisive between these
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two states because for V2 yzx is true as well as for the others. Therefore
we must have at least zRx as V1 cannot be decisive. But then V 2 i s
decisive between x an y because both V 1 and the others prefer x to y ,
whereas V2 prefers y to x , and by transitivity yPx . Therefore V2
is a smaller decisive set than V , which is contrary to the assumption that
V is the smallest decisive set. Thus we have established the Arrow theorem.
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